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UNESCO, PALESTINE AND ARCHAEOLOGY IN CONFLICT
DAVID KEANE AND VALENTINA AZAROV

I.

INTRODUCTION

On 23 November 2011, Palestine became a member of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"), and acceded to
and ratified a number of UNESCO's Conventions.' Some observers view this
membership as decisive, or at least significantly dispositive, in the debate on the
international recognition of Palestinian statehood. UNESCO is characterized as a
springboard by which Palestine can further recognition of its international
sovereignty, which, at the present time, is inexorably stalled. However, this
recognition is not without challenge-for example, the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court has not recognized Palestine's acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction. 3 UNESCO has, in turn, descended into a budgetary crisis
with the withdrawal of funding from the U.S. and other states, which represent
twenty-two percent of its budget. In February 2012, UNESCO responded to this
crisis with a plan to "re-engineer" the organization, implicitly confirming that it
will not allow any revocation of the Palestinian membership vote,5 despite a
campaign to "un-admit" Palestine.6 This paper analyzes the legal consequences of

** Mr. Keane is a Senior Lecturer in Law, Middlesex University, London; Ms. Azaraov is a Lecturer in
Human Rights and International Law, Al-Quds Bard College, Al-Quds University, Palestine. The
authors would like to thank Shane Darcy and Michael Kearney for their comments. The authors assume
all responsibility for the content cited in this paper. Please direct comments to d.p.keane@mdx.ac.uk;
valentinaazarov@gmail.com.
1. Palestine,UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, http:

//www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/worldwide/arab-states/Palestine (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
2. William A. Schabas, Relevant DepositaryPractice of the Secretary-Generaland Its Bearing
on PalestinianAccession to the Rome Statute, PHD STUDIES INHUMAN RIGHTS (Nov. 3, 2011), http://
humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/20 11/11 /relevant-depositary-practice-of.html.
3. Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine, INT'L CRIM. CT. 11 5-7 (Apr. 3, 2012)
[hereinafter Situation in Palestine],available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB94FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine0304l2ENG.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger & Scott Sayare, UNESCO Accepts Palestinians as Full Members,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at A8. Canada, which contributes about $10 million to UNESCO per year,
also withdrew UNESCO funds. Canada Won't Cover UNESCO Budget Gaps, CBC NEWS: WORLD
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/201 1/11/01 /palestinians-un-agencies-unesco.html.
5. Director-General of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
FinancialSituation of the Organizationand its Implicationsfor the Implement of Document 36 C/5, 1 2,
U.N. Doc. 189 EX/15 (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002152/2152
02e.pdf.
6. See, e.g., JIM ZANOTITI, U.S. FOREIGN AID TO THE PALESTINIANS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2223 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf
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Palestine's membership in UNESCO and its ratification of UNESCO conventions
through an examination of the protections afforded by the UNESCO treaty
framework governing cultural, amongst other forms of, heritage. This is
particularly relevant as Palestine's application for UNESCO membership took
place in the context of what are termed the Palestinian U.N. initiatives, intended to
further Palestine's status and activate its rights as a state in the international legal
order.7 The initiatives manifested in a resolution adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly on 29 November 2012 "upgrading" Palestine's observer status.
For more than a century, Palestinian cultural heritage and property has been
the subject of capture and destruction by other states. Palestine's accession to
various UNESCO conventions testifies to the effect that no other sovereign
controls its cultural heritage and property. Palestinians have habitually asserted
internationally-recognized principles as a point of departure in "final status"
negotiations on what is termed the "archaeology file," 9 yet have been unable to
maintain complete control of such property. Ahmad A. Rjoob of the Palestinian
Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities describes Palestinian cultural heritage as "one
of the most intensively abused, excavated and subsequently disturbed
worldwide," 10 a result of more than a century of management from different
administrations, each with its own methods of research and distinct political
purpose. "The Palestinian Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities and Israeli sources
estimate that between 1967 and 1992 about 200,000 artifacts were removed from
the occupied Palestinian territory annually," with approximately 120,000 removed
each year since 1995.11 This hemorrhaging of Palestinian cultural property is
occurring in a context where archaeology has been used by Israel "as a pretext to
gain territorial control" and exercise sovereign rights "over Palestinian lands [in
order] to further its settlement enterprise" and exploit natural resources.12
7. See Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the
OccupiedPalestinianTerrority, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 551, 552 (2005). The aim of the initiatives is
to end Israel's unlawful advancement of sovereignty claims over territory beyond its borders. See also
Oma Ben-Naftali, PathoLA Wgical Occupation: Normalizing the Exceptional Case of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and Other Legal Pathologies, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 129, 149-57 (Oma Ben-Naftali ed., 2011).
8. G.A. Res. 67/28, M 1-2, 4, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/L.28 (Nov. 26, 2012). The resolution,
adopted by a majority of 138-9 with 41 countries abstaining, granted the State of Palestine "nonmember state status" in the United Nations. G.A. Res. 69/17, % 1-2, 4-6, U.N. Doc A/RES/67/19 (Nov.
29, 2012).
9. Gabriel Fahel, RepatriatingPalestinianPatrimony: An Overview of PalestinianPreparations
for Negotiationson Archaeology, 2 PRESENT PASTS 19 (2010), available at http://www.presentpasts.in
fo/article/view/pp. 19/41.
10. Ahmed A. Rjoob, Contested Management of ArchaeologicalSites in the Hebron District, 2
PRESENT PASTS 24 (2010), available at http://www.presentpasts.info/article/view/pp.24/36.
11. Fahel, supra note 9.
12. Id. For instance, in a recent judgment the Israeli Supreme Court upheld Israel's right as an
occupier to exploit the stone quarries in the Palestinian territory without limits, allowing Israel to sell
and use the product of exploitation on the private Israeli market. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din v. Commander
of the Israeli Forces in the West Bank, at 19 [2011] (Isr.), available at http://www.yeshdin.org/userfiles/file/%D7%94%D7%9BD7%A8%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%AA%20%D7%93%D7%
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Section II traces the history of archaeological laws and practices in Palestine,
from the Ottoman era to contemporary Israeli military orders. Section III
examines the rules governing the protection of cultural property during military
occupation under the aegis of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,' 3 and the consequences of future
Palestinian ratification of the Convention and its 1999 Second Protocol.14 Section
IV tracks the illicit trade in antiquities from Palestine, and the potential effects that
ratification of two instruments would have on regulation and restitutionparticularly, the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property,' 5 and 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects.' 6 Section V focuses on the underwater cultural heritage off the
coast of Gaza and the maritime zones of legal control granted by the 2001
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, the first
international treaty that Palestine has ratified.' 7 Finally, Section VI assesses the
consequences of UNESCO membership, including whether membership of a U.N.
agency means that Palestine can ratify instruments outside of UNESCO's
competence.
II.

DOMESTIC LAW AND ARCHAEOLOGY

The era of Byzantine pilgrimage to the Middle East saw church officials
encourage the acquisition of relics, and "[b]y the end of the fourth century C.E.,
the export . . . of relics . . . had reached enormous proportions."

8

This Christian

interest, which spanned the Muslim conquest from the 7th century C.E. onwards,
gave way to a secular interest in the region with the "growth of antiquarianism in
the 18th century."' 9 In this period virtually all areas of archaeological concern
were under Ottoman rule. 20 Regulations on antiquities were first issued in 1869,21

99%D7%9F/psak.pdf. The principal basis for the Court's rationale was a "dynamic" interpretation of
the usufruct rule, enshrined in Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Id. at 5-19.
13. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
14. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769 [hereinafter 1999 Second Protocol].
15. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of. Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO
Convention].
16. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention].
17. Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Paris, Nov. 2, 2001, 41
I.L.M. 40 (entered into force Mar. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Underwater Heritage Convention].
18. Morag M. Kersel, The Trade in Palestinian Antiquities, 33 JERUSALEM Q. 21, 21-24 (2008)
[hereinafter Kersel, The Trade in PalestinianAntiquities].
19. Id. at 23.
20. G. R. H. Wright, Archaeology and Islamic Law in Ottoman Cyprus, in CYPRUS INTHE 19TH
CENTURY AD: FACT, FANCY AND FICTION 261, 261-67 (Veronica Tatton-Brown ed., 2001).
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and the Ottoman rulers enacted an Antiquities Law in 1874 (Asari-Atika),
including provisions that have subsequently become canonical in the legal
protection of antiquities.22 Prior to this there is no record of a sui generis
antiquities law for Ottoman territories, with the exception of particular or
individual archaeological activity regulated via an imperial decree, orfirman, from
the Sultan.23 In 1884, a further law "established national patrimony over all
artifacts in the Ottoman Empire" and required excavation permits. It deemed all
artifacts discovered "the property of the National Museum in Constantinople" and
prohibited their export without its permission.24 These laws were undermined by
the lack of enforcement to prevent widespread ransacking of ancient tombs and
other forms of illicit digging. As one observer noted, "under Turkish rule
everything was prohibited; but everything was possible."25
The territorial shape of Palestine, long left undefined, was determined by the
archaeologists of the Survey of Western Palestine,2 6 sponsored by the Londonbased Palestine Exploration Fund and published in 1880. The introduction to the
Survey notes that it contains "all the information that is usually found in a
topographical map," 27 and it would form the contours of the post-World War I
British Mandate over Palestine. 28 The Mandate Period oversaw the establishment
of the Palestine Archaeological Museum and the Department of Antiquities of
Palestine in 1920.29 The antiquities law was re-drafted and the resultant
Antiquities Ordinance of 1920-re-issued in 1929 30 -replaced the existing 1884
21. Nicholas Stanley-Price, The Ottoman Law on Antiquities (1874) and the Founding of the
Cyprus Museum, in CYPRUS IN THE 19TH CENTURY AD: FACT, FANCY AND FICTION 267, 267-72
(Veronica Tatton-Brown ed., 2001).
22. Wright, supra note 20, at 265. Its provisions included vesting of all antiquities in the state,
establishment of a responsible department, no excavation without a permit, proper recording of finds
and no export without special permission.
23. Id. at 263.
24. Kersel, The Trade in PalestinianAntiquities, supranote 18, at 24 (arguing that the 1884 Law
"could be construed as legalized cultural imperialism-motivated by the Ottoman Empire's desire to
appropriate material from its territories rather than for the preservation of the archaeological legacy of
the region").
25. Shimon Gibson, British ArchaeologicalInstitutions in Mandatory Palestine 1917-1948, 131
PALESTINE EXPLORATION Q. 115, 136 (1999).
26. Neil Asher Silberman, Structuring the Past: Israelis,Palestiniansand the Symbolic Authority
of Archaeological Monuments, in THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF ISRAEL: CONSTRUCTING THE PAST,
INTERPRETING THE PRESENT 62, 67 (Neil Asher Silberman & David Small eds., 1997).
27. Trelawney Saunders, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEY OF WESTERN PALESTINE: ITS
WATERWAYS, PLAINS, & HIGHLANDS 4-5 (1881) (noting that "[w]ithout such a map of the country as
the [Palestine Exploration] Fund has produced, the student of the History of Palestine, sacred and
profane, ancient, medieval and modem alike, had to grope about in the midst of uncertainty.").
28. A 1918 Memorandum on Ancient Sites and Military Operations in Palestine from the
chairman of the Palestine Exploration Fund to the Secretary of State for War emphasized that "many of
the ancient sites may turn out to be strategic points of vantage in the military operations of today." See
Gibson, supra note 25, at 126-27.
29. Id. at 115.
30. GEORGE HILL, TREASURE TROVE IN LAW AND PRACTICE: FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE
PRESENT DAY 270 (1936); Kersel, The Trade in PalestinianAntiquities, supra note 18, at 26.
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Ottoman law, representing a "more relaxed legislation that allowed for flexibility
in the export of antiquities." 3' The Antiquities Ordinance would subsequently
become the basis for the Israeli and Jordanian Antiquities Laws,32 with the latter
being used as its legal basis by the contemporary Department of Antiquities of the
Palestine Authority. 33
The Antiquities Ordinance laid down that "all antiquities whether of a
moveable character or fixed in the soil which shall be hereafter discovered shall be
deemed to be the property of the Government," meaning the Civil Government of
Palestine, 34 but afforded provisions for a "fair division" of finds between the
Palestine Museum and foreign institutions undertaking excavations.35 This was the
result of intense lobbying by the British archaeological establishment to implement
more liberal antiquities laws in territories under British dominion and in stark
contrast to comparable legislation in European states.36 After the establishment of
the State of Israel in May 1948:
[T]he West Bank came under the guardianship of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan while the Gaza Strip was administrated by Egypt,
and the Antiquities Ordinance of 1929 remained in effect in both places.
Then in 1966 the temporary Antiquities Law .

.

. was enacted by the

Kingdom of Jordan and imposed on the West Bank. This law declared
that antiquities are considered the national property of [Jordan]....
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Ministry of Tourism and
Antiquities in 1994, the Ministry . . . has drafted its own version of a
national antiquities law . . . [which has yet to be] enacted. . . . [As a

result] the Jordanian Antiquities Law of 1966 is still applicable in the
Palestinian Territories today.37
Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967,
Israel governed the territory through the military's commander and civil
administration, as it was the Occupying Power. The law that came to apply in the
Palestinian territory under the rule of the Israeli occupier was an amalgamation of
the old Ottoman and Jordanian law, some existing Palestinian law, and
predominantly military legislation issued by the Israeli military commander and

31. MAGNUS T. BERNHARDSSON, RECLAIMING A PLUNDERED PAST: ARCHAEOLOGY AND NATION
BUILDING IN MODERN IRAQ 124 (2005),

32. The contemporary legal antiquities trade in Israel is discussed in Section IV infra. See also
Kersel, The Trade in Palestinian Antiquities, supra note 18, at 26 ("[T]he definition of buying and
selling of artefacts is clearly spelled out [in the Antiquities Ordinance] . . . with a basic definition of 'to
deal' . . . [and] guidelines for obtaining licenses to deal in and export antiquities," with many of these
requirements in force in the current trade in Israel.).
33. Gibson, supra note 25, at 131.
34. Id. at 137.
35. Id. (citing Chapter V, Clause 30 of the Antiquities Ordinance 1920).
36. BERNHARDSSON, supra note 31, at 126.
37. Salah H. Al-Houdalieh, ArchaeologicalHeritage and Related Institutions in the Palestinian
National Territories 16 Years After Signing the Oslo Accords, 2 PRESENT PASTS 20 (2010), availableat
http://www.presentpasts.info/article/view/pp.20.
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used to control a long list of areas of Palestinian daily life under occupation.
"[R]esponsibility for archaeology transferred to two Israeli Staff Officers for
Archaeology (SOAs): one for the Gaza Strip and another for the West Bank
excluding East Jerusalem."38
The archaeological legal framework remained largely intact with crucial
modifications through military orders aimed at licensing, excavations, and the
trade in antiquities.39 "Military orders are decrees issued by the military
commander" which become law for every Palestinian living in the area
immediately upon issuance. 40 For archaeology, "[t]he most important was Military
Order No. 119 of 1967, which revoked many of the principles of [the British
Mandate Antiquities Ordinance]" and placed responsibility for antiquities under
military officials. 41 According to this "Order Concerning Law Of Antiquities," all
appointments made or jurisdiction granted by the Jordanian government pertaining
to the management of antiquities were cancelled, and responsibilities transferred to
the Israeli official-in-charge, who could enact new orders where needed. 42
The SOA, or, the Staff Officer for Archaeology in the Civil Administration, is
the Israeli army officer in charge of archaeology in the occupied West Bank. The
position was held for some twenty-five years by Dr. Yitzhak Magen, which led one
archaeologist to call the post "a lifetime appointment, completely without
precedent in the Israeli public service."43 It has been described as "[a] professional
body by character . .. headed by a civilian who is an expert in the field, but who
operates within an army framework, such as the Civil Administration, and on the
basis of military orders."44 Since "[i]nternational law prohibits archaeological digs
in occupied territories, other than rescue digs, and the findings may not be
removed from those territories . . . [the SOA] holds sole responsibility for all

archaeological matters beyond the Green Line." 45
Almost immediately following the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian territory, archaeological surveys were conducted in the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.46 The SOA is the only authority that can issue

38. Rjoob, supra note 10.
39. Id.
40. NEvE GORDON, ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION 27 (2008). See also DAvID KRETZMER, THE
OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 27-29
(2002).
41. Hamdan Taha, The Current State of Archaeology in Palestine, 2 PRESENT PASTS 17 (2010),
available at http://www.presentpasts.info/article/view/pp.17/34.
42. Study Guide: Israeli Military Orders in Use in Adjacent Palestinian Occupied Territories,
ISRAEL LAW RESOURCE CENTER (Feb. 2007), http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/Israelmilitar
yorders/studyguide/sgmol htm.
43. Meron Rapoport, Buried Treasure That's Kept in the Dark, HAARETZ (Dec. 17, 2006),
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/buried-treasure-that-s-kept-in-the-dark-1.207435.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. NADIA
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excavation licenses, and the vast majority of these it issues to itself.47 Further, it
oversees and conducts the excavations and selectively publishes results in its inhouse publications. 48 The SOA has not been subordinated to the Israel Antiquities
Authority. 49 The result "is that the SOA has become an autonomous, highly
centralized unit."50 In particular, these military orders give the SOA "a free hand
to conduct excavations, confiscate land and transfer objects throughout the West
Bank without oversight by anyone in the occupation authority,"5 1 with the result
that hundreds of excavations in the occupied Palestinian territory were authorized.
Rjoob highlights the opacity of the SOA's activities:
No one knows where excavations are taking place or the whereabouts of
finds. There is no obligation to report archaeological activities, or if
there is, it is a selective choice based on the excavator's whim or the
aims and priorities of the SOA. As a result, most archaeological
excavations in the West Bank do not have publications. 52
Under the 1995 PLO-Israel Interim Agreements, known as the Oslo
Accords, 53 "the Palestinian Authority took over responsibility for archaeology in
Areas 'A' and 'B', representing about 40% of the Occupied Palestinian territories,"
the first time the Palestinians could control part of their own cultural heritage.54
While the powers and responsibilities over archaeology in some parts of Area C
were to be transferred to Palestinian institutions, with the goal of eventually
including all of the West Bank and Gaza, this arrangement has never been
implemented.55 All excavations in Area C-more than sixty percent of the West
Bank-have been conducted under the SOA, with ninety-five percent of these
conducted by the SOA himself.56 According to Rafi Greenberg, overall some
"1,100 excavation permits were issued for digs . . . at 700 sites in the West Bank,

47. RAPHAEL GREENBERG & ADI KEINAN, ISRAELI ARCHAEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY IN THE WEST

BANK 1967-2007: A SOURCEBOOK 6 (2009).
48. Id.
49. Rapoport, supra note 43. The Israeli Antiquities Authority was established by the Antiquities
Authority Law of 1989, which repealed the earlier Antiquities Law of 1978. See also Nidal Sliman, The
Protectionof CulturalProperty in OccupiedEast Jerusalem:ArchaeologicalExcavations and Removal
of Cultural Property, in XXXV THESAURUS AcROASIUM: MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL

LAw 341, 353 (Kalliopi Koufa ed., 2007).
50. GREENBERG & KEINAN, supranote 47, at 6 n.1.
51. Rjoob, supranote 10.
52. Id.
53. What was the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement?, PRoCoN.oRG (2013), http://israelipalestinian.pr
ocon.org/view.answers.php?questionlD=000439.
The Agreements codify a set of practical
arrangements for the daily administration of the occupied territory by the Israeli military government
and the Palestinian Authority, a body of the PLO created for this purpose. As such, their
implementation must be in line with the international law of belligerent occupation. Eyal Benvenisti,
Responsibilityfor the Protectionof Human Rights Under the Interim Israeli-PalestinianAgreements, 28
ISR. L. REV. 297, 297-98 (1994). See also Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and SelfDetermination,4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 564, 564 (1994).
54. Rjoob, supra note 10.
55. Taha, supranote 41.
56. Rjoob, supranote 10.
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not including East Jerusalem," and were largely without documentation of any
kind, which exists for only approximately fifteen percent of the digs.
Consequently, he describes Israel's behavior in the territories as "an archaeological
heart of darkness." 58
Archaeology has been, and continues to be, used as a pretext for the
procurement of territory. The presence of archaeological or biblical sites is used to
For
justify confiscating Palestinian lands and building illegal settlements."
example, the construction of the road leading to the illegal settlement outpost
Migron was based on the licensing of an archaeological dig.60 Land next to the
Palestinian village of Susiya Al-Qadime was confiscated on the pretext of
archaeological digs and a settlement established nearby, when a 4th century
synagogue was uncovered by Israeli excavations in the 1970s. 6 1 The occupation
authorities declared the area to be an archaeological park, expelling local residents
from their land who live in tents on a hill between the settlement and the
archaeological park.62 The Palestinians who were barred from accessing the Ein
Al-Kis freshwater spring near the village of Nabi Saleh, on the unfounded grounds
that it was an archaeological site, petitioned the Israeli High Court together with
the rights group Yesh Din, whose attorney noted that: "The authorities are using
archaeological claims as an excuse to prevent the petitioners from accessing their
lands-based on considerations that have nothing to do with archaeology." 63
An independent Palestinian approach to archaeology, considered today to be
"surviving, if not thriving," began in the late 1970s.6 The Palestinian Department
of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage, re-established in 1994, is considered to be a
revival of the Department of Antiquities that was established in 1920 under the
British Mandate and terminated by the political events of 1948.65 A number of
excavations have been carried out, including collaborations with foreign experts
and institutions.66 Due to the different sets of existing archaeological legislation
inherited by the Department, it is presently working on a draft of the Law of
Cultural Heritage, which "resituates the archaeology of Palestine within the

57. Rapoport, supra note 43.
58. Id.
59. Adel H. Yahya, Looting and "Salvaging" the Heritage of Palestine, 2 PRESENT PASTs 26
(2010), availableat http://www.presentpasts.info/article/view/pp.26.
60. Migron - Timeline ofan Illegal Outpost, PEACE Now, http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/m
igron-timeline-illegal-outpost (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
61. Nadia Abu-Zahra, IDs and Territory: Population Control for Resource Expropriation, in
WAR, CITIZENSHIP, TERRITORY 303, 322 (Deborah Cowen & Emily Gilbert eds., 2008).
62. See also Ehud Krinis, David Shulman & Neve Gordon, Facing an Imminent Threat of
Expulsion, COUNTERPUNCH (June 22-24, 2007), http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/06/22/facing-animminent-threat-of-expulsion/.
63. Tovah Lazaroff, Court Asked to Ensure Palestinian Farmers' Water Access, JERUSALEM
POST, http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=199822&R=R3 (last updated Dec. 17, 2010,
01:14 PM).
64. GREENBERG & KEINAN, supra note 47, at 7.

65. Taha, supra note 41.
66. GREENBERG & KEINAN, supra note 47, at 7.
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universe of the international discipline." 67 At the same time the priority is to
combat the looting of archaeological sites during occupation, hundreds of which
continue to be plundered to service the active illegal trade in cultural property, 68 as
well as potentially setting the ground for a legal trade in antiquities in Palestine,
although this issue is undecided.69
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARCHAEOLOGY

Israeli involvement in the management of Palestine's cultural heritage since
the occupation of the Palestinian territory in 1967 has been intense, requiring
investigation in terms of its compliance with international humanitarian law. The
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict and its First Protocol ("1954 Hague Convention"), 70 much of
which constitutes customary international law, 7' complements and reinforces the
protection afforded to cultural property by the laws of war found in the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention and 1907 Hague Regulations. 72 "The prohibition on
pillage of cultural property is lex specialis to the general prohibition of pillage" in
Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, intended to encompass affirmative
duties of the Occupying Power to prevent private groups and individuals from
undertaking such acts.73 The provisions on the protection of private and public
property in occupied territory also includes the "property of the communes, that of
religious, charitable, and educational institutions, and those of arts and science,"
and strictly prohibit all forms of its use, save for temporary requisitioning of
movable property.74 The protection framework, defined in Article 4 of the 1954
Hague Convention, requires that State Parties ensure respect for cultural property

67.
68.
69.
70.
Conflict,

Taha, supra note 41.
Id.
Kersel, The Trade in PalestinianAntiquities, supra note 18, at 32.
First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter First Protocol].

71. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS

&

LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,

CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAw, VOLUME 1: RULES 129 (2005). The annotated supplement to the U.S. Naval
Handbook holds that, whilst the U.S. is not a party to the 1954 Hague Convention, it considers it to
reflect customary law. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS 297-305 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) [hereinafter U.S. NAVAL
HANDBOOK], available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo3917/Naval-War-College-vol-73.pdf.
72. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 52-53, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I].
73. YUTAKA ARAi-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

LAW 246-47 n.28 (2009).
74. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 55-56,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention 1949]; Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 53, 55-56, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat, 2277
[hereinafter Hague Regulations 1907]; Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its Annex arts. 53, 56, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779 [hereinafter Hague Regulations 1899];
ARAi-TAKAHASHI, supranote 73, at 247-48.
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by shielding what is a broadly defined category of property from attacks and other
uses "which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage," unless "military
necessity imperatively requires such a waiver."75 It further requires the
"prohibit[ion], prevent[ion] and [cessation]" of any acts of "vandalism directed
against . . . cultural property."76

It has been supplemented by the enhanced

protection regime in the 1999 Second Protocol. 7
Israel is a party to the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol,78 but is
not a party to the 1999 Second Protocol. The International Court of Justice has
affirmed the applicability of international humanitarian and human rights law
conventions to which Israel is a party, including the Fourth Geneva Convention
and the 1954 Hague Convention, to its activities in the Palestinian territory.79
Despite Israel's obligations under these instruments, since 1967, and especially
during the Palestinian uprising in 2000, Israel has damaged and destroyed
Palestinian historical, cultural and religious sites throughout the occupied
Palestinian territory.80 For instance, the Israeli military operations in the Old City
of Nablus in 2002 resulted in extensive damage of cultural heritage, including
structures dating to the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman eras.81 Sliman notes that
Jerusalem is a particularly stark example, including the past "seizure of historical
and religious buildings, such as the Palestinian Archaeological Museum" and the
razing of the Moroccan Quarter in the old city, which echoed the destruction of the
Jewish Quarter by Jordanian forces in 1948.82
A number of continuing projects, administered by the Israel Antiquities
Authority, are a source of serious concern among archaeologists. The agreement

75. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 13, arts. 4(l)-(2).
76. Id. art. 4(3).
77. See JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY INTHE EVENT OF ARMED 236-41
(2006) (providing an account of the range of UNESCO initiatives that led to the drafting of the 1999
Second Protocol).
78. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 13; Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention,
UNESCO.ORG, http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E&order-chrono
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013); Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event ofArmed Conflict, UNESCO.ORG, http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO-15391&an
guage=E&order-alpha (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
79. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, % 89, 101 (July 9).
80. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Shieldedfrom Scrutiny: IDF
Violations in Jenin and Nablus, at 57-58, Al Index MDE 15/143/2002 (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter
Amnesty Int'l, Israel], available at www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDEl5/143/2002/en/c4ef6642d7bc-lldd-b4cd-01eb52042454/mdel51432002en.pdf. See also Destruction of Palestinian Cultural
Heritage: The Old City of Nablus, NEGOTIATIONS AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT: PALESTINE LIBERATION

ORGANIZATION (2013), http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=69 (estimating damage at $54
million USD).
81. Amnesty Int'l, Israel,supranote 80, at 57.
82. Sliman, supra note 49, at 354. See also Thomas Abowd, The Moroccan Quarter:A History of
the Present,7 JERUSALEM Q. 6, 8 (2000), available at http://www.jerusalemquarterly.org/ViewArticle.
aspx?id=239.
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by the Israel Nature and Parks Authority to cede administration of the "City of
David" park, located in the village of Silwan in occupied East Jerusalem, to Elad,
an Israeli private group with political links involved in acquisition and settlement
of property with no independently verifiable archaeological stature, has been a
source of litigation. A UNESCO-appointed technical mission to the Old City of
Jerusalem, which had reported to the World Heritage Committee, had concluded
that Israel is acting in violation of international law in its archaeological
excavations at the site and should abstain from undertaking any changes in the
structures that would undermine its authenticity and integrity. 84 Yet in October
2011, the Israeli High Court criticized the agreement but ultimately ruled that it
was legal.85
A case that has similarly attracted media attention concerns the Simon
Wiesenthal Centre's construction of a Museum of Tolerance in West Jerusalem.8 6
This construction involved excavations at the ancient Mamilla Cemetery with
hundreds of exhumations of graves and remains and has been deemed a
desecration of remains by the U.S. human rights organization Center for
Constitutional Rights, which has filed a petition to U.N. bodies and the Swiss
government on behalf of Palestinian descendants of those buried at the cemetery.8 7
Dating from the 7th century, the British Mandate authorities pronounced the
cemetery an antiquities site in 1944.8 New photographic evidence released on 26
March 2012 showed the excavations are continuing, despite claims to the
contrary.8 9
Mamilla Cemetery is located in the western part of Jerusalem, which together
with East Jerusalem and its environs, was declared to be an internationalcorpus
separatum under U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947.90
Resolution 181 proclaims a special international regime for Jerusalem, and
requires that: "[e]xisting rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or
sites shall not be denied or impaired," and that "Holy Places and religious
buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any

83. Nir Hasson, Israeli NGO: Elad Group has "Veto" Power over Jerusalem's City of David,
HAARETZ (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israeli-ngo-elad-group-has-veto-

power-over-jerusalem-s-city-of-david-1.391619.
84. UNESCO, Report of the Technical Mission to the Old City ofJerusalem, M 48-50, U.N. Doc.
WHC-07/3 1.COM/INF.7A.2 (Feb. 27, 2007-Mar. 2, 2007), availableat http://whc.unesco.org/uploads
/news/documents/news-315-1.pdf.
85. Nir Hasson, High Court Critical of Elad Contract in City of David Park but Rules it Legal,
HAARETZ (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/high-court-critical-of-eladcontract-in-city-of-david-park-but-rules-it-legal-1.392184.
86. See, e.g., Rory McCarthy, Row Over Plan to Build Jewish Museum of Tolerance on Site of
Muslim Cemetery, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/10/jewis
h-museum-tolerance-muslim-cemetery.
87. Mamilla Cemetery in Jerusalem, CENTER FOR CONST. RTs., http://ccrjustice.org/Mamilla (last
visited Feb. 11, 2013).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. G.A. Res. 181 (II), at 146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947).
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way impair their sacred character." 9' Israel's Protection of Holy Places Law of
1967, which applies to all of Jerusalem, states that: "The Holy Places shall be
protected from desecration," 92 yet the Center for Constitutional Rights deems
Mamilla to be part of a pattern of systematic neglect of non-Jewish religious sites
in the city.93 Such practices were condemned by U.N. Security Council Resolution
476 of 30 June 1980, which deplored "the persistence of Israel, in changing the
physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and the status
of the Holy City of Jerusalem," a reference to the entirety of the city and not just
East Jerusalem. 94
Article 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention deals specifically with situations of
belligerent occupation, requiring that states "as far as possible support the
competent national authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding and
preserving its cultural property." 95 In the event that the competent national
authorities are unable to perform their obligations, the Occupying Power shall, in
close cooperation with the authorities, take only the most necessary measures of
preservation. 96 It is understood, therefore, that the Occupying Power will not
administer cultural property, nor undertake preservation measures save in the
exception where measures must be undertaken in close cooperation with the local
authorities, 97 compliant with the occupier's obligations to maintain the laws and
institutions of the occupied territory."
Even in these exceptional cases, an
Occupying Power, who is absolutely prohibited from undertaking permanent
changes in the occupied territory, is stringently limited to the execution of "the
most necessary measures of preservation" to the end of preventing the
deterioration of cultural property damaged in the course of hostilities.99
According to archaeologists, any excavation is also an act of destruction,
whereby excavation "comes to possess a double meaning, as the recovery and
understanding of archaeological remains and at the same time, the destruction of
91. Id. at 149,$ 13.
92. Protection of Holy Places Law, cited in Protectionof Holy Places Law, 1967, ISR. MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 30, 1998), http://www.mfa.gov.ili/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peac
e+ProcessfProtection+of+Holy+Places+Law.htm.
93. CAMPAIGN TO PRES. MAMILLA JERUSALEM CEMETERY, PETITION FOR URGENT ACTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN MAMILLA CEMETERY BY ISRAEL 30-32 (2010), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/MAMILLA%20 FinalSubmission.pdf (including a statement of Deputy
Mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvinisti that pre-1948 Muslim burial sites have been "turned into garbage
dumps, parking lots, roads and construction sites . . . Open burial sites are scattered throughout the
country, human bones are strewed about, and tombstones are shattered.").
94. S.C. Res. 476, U.N. Doc. S/RES/476 (Jun. 30, 1980).
95. 1954 Hague Convention, supranote 13, art. 5(1).
96. Id. art. 5(2). The International Court of Justice held that this includes the occupying power's
responsibility for his own actions as well as for those of others in the occupied territory. Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 224 (Dec. 19).
97. 1954 Hague Convention, supranote 13, art. 5(2).
98. ROGER O'KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 309
(2006).
99. It will tend to be only in the most urgent circumstances. See, e.g., 1954 Hague Convention,
supra note 13, art. 5(2).
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the context and integrity of those remains."100 Consequently, Article 32 of
UNESCO's Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to
Archaeological Excavations, particularly on excavations in occupied territory,
affirms: "any Member State occupying the territory of another State should refrain
While
from carrying out archaeological excavations in the occupied territory."'
Article 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention codifies the occupier's obligation not to
engage in excavations unless they fulfill certain criteria, Article 9(1)(b) of the 1999
Second Protocol positively restates this obligation by demanding that States Parties
prohibit and prevent all excavations in occupied territory, save where it is strictly
required to safeguard or preserve cultural property. 102
O'Keefe suggests that Article 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention should be
interpreted consistently with the prohibition on excavations in occupied territory in
Article 9 of the 1999 Second Protocol.1 0 3 It might be deemed that the formulation
of an express prohibition on excavations in the 1999 Second Protocol implies the
absence of such a prohibition from the 1954 Hague Convention. However, this
remains inconclusive since the 1999 provisions were intended to avoid any
doubt. 104 Arai-Takahashi notes what he terms "the controversy over the lacunae in
the 1954 Convention," suggesting the possible existence of a prohibition in Article
5 of the 1954 Hague Convention.105 Vrdoljak states, even more firmly, that Article
9 only adds clarification to the obligation found in the spirit of Article 5.106
Relevant state practice is seen only in the controversy over Israel's
excavations in the Old City of Jerusalem, which resulted in widespread
condemnation by High Contracting Parties and UNESCO's Executive Board
resulting in the suspension of all UNESCO aid to Israel in 1974.107 Therefore,
despite the absence of an explicit prohibition on the conduct, sponsorship or
authorization of excavations by the Occupying Power in the 1954 Hague
Convention and the lack of sufficient state practice to prove the existence of an
international customary norm, 108 a functional, object and purpose oriented

100. Gavin Lucas, Destruction and the Rhetoric of Excavation, 34 NORWEGIAN ARCHAEOLOGY
REV. 35, 35 (2001).
101. UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, Ninth Session, New Delhi 1956: Resolutions,
at 44, 32 (1957), quoted in JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF
ARMED CONFLICT 87 (1996).

102. 1999 Second Protocol, supranote 14, art. 9(1)(b).
103. O'KEEFE, supranote 98, at 138-40.
104. Id. at 139.
105. ARAi-TAKAHASHI, supra note 73, at 252.
106. ANA FILIPA VRDOUAK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, MUSEUMS AND THE RETURN OF CULTURAL
OBJECTS 149 (2006).
107. UNESCO, Gen. Conference, Jerusalem and the Implementation of Resolution 3.427 Adopted
by the Eighteenth Session of the General Conference, § 11,U.N. Doc. 19 C/I 13 Annex (Oct. 29, 1975),
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0002/000228/022874eb.pdf See also CLARE WELLS,
THE UN, UNESCO AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE 3 (1987).

108. O'KEEFE, supranote 98, at 139.
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interpretation of the occupier's authority suggests that a prohibition can, and
should be, read into Article 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention.1 09
O'Keefe also highlights that competent national authorities in occupied
territories should still have the province to regulate excavations.' 10 As laid out in
Article 9(2) of the 1999 Second Protocol: "Any archaeological excavation of,
alteration to, or change of use of, cultural property in occupied territory shall,
unless circumstances do not permit, be carried out in close co-operation with the
competent national authorities of the occupied territory.""'
One delegate
expressed strong opposition to the "unless circumstances do not permit"
qualification, since in some occupied territories the activities of the local
institutions are curtailed or even subjected to closure." 2 Indeed this is the case of
the Palestinian Department of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage whose ability to
conduct excavations has been a priori curtailed by the Israeli authorities.
Israeli institutions, in turn, have relied on this reality to justify excavations
without cooperation with the national authorities of the legitimate Palestinian
sovereign, including its contentious archaeological activities in the Old City of
Jerusalem, and the Mosque of Ibrahim at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, part
of which was converted into a synagogue after Israel occupied the West Bank."
Israel's widespread practice of excavations is based on the view that international
law does not forbid excavations in occupied territory.1 4 The details of Israel's
excavations remain largely unknown to the Palestinian authorities, and it is clear
that its practice unmistakably exceeds the limits set out by the international law of
occupation, which generally prohibits most types of archaeological activity, and in
particular, excavations that can be expected to result in the destruction of cultural
property." 5
In addition to the package of preventive mechanisms, the 1954 Hague
Convention provides a set of remedies including criminal liability and restitution.
The definition and institutionalization of the consequence of criminal prosecution

109. The occupier's obligation to maintain normal life in the occupied territory entails, in practice,
the conservation of the cultural, political and social fabric of life of the occupied population, as well as
ensuring the continuation of their organic development within their cultural, political and social
ecosystem. O'KEEFE, supranote 98, at 139.
110. He infers that the provision is precautionary, premised on the idea that the only way to
safeguard it is to ban all excavations for the duration of the occupation. Id. at 262.
111. 1999 Second Protocol, supra note 14, art. 9(2).
112. The delegate is not named. O'KEEFE, supra note 98, at 263.
113. Id. at 140, 262. The measure was declared null and avoid by the U.N. General Assembly in
1975. G.A. Res. 3525 (XXX) D(l), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3525(XXX) (Dec. 15, 1975).
114. JOANNA OVERDIRAN, PLUNDER, DESTRUCTION, AND DESPOLIATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
ISRAEL'S VIOLATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE OCCUPIED WEST
BANK AND GAZA STRIP 17 (1997). Professor H. Reinink, Commissioner-General for Cultural Property
accredited to Israel, was of the view "that excavations were not prohibited by the [1954 Convention] but

only by the UNESCO Recommendation ... [that] was not legally binding." Id.
115. Sliman, supra note 49, at 355-56.

2013

UNESCO, PALESTINE AND ARCHAEOLOGY IN CONFLICT

323

for offences against cultural property is rooted in the international legal order."6
While the 1954 Hague Convention provides for individual criminal responsibility
in case of certain breaches, the effectiveness of the provision was undermined by
the lack of a list of specific offenses that could give rise to criminal sanctions, later
enunciated in Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol as part of five "serious
violations:" the first three corresponding to grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977,"' the fourth and fifth considered
serious violations of the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1999 Second Protocol." 8
The Statute of the International Criminal Court" 9 and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 20 recognized the fourth and fifth acts as "war
crimes." The two "serious violations" of relevance to occupied territory, which are
subject to mandatory universal jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 16(1) of
the 1999 Second Protocol, are "extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural
property," and "theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed
against, cultural property," resonating the provisions on property protection in the
1907 Hague Regulations.121
There are limits on the ability of international criminal law to ensure the
protection of cultural property. Similarly, under the principle of universal
jurisdiction for war crimes applicable to these offenses, states are permitted to
enact universal jurisdiction laws, but are neither compelled,1 22 nor regulated, in the
manner in which they legislate to pursue perpetrators.' 23
Nevertheless,
116. ARAi-TAKAHASHI, supra note 73, at 254 (noting that The Report of the Commission on
Responsibility established this as early as 1919 (citing COMM'N ON RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS
OF THE WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES, REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRELIMINARY PEACE
CONFERENCE (1919), reprintedin 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 115 (Jan.-Apr. 1920)).
117. In particular: (1) "[M]aking cultural property under enhanced protection the object of attack;"
(2) "using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in support of
military action;" (3) "extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property protected under the
Convention and [Protocol II]." 1999 Second Protocol, supranote 14, art. 15.
118. In particular: (4) "making cultural property protected under the Convention ... the object of
attack;" (5) "theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of violence directed against, cultural property
protected under the Convention." 1999 Second Protocol, supra note 14, art. 15.
119. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(ix), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (showing that offenses of destroying or willfully
damaging cultural property are covered by one of the specific offences relating to conduct of hostilities,
namely, of attacks intentionally directed against immovable cultural property as a specific category of
war crimes).
120. Updated statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 8(d),
adoptedby S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), availableat http://www.icty.org/x/file
/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute sept09 en.pdf.
121. 1999 Second Protocol, supra note 14, arts. 15-16.
122. Id. art. 16(2)(b). See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of Cultural
Property in Armed Conflict: The Significance ofthe Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Conventionfor
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, in PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY INTHE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 51-52 (2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/asset
s/files/other/report-icrc_002_0805.pdf.
123. The United States succeeded in its application for an exception to universal jurisdiction for
nationals not party to the 1999 Second Protocol.Henckaerts, supra note 122, at 51.
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international criminal law has a credible track record of prosecutions for violations
of the cultural property laws of armed conflict.' 24 In some cases, offences against
cultural property can amount to crimes against humanity, in so far as these acts are
part of a broader set of facts on the widespread or systematic persecution of a
civilian population.125 While the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
has been successful in prosecuting and punishing crimes related to cultural
property, restitution and restoration of cultural property remain deficient.
Restitution is governed by Article 1(3) of the First Protocol of the 1954
Hague Convention, to which states parties must return cultural property that has
been removed from the occupied territory at the close of hostilities. Israel is a High
Contracting Party. Consequently, "[i]f the continued hostilities have no bearing on
this issue, artifacts should be returned irrespective of the ongoing hostilities." 26
The solution adopted by Article 1 of the Protocol is administrative and does not
deal with questions of ownership, in that objects taken from an occupied territory
are to be returned to its competent authorities, which are expected to decide on
questions of ownership.127 An important precedent, amongst others, is the 1993
handover to Egypt of all archaeological findings from Israel's excavations in Sinai
during its occupation from 1967 to 1983.128 All items were returned in 1994. The
duty to effect restitution is "categorical," but arguably only applies "where it is the
territory of another Contracting Party that is occupied." 29 Egypt is a High
Contracting Party to the 1954 Hague Convention, and the 1993 Agreement
between Israel and Egypt concisely provided: "all artifacts and finds from Sinai
will be returned to Egypt within the next two years .

. .

. Those artifacts which

have been processed and documented, will be returned to Egypt within the next
two months."' 3 0
A Palestinian ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocol
would invoke the restitution provisions of the treaty for objects removed from the
Palestinian territory during the continuing occupation. The question of retroactive
effect would be open for examination based on the potential customary character
of the 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocol, and is considered a debatable issue
in permanent status negotiations.131 A strategy for restitution that aims to
effectively correct the wrongs committed during the occupation of Palestinian
territory needs to ensure the return of cultural property to its rightful place and

124. See Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The
Practiceof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1,
30-31 (2001).
125. Id. at 25-28.
126. Talia Einhorn, Restitution of Archaeological Artifacts: The Arab-Israeli Aspect, 5 INT'L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 133, 143-44 (1996).
127. Id. at 141.
128. Id. at 142.
129. Id. at 138-39.
130. Id. at142.
131. Fahel, supra note 9.
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owner, and this question is part of bilateral negotiations.' 32 In a similar vein, U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 3391 (XXX) on the Restitution of Works of Art to
Countries Victims of Expropriation highlights the special obligation imposed on
states that had access to valuable objects "as a result of their rule over or
occupation of a foreign territory."13
An illustrative example of Israel's illegal removal of artifacts from the
Palestinian territory is the case of the Dead Sea Scrolls, removed from the
Palestine Archaeological Museum in East Jerusalem in 1967, where they were held
on display since their discovery in Qumran, a village located in the West Bank on
the northwest coast of the Dead Sea, in a series of excavations between 1947 and
1956.134 At present, the Scrolls are listed as part of the Inventory of Cultural and
Natural Heritage Sites of Potential Outstanding Universal Value in Palestine,
compiled jointly by UNESCO and Palestinian institutions.' 35 In June 2009, the
Scrolls were exhibited by the Israel Antiquities Authority at the Royal Ontario
Museum in Toronto, Canada. Despite written protests by the Palestinian Minister
of Tourism and Antiquities to the Royal Ontario Museum and the Canadian
government, the exhibit ran until January 2010 in violation of Israel, Canada and
the Museum's obligations under the UNESCO framework.136 Jordan, which
occupied the West Bank in the period of the excavations that led to the Scrolls'
discovery, also sent a diplomatic communication near the end of the Royal Ontario
Museum exhibit requesting Canada to seize the Scrolls.137
Despite claims in the Canadian media that "the application to the scrolls of
the 1954 Hague Convention is not clear-cut," the rules are in fact

132. Id.
133. G.A. Res. 3391 (XXX), 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3391 (Nov. 19, 1975).
134. CANADIANS FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE INTHE MIDDLE EAST, FACTSHEET: LEGAL VIOLATIONS
WITH THE ROM's DEAD SEA SCROLLS EXHIBIT (2009), available at http://www.cjpmo.org/DisplayDoc
ument.aspx?DocumentlD=409.
135. The listing was done in 2005. Fact Sheet on the Illegal Removal of the Dead Sea Scrollsfrom
Occupied Palestinian Territory (on file with authors). See also, Elias Sanbar, Protection of Artifacts
Removed from the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, AUAZEERRA TRANSPARENCY UNIT (Apr. 15, 2009),
available at http://thepalestinepapers.com/en/document/4524.
136. Palestinians Call on Canada to Cancel Scroll Exhibition, DAWN.COM (Apr. 13, 2009),
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/92452. The Royal Ontario Museum's obligations are premised on its
membership in the Canadian Museums Association, which is committed to the ethical guidelines set out
by the International Council of Museums, namely Section 2. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF
MUSEUMS, ICOM CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS 3-6 (2013), availableat http://icom.museum/filead
min/user upload/pdf/Codes/codeethics20l3_eng.pdf. The Museum must also ensure that at a
minimum it does not offend the criminal standard set out in Section 36.1(2) of Canada's Cultural Export
and Import Act, which provides that "no person shall knowingly export or otherwise remove cultural
property . . . from an occupied territory of a State Party to the Second Protocol." Cultural Property
Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-51, available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-51/pa
ge- I.html.
137. Michael Valpy, Scroll Exhibit Closes Amid Controversy, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Jan. 4,
2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/nationaVscroll-exhibit-closes-amid-controversy/articlel4
17846/.
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straightforward.' 38 Canada, who is a signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention and
its protocols, was under an obligation to "take into custody cultural property
imported into its territory either directly or indirectly from any occupied territory"
and to return it to the local authorities in the occupied territory.
The Canadian
government based its decision to refuse Palestinian requests to halt the exhibition
on the fact inter alia that Palestine was not a State Party to the 1954 Hague
Convention and its Protocols. Palestine's UNESCO membership and accession to
the Convention provide it with additional clout to claim rights and demand
compliance by other states in relation to the Scrolls, as well as other artifacts
removed from its territory during occupation. Sections of the Scrolls have also
been recently exhibited in the U.S.,1 40 which has accepted the customary nature of
the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol.141 Should Palestine ratify the
1954 Hague Convention and its first Protocol, it could consider filing a case before
U.S. courts to request the property's seizure.142
IV. THE ILLICIT TRADE IN ANTIQUITIES
The illegal antiquities market is comparable to other major international
criminal enterprises such as drugs or arms smuggling, with one major exception;
antiquities pass through a series of portals where they are transformed from illegal
to legal.143 In other words, they are laundered.'" There are insufficient studies on
the global trade in illicit antiquities, with the first book on the subject not
appearing until 1973,145 with no mention of Palestine. A more recent work with a
number of international contributions similarly does not examine the illicit trade in
Palestine.14 6 In fact, there is a mere handful of studies on the illicit trade in
Palestinian antiquities, despite figures from Palestinian sources attesting to

138. Id.
139. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict art. 1, openedfor signatureMay 14,1954,249 U.N.T.S. 358.
140. John R. Quain, DeadSea Scrolls Get New Life, Fox NEWS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.fox
news.com/scitech/2012/02/08/dead-sea-scrolls-get-new-life/.
141. See U.S. NAVAL HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 299-305.
142. See Howard N. Spiegler & Lawrence M. Kaye, American Litigation to Recover Cultural
Property: Obstacles, Options, and a Proposal, in TRADE INILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE DESTRUCTION
OF THE WORLD'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 121-32 (Neil Brodie, Jennifer Doole & Colin Renfrew
eds., 2001) (discussing litigation before the U.S. courts in relation to the return of cultural property).
143. Morag M. Kersel, From the Ground to the Buyer: A Market Analysis of the Trade in Illegal
Antiquities, in ARCHAEOLOGY, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE ANTIQUITIES TRADE 188-89 (Morag M.

Kersel, Christina Luke & Kathryn Walker Tubb eds., 2006) [hereinafter Kersel, From the Groundto the
Buyer].
144. Id. at 189.
145. KARL E. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST 132 (1973). Meyer notes in his text that this absence
of research is difficult to understand given that the plundering of tombs and temples is "assuredly the
[world's] second-oldest profession." Id.
146. See generally TRADE

IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES:

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD'S

ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE v, vi (Neil Brodie, Jennifer Doole & Colin Renfrew eds., 2001) (making
no mention of Palestine at any point in the more modem text).
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hundreds of thousands of objects being illegally exported from the occupied
Palestinian territory every year. 147 Yahya estimates:
[H]istoric Palestine (Israel, the West Bank & Gaza Strip) has a total of
more than 35,000 large and small archaeological sites and features
(caves, ruins, tells, sanctuaries, quarries, towers, churches, mosques,
etc.) from all historic and prehistoric periods. The West Bank alone
contains about a third of these sites and features (12,217) . . . . Many of

these sites have been destroyed, particularly since the occupation of the
West Bank by Israel in 1967. The exact number of sites robbed in the
occupied territories since then is unknown, but it is estimated to be in
the thousands.1 4 8
The primary international legal instrument governing the illicit trade in
antiquities is the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property ("1970 UNESCO Convention").149 It is an unsatisfactory instrument,
with a number of agreed shortcomings. Curiously, commentators have noted that
the majority of its provisions were never designed to be implemented. Bator
writes: "only a small fraction of the Convention was intended to have serious
operative consequences; the rest has only rhetorical existence."' 5 0
The scope of the 1970 UNESCO Convention is limited in the chapeau of
Article 1 to cultural property, which is "specifically designated by each State as
being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or
science."11 As a result, "unlawfully excavated cultural objects are not covered by
the 1970 [UNESCO] Convention which only provides for the restitution of
inventoried cultural objects stolen from a museum or similar institution."' 52 In
many states, clandestine excavations are the largest contributor to illicit trade.' 5 3
More generally, it is considered that the instrument is undermined by textual
weaknesses, and the fact that many art-importing states have not ratified it.' 5 4

147. Yahya, supra note 59.
148. Id.
149. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 15.
150. PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART
(1982).

94-95 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1983)

151. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supranote 15, art. 1.
152. UNIDROIT Secretariat, UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects: Explanatory Report, UNIF. L. REv. 476, 504 (2001) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Explanatory
Report], available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalpr
operty-explanatoryreport-e.pdf.
153. Ian M. Goldrich, Comment, Balancing the Need for Repatriation of Illegally Removed
CulturalProperty with the Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers:Applying the UNIDROIT Convention to
the Case of the GoldPhiale,23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 118, 138 n. 107 (1999) (giving the example of Italy
in this regard).

154. Nina R. Lenzner, Comment, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does the
UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the UNESCO
Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 478-79 (1994). Although Australia, Canada and the
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Israel, in common with other "transit States" has not ratified the 1970 UNESCO
Convention. 155
In an effort to address the recognized shortcomings, UNESCO requested the
drafting of a supplementary private international law convention by the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT"), the
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
("UNIDROIT 1995"). It was opened for signature in 1995.16 As UNESCO had
asked UNIDROIT to focus on the private law elements of the implementation of
the 1970 UNESCO Convention, both instruments are considered complementary
or "fully compatible."'15
UNIDROIT 1995 covers two categories of cultural
property, stolen and illegally exported, with differing rules regarding each.
Importantly, UNIDROIT 1995 has no retroactive effect, so that it does not allow
for the restitution of cultural objects stolen or illegally exported before its entry
into force.' 58
The private international law approach undertaken in UNIDROIT 1995
endows claimants-who may be private individuals as well as states-with certain
rights, permitting a cause of action to be brought in the location country of the
object being sought.'5 9 Thus under Article 8(1), jurisdiction lies only with "the
courts or other competent authorities of the Contracting State where the cultural
object is located."16 0 Essentially, it "puts the courts ... in charge of resolving
disputes over cultural property."' 6 ' While theft is a sufficient ground in itself to
claim restitution under UNIDROIT 1995,162 illegal export is not a sufficient
ground to obtain a court order for an object's return.
Article 5(1) allows contracting states to request the return of a cultural object
illegally removed from its territory, provided the requesting state and the state
Article 1(b) defines "illegally
addressed are parties to UNIDROIT 1995.16
exported" as "removed from the territory of a Contracting State contrary to its law
regulating the export of cultural objects for the purpose of protecting its cultural
heritage," meaning the requesting state must have specific regulations governing

United States are signatories in terms of the text, Lenzner notes that many of the 1970 Convention's
provisions amount to "mere rhetoric" with no real requirements imposed on signatories. Id.at 479-80.
155. See States Parties:Ratification Status, UNESCO.ORG (Sept. 19, 2012), http://whc.unesco.org
/en/statesparties/ (showing the list of nations that have ratified the Convention).
156. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16.
157. UNIDROIT ExplanatoryReport, supranote 152, at 480.
158. Id. at 490 (noting that the Preamble uses the phrase "in the future" in this regard).
159. Lenzner, supra note 154, at 493-94.
160. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art. 8(1).
161. Lenzner, supra note 154, at 494.
162. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art.l (stating that claims must have an
"international character" possessed by definition for illegally exported objects but not necessarily for
stolen objects). See also UNIDROIT ExplanatoryReport, supra note 152, at 494.
163. UNIDROIT ExplanatoryReport, supranote 152, at 526.
164. Id.
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the protection of its cultural objects.165 Article 5(3) sets out the interests protected
which define the types of objects covered. It reads:
The court or other competent authority of the State addressed shall order
the return of an illegally exported cultural object if the requesting State
establishes that the removal of the object from its territory significantly
impairs one or more of the following interests:

(a) the physical preservation of the object or of its context;
(b) the integrity of a complex object;
(c) the preservation of information of, for example, a scientific
or historical character;
(d) the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or
indigenous community, or establishes that the object is of
significant cultural importance for the requesting State.' 66
According to the Explanatory Report, the "physical preservation of the object
or of its context" encompasses the protection of archaeological sites from pillage
or illegal excavations, while "the preservation of information, of, for example, a
A general
scientific or historical character" envisions clandestine excavations.
provision following the fourth subcategory is included for objects of "significant
cultural importance," considered a restrictive term to be narrowly interpreted. 68
Under Article 5(4), the requesting state must supply "all relevant information of a
legal (in particular, any export regulations that have been infringed) or cultural
nature, such as expert evidence to determine the extent of the damage" to the
interests listed in Article 5(3). 169
Article 5 is a reflection of the deliberations on UNIDROIT 1995 that
repeatedly expressed concern with the pillaging of archaeological sites, a practice
that fell outside the remit of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Subparagraph 4 of
the Preamble reads: "deeply concerned . . . in particular [by] the pillage of

archaeological sites and the resulting loss of irreplaceable archaeological, historical
and scientific information;" the definitions in Article 2 reference "objects which
are of importance for archaeology;" and Article 3(2) uses the words "cultural
object which has been unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully
retained."o70 These perceived deviations have spurred some debate over whether
such objects should be considered stolen or illegally exported. Subsequently it was
decided to include a special provision where the general conditions for bringing
claims for return, under Article 5(3)(a)-(c), were specifically formulated to include
excavated objects.' 7'
165. Id.
166. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art. 5(3).
167. UNIDROIT Explanatory Report, supra note 152, at 528-30 (discussing Article 5(3)(a)-(d) of

the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 532.

170. Id. at 504 (quoting 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16).
171. Id.
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Article 11 sets out the procedure for signing, ratifying, approving or acceding
to the Convention. All States may become contracting parties to UNIDROIT 1995
whether or not they are members of UNIDROIT,1 72 subject to the deposit of a
formal instrument to that effect with the Italian Government as its depositary and
thirty-three signatories at present.173
UNIDROIT 1995 balances "the interests of dispossessed owners and bona
fide purchasers by requiring restitution of the stolen object and compensation to
purchasers when they have exercised the necessary due diligence." 174 It reconciles
tensions "between market and source nations, and between the civil and common
law countries by protecting . .. the rights of the original owner and of the bona fide
purchaser."1 75 Fundamentally, however, it significantly expands the rights of
contracting parties "seeking the return of illegally exported [cultural] property by
providing . .. private litigation rights without. . . government intercession."' 76

In the case of Palestine, the pathway of the illicit trade is broadly identifiable.
Initially, local people, or subsistence diggers, "are usually responsible for the
looting of archaeological sites."177 "They sell to middlemen, who . . . resell to the
antiquities dealers at a [high] mark-up;" it is these "middlemen who retain the
majority of the profits," with the original looter usually receiving less than one
percent of the retail value.' 78 Palestinian involvement in the looting stems from the
alienation of the population from its own cultural heritage. Sites excavated by
Israeli or foreign archaeologists are invariably shipped out of the country and
exhibited in museums to which Palestinians have no access.' 79
More
pragmatically, looting grows in line with unemployment, with looting increasing
300 percent following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, preventing
Palestinians from seeking employment in Israel.180
Israel is one of the few states with a legally sanctioned antiquities market.
According to Kersel, "Israel is an excellent example of a geographically
advantaged state due to its proximity to the Palestinian Authority ("PA"), where
most of the looting in this region occurs."' 8 Thus, Israel is the transit market
where "the conversion from illegal to legal takes place," and once an export license
is attained "the material can be successfully negotiated through customs" openly
and legally, entering the market as a legitimate antiquity.'82 Israel's 1978 national

172. Id. at 552.

173. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16.
174. Claudia Fox, Note and Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 9 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 225, 257 (1993).
175. Id. at 266.
176. Id. at 257.
177. Kersel, From the Ground to the Buyer, supra note 143, at 190.
178. Id.
179. Yahya, supra note 59.
180. Id.
181. Kersel, From the Ground to the Buyer, supra note 143, at 191.
182. Id. at 193.
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patrimony law vests ownership of archaeological material in the state, meaning it
is legal to buy and sell artifacts from pre-1978 collections, with a consequent
system of legally-sanctioned dealers in antiquities who may request export permits
issued by the Israel Antiquities Authority ("IAA").' 83 As highlighted, a law on
national patrimony for Palestine is being drafted by the PA, with the issue of the
legal sale of antiquities still to be adjudged, which means that at present cultural
heritage protection in Palestine is still governed by the Jordanian Law of
Antiquities. 184
Documentation and reports confirm that a significant amount of "material
[on] sale in the legally sanctioned shops in Israel" originates in looted sites in
Palestine.185 It is possible for dealers "to sell looted material by exchanging the
registry numbers of materials already sold with those of a similar description,"
which have just appeared on the market.' 8 6 An antiquity receives an official
registry number. For instance, if a tourist buys the antiquity from a legally
sanctioned dealer, they are required to obtain an export license from the IAA. As
this is not always the case, there is no comprehensive official record of these sales,
and the same registry number can be used again.' 8 7 The chronic underfunding of
the PA Department of Antiquities, and to a lesser extent the IAA, means a low
level of priority is given to such issues in light of the current political situation,
allowing Israel's unique legal market to provide a "perfect setting for looting and
illegal excavation."' 8 8 Kersel concludes:
Artefacts routinely .. . enter a process of laundering, and then are sold
as "legally" exported from licensed dealers in Israel. The Israeli legal
venue that allows the sale of illegally-excavated artefacts provides an
impetus for looting. Artefacts, many from the West Bank and Gaza,
routinely make their way into the legitimate marketplace through a
system of laundering and the reuse of inventory numbers.' 89
A further difficulty is underlined by the belief that the SOA in the occupied
Palestinian territory is effectively marking sites for looters, due to the insufficient
funding provided for the maintenance of excavations sites. Greenberg and Keinan
note, for example, how he "uncovered a beautiful mosaic in a Byzantine church,
but after he left thieves came and removed the entire mosaic."'190 Or as Rjoob
writes on Khirbet al Qasir, in the wilderness of Hebron: "The SOA excavated the
site without any justification, subsequently transferring its artifacts to unknown
whereabouts and leaving the site without the minimum means of protection and to

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 195.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197-98.
Kersel, The Trade in PalestinianAntiquities, supranote 18, at 30.
Rjoob, supranote 10 (quoting Meron Rapoport, supra note 43).
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the mercy of antiquities robbers."' 91 In some cases, the looters are the Palestinian
laborers employed on the sites during the "salvage excavation," who subsequently
return to plunder the remains, which then make their way to the legal antiquities
market in Israel. An account from the excavator at El Qom is illustrative:
[W]e did a little investigation of the Iron Age site and we determined
that Khirbet El-Q6m was certainly biblical Maqqidah, a very important
border fortress. After we left the site there was no control and the
villagers must have resumed digging, because the market a few years
later was flooded by hundreds of Idomaean ostraca inscriptions on
pottery, ink inscriptions from the Persian and early Hellenistic periods.
Basically our excavation must have trained the villagers as future
looters.192
The practices of locals are rooted in the belief that archaeologists are
themselves profiting from that which they excavate, with "the enforcement of
protectionist laws as redirection of local wealth to foreigners."' 93 Kersel et al., in
their anthropological study consisting of interviews, concluded that many locals
"come to view archaeologists as looters themselves, but 'looters who operate
above the law."' 94 Communication between archaeologists and locals is poor,
with the effect that "locals cannot help but wonder if artifacts recovered in
scientific excavations are bound for the antiquities market" in Israel. 195
The UNESCO and UNIDROIT framework is imperfect, with the former
having a severely restricted reach and the latter a low level of ratification, meaning
only the courts of a small number of states are actionable should Palestinian
antiquities from illegally-excavated sites end up outside Palestine's borders. Some
of the market nations, including the U.K., U.S., and Canada, have not ratified
UNIDROIT 1995, although it has been ratified by Switzerland.' 96 Yet, the
Convention ought to be seen not as an end in itself, but rather as a "step in the
continuing war against the illicit trade" in antiquities.' 97 There is no question that
the best means of avoiding difficult "private lawsuits is to utilize local and

191. Id. Rjoob also quotes an SOA employee who participated in the excavation: "Our excavations
revealed a well-preserved Roman-Byzantine settlement, built with well-dressed stones and paved with
splendored colored and monochrome mosaics. However, by the end of the excavations, all artifacts
were transferred to unknown storerooms in Jerusalem and the site has been abandoned and left without
any protection measures. Since the end of excavations, I have not returned to the site. It might be badly
deteriorated." Id.
192. Morag M. Kersel, Christina Luke & Christopher H. Roosevelt, Valuing the Past: Perception
ofArchaeologicalPracticein Lydia and the Levant, 8 J. Soc. ARCHAEOLOGY 298, 310 (2008) (quoting
a personal communication with William Dever).
193. Id. at 314.
194. Id. (quoting Morag M. Kersel, License to Sell: The Legal Trade of Antiquities in Israel (2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Archaeology, University of Cambridge)).
195. Id. at 315.
196. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16.
197. Spiegler & Kaye, supranote 142, at 130.
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international law enforcement authorities ... to enforce local criminal statutes and
international conventions."' 98
A related issue is the need for Palestine to establish its own legal trade in
antiquities. According to Spiegler and Kaye, "calls for the licit market come from
those who just do not want the art of source nations to continue to be maintained
by those nations, which is a policy that in our view fails on both sovereign and
equitable grounds."' 99 The Jordanian experience is illustrative, whereby a legal
trade for licensed dealers existed until 1976, overseen by the Department of
Antiquities. The abolition of this trade saw "a surge in illicit excavations and
pillaging . . . with the creation of a brisk black market."200 Bisheh of the Jordanian

National Museum sees equally convincing arguments for prohibition and
legalization under strict measures of control, although ultimately would vote
against a legal trade.201
V.

UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE

Protection of underwater cultural heritage can further efforts to assert control
over Palestine's waters, off the coast of the Gaza Strip, where Israel has been
imposing a prolonged naval blockade, which prevents Palestinians from having
any access to most parts of their territorial waters. 202 "On 8 December 2011,
Palestine deposited with the [UNESCO] Director-General its instrument of
ratification of the [2001] Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
,,203
Heritage,
("Underwater Heritage Convention") which entered into force on 8
March 2012.204 The Underwater Heritage Convention was drafted in response to
the recent expansion of the discipline of underwater archaeology, which has
extended its sphere from relatively shallow coastal waters to the deep seabed with
the rapid development of technology. 205 As expressed by the Canadian delegation
198. Id. at 125.
199. Id. at 130.
200. Ghazi Bisheh, One Damn Illicit Excavation After Another: The Destruction of the
Archaeological Heritage of Jordan, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
WORLD'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 115 (Neil Brodie, Jennifer Doole & Colin Renfrew eds., 2001).
201. Id. at 118.
202. An analysis of the blockade is beyond the scope of this paper. At present Gaza does not
control its territorial waters and approximately "85 per cent of its fishing waters are totally or partially
inaccessible due to Israeli military measures," according to a U.N. Human Rights Council panel report.
The experts concluded that the blockade of Gaza continues to violate international law. See News
Release, U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, How Can Israel's blockade of Gaza be
Legal? - U.N. Independent Experts on the "Palmer Report," UN.ORG (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/D805C73314EFC9E78525790A0055784E.
203. UNESCO, Ratification by Palestine of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage, UNESCO.ORG (Jan. 16, 2012), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-JRLID=48774&
URL DO=DO TOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html.
204. Id.
205. Craig Forrest, A New International Regime for the Protection of Underwater Cultural
Heritage, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 511, 512 (2002). Technological advances have made 98 percent of
the seabed accessible. See FREDERIK SOREIDE, SHIPS FROM THE DEPTHS: DEEPWATER ARCHAEOLOGY
4(2001).
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at the drafting conference, it is apparent that "the main thrust of the proposed
convention should be to deal with treasure hunters or dive expeditions which focus
on [underwater cultural heritage]."206 The definition of underwater cultural
heritage in Article 1(a) of the Underwater Heritage Convention is ."all traces of
human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological character which
have been partially or totally under water, periodically or continuously, for at least
100 years." 207 The Underwater Heritage Convention's objective is to preserve
underwater cultural heritage for the benefit of humanity through cooperation
between state parties, without the determination of ownership rights.
The geographical scope of the Underwater Heritage Convention, or its
jurisdictional reach, is threefold, based on the differing zones of a State Party's
waters. The overall aim is in situ protection, but "where it is concluded that
recovery is appropriate, to ensure that it is undertaken in accordance with the
terms" set out in the Annex to the Underwater Heritage Convention.208 First, under
Article 7(1), a State Party has the "exclusive right to regulate and authorize
activities directed at underwater cultural heritage in their internal waters,
archipelagic waters and territorial sea." 209 These terms are defined by the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 ("UNCLOS"), 210 which requires that any
interpretation of the Underwater Heritage Convention be consistent with its
provisions. Articles 2 and 3 of UNCLOS hold that the territorial sea, a belt of
coastal waters extending at most twelve nautical miles from the baseline of a
coastal state, is regarded as part of the state's sovereign territory.
Secondly, under Article 8 of the Underwater Heritage Convention, the State
Party may "regulate and authorize activities directed at underwater cultural
heritage within their contiguous zone." 21 1 The contiguous zone is defined in
Article 33 of UNCLOS as not more than twenty-four nautical miles, an area in
which competence is exercised for special purposes.21 2 Although "[a] state does
not have to claim a contiguous zone .

.

. about one-third of coastal states do."213

For example, the Netherlands recently established a contiguous zone with the aim
inter alia of preventing the infringement of rights governing objects of an
archaeological or historic character.214 The practical result was the extension of
the geographical scope of its relevant domestic legislation to prohibit the

206. Forrest, supra note 205, at 531 n.87.
207. Underwater Heritage Convention, supranote 17, art. 1(a).
208. Sarah Dromgoole, 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protectionof the Underwater Cultural
Heritage, 18 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 58, 76 (2003).
209. Underwater Heritage Convention, supranote 17, art. 7(1).
210. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
211. Underwater Heritage Convention, supranote 17, art. 8.
212. UNCLOS, supra note 210, art. 33; Lloyd C. Fell, Maritime Contiguous Zones, 62 MICH. L.
REv. 848, 850 (1964).
213. Dromgoole, supra note 208, at 78 n.97.
214. Harm M. Dotinga & Alex G. Oude Elferink, CurrentLegal Developments: The Netherlands,
22 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 317, 321 (2007).
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excavation or removal of such objects without a relevant permit, with criminal
sanctions attached for infringement.215
Finally, under Article 9 of the Underwater Heritage Convention, State Parties
have a responsibility to protect underwater cultural heritage in the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf, which should not extend more than 200
nautical miles. 216 Responsibility for underwater cultural heritage in this zone
entails a reporting obligation on states parties who discover or engage in an
activity aimed at such objects. Furthermore, Article 10 grants an overarching right
to states parties to prohibit or authorize activity aimed at underwater cultural
heritage in their exclusive economic zone.217 Essentially, these provisions
218
endeavor to establish a consultative relation between interested States Parties.
As for the jurisdiction of the Underwater Heritage Convention in the case of
Palestine, first the rivers or inland seas, including stretches of the River Jordan and
the Dead Sea, are within the reach of the Convention. 219 It remains largely unclear
what, if any, underwater cultural heritage can be found in Palestine's inland
waters. Evidently, the internal waterways of the West Bank are more commonly
examined from a hydro-political and humanitarian viewpoint,220 with the River
Jordan, for example, being a source of long-running multilateral disputes in which
the possible existence of underwater cultural heritage has not been relevant. 221
Similarly, the Dead Sea is unknown in underwater cultural heritage terms, but is
itself a cultural heritage site proposed for inclusion on the World Heritage List. In
neighboring Jordan, a recent report under the Underwater Heritage Convention that
mentions the Dead Sea, indicated that "no submerged heritage site [has] been
detected in Jordan, since no excavations or surveys have been conducted." 222
Whilst Israel has not ratified the Underwater Heritage Convention, there is a
dedicated Marine Archaeological Unit attached to the Israel Antiquities
Authority, 223 which includes inland waters such as the Dead Sea in its remit,224
215. Id. at 323.
216. UNCLOS, supranote 210, art. 57.
217. Dromgoole, supra note 208, at 83.
218. Anastasia Strati, Protection of the Underwater CulturalHeritage:From the Shortcomings of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to the Compromises of the UNESCO Convention, in
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND NEW CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF THE SEA: TIME BEFORE AND TIME AFTER
45 (Anastasia Strati, Maria Gavouneli & Nikolaos Skourtos eds., 2006).
219. Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 17, art. 28.
220. See GREG SHAPLAND, RIVERS OF DISCORD: INTERNAL WATER DISPUTES IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 20-27 (1997).
221. See AARON T. WOLF, HYDROPOLITICS ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER: SCARCE WATER AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1 (1995).

222. UNESCO Regional Meeting, Oct. 25-27, 2010, Jordan: National Report on Underwater
CulturalHeritage,U.N. Doc. CLT/CIH/MCO/2010/RP/173 (Nov. 12, 2010).
223. See Shelley Wachsmann & Dan Davis, Nautical Archaeology in Israel, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY 500 (Carol V. Ruppd & Janet F. Barstad eds., 2002).
224. See The Marine Archaeology Branch, ISRAEL ANTIQUITIES AUTHORITY, http://www.antiquit
ies.org.il/article_Item eng.asp?sec_id=28&subj id=233 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013); Introduction to
Marine Archaeology in Israel,ISRAEL ANTIQUITIES AUTHORITY, http://www.antiquities.org.illmodules
eng.asp?Module-id=85 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
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although there are no reports of any discovery. There has, however, been an
important find in the Sea of Galilee in Israel of an ancient Ist century fishing
boat,225 an indication that internal waters in the region may yield further
discoveries.
The immediate relevance of the Underwater Heritage Convention to Palestine
is in relation to the Gaza Strip, despite the present inaccessibility of its waters
resulting from the maritime blockade. A recent analysis of archaeology in Gaza
notes: "a lot of artifacts are not the result of active digging with shovels ... but of
underwater diving." 226 Furthermore ancient ships and trade routes in the
southeastern Mediterranean have spurred intense interest among underwater
archaeologists and explorers.227 A 2002 piece by Robert Ballard et al. charts the
discovery of two 8th century C.E. Phoenician shipwrecks, named Tanit and Elissa
by the team, thirty-three nautical miles off the coast of Gaza. 228 The wrecks are
not within Gaza's territorial waters, nor in its contiguous zone, but they could end
up being located within its exclusive economic zone, in the event that Palestine
declares one. In such a case, Palestine would have a right "to prohibit or authorize
any activity directed at such heritage" located in their exclusive economic zone, in
accordance with Article 10(2) of the Underwater Heritage Convention.229
The Tanit had a cargo of 385 visible amphoras 230 used to transport fine wine,
while Elissa had 396 amphoras, representing just the top two tiers of the cargo.231
To put this in context, the best-known sites on land for ancient amphoras, at Hazor
in Israel and Tyre in Lebanon, had revealed sixty whole forms. Ballard's team
collected samples with the aim of establishing the size and date of the shipwreck,
the nature and origin of the cargo, the home port of the crew, its route and
destination, the cause of the shipwreck, and the relationship with the economic
network of the Mediterranean. 232 This led to the conclusion that the Tanit and
Elissa potentially marked "an ancient trade route along which other shipwrecks

225. See SHELLEY WACHSMANN, THE SEA OF GALILEE BOAT: A 2000 YEAR OLD DISCOVERY
FROM THE SEA OF LEGENDS 4, 348 (2000).

226. Fareed Armaly, Crossroads and Contexts: Interviews on Archaeology in Gaza, 37 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 43, 54 (2008).

227. See generally id. (discussing archaeologists' and explorers' underwater work).
228. Robert Ballard et al., Iron Age Shipwrecks in Deep Water off Ashkelon, Israel, 106 AM. J.
ARCHAEOLOGY 151, 151 (2002).
229. Underwater Heritage Convention, supranote 17, art. 10(2).
230. Ballard et al., supra note 228, at 158; see also Armaly, supra note 226, for a description of the
role of amphoras in establishing the Gazan museum project provided by the Geneva museum curator
Marc-Andr6 Haldimann: "[O]ur particular interest in Gaza goes back to 1980, when excavations under
the Cathedral of Geneva turned up the remains of two wine amphoras from Gaza . . . . As to why
amphoras from Gaza would be found under the cathedral of Geneva, the explanation is to be found in a
text by Grdgoire de Tours, who wrote in the sixth century A.D. that the best wine for celebrating the
Mass is the wine of Gaza."
231. Ballard et al., supranote 228, at 158.
232. Id. at 152.
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could be found." 233 The title of the piece is Iron Age Shipwrecks in Deep Water
OffAshkelon, Israel, yet the Phoenician wrecks should be more properly described
as being off the coast of Gaza. There is a topographic map of the wrecks included
in the piece, which shows quite clearly that the closest land to the site of the
wrecks is Gaza, if a direct line is drawn from the indicated sites to the surrounding
coastlines. 234 Despite the title, the piece itself describes its subject as "shipwrecks
in the area of Egypt and the Gaza Strip, 33 nautical miles offshore." 235 A follow-up
paper in a larger study on the history of deep-water archaeology notes how, in
2003, Ballard's team "tried to go back to the site for more detailed archaeological
investigations but could not obtain a permit from the Egyptian authorities," 236
marking the total excision of Palestine from the research. Any such explorations
would require the prior authorization and involvement of the Palestinian side to be
lawful, following its ratification of the Underwater Heritage Convention.
Overall, Palestinian ratification of the Underwater Heritage Convention
would provide Palestine with the legal right to assert a contiguous zone for the
purposes of underwater cultural heritage protection. Palestine could consider
following the example of the Netherlands and explicitly extend the scope of its
forthcoming heritage legislation to its territorial seas and the contiguous zone,
creating an archaeological zone of control over underwater cultural heritage that
extends to twenty-four nautical miles off the coast of Gaza. A dedicated
Palestinian underwater archaeological unit should thereby be established to
coordinate with researchers and prospective exploration missions, which could
conceivably work closely, or be attached to the Gaza archaeological museum. The
museum is due to open at the ancient port site of Gaza-Blakhiya in 2017.237
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF UNESCO MEMBERSHIP

Palestine's membership of UNESCO, a specialized agency of the United
Nations, significantly contributes to the legal settlement of the question of
Palestine's status as a "state" in international law, especially for the purposes of
accession to other international institutions or treaties. First, it brings Palestine
within the so-called "Vienna formula", outlined by the U.N. Treaty Section of the
Office of Legal Affairs in its Summary of Practice of the Secretary-GeneralAs
Depositary ofMultilateralTreaties:
when a treaty is open to "States", how is the Secretary-General to
determine which entities are States? If they are Members of the United
Nations or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
there is no ambiguity. However, a difficulty has occurred as to possible
participation in treaties when entities which appeared otherwise to be

233. Id. at 156. Ballard surmises that the ships could also be the "famous 'ships of Tarshish'
mentioned in the Bible." Id. at 166.
234. Id. at 152.
235. Id. at 151.
236. SOREIDE, supra note 205, at 45.
237. See Armaly, supra note 226, at 44.
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States could not be admitted to the United Nations, nor become Parties
to the Statute of the International Court of Justice owing to the
opposition, for political reasons, of a permanent member of the Security
Council. Since that difficulty did not arise as concerns membership in
the specialized agencies, where there is no "veto" procedure, a number
of those States became members of specialized agencies, and as such
were in essence recognized as States by the international community.
Accordingly, and in order to allow for as wide a participation as
possible, a number of conventions then provided that they were also
open for participation to States members of specialized agencies ....
This type of entry-into-force clause [i]s called the "Vienna formula."238
Any treaty that follows the "Vienna formula" can be signed and ratified by
Palestine by virtue of its membership of UNESCO. There remains a question as to
treaties that do not expressly follow the "Vienna formula," including the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, which states only that the instrument is
open for signature by "all States" in its Article 125(1). Schabas cites the Summary
ofPracticeof the Secretary-General:239
Nevertheless, a number of treaties adopted by the General Assembly
were open to participation by "all States" without further specifications .
. . . In reply to questions raised in connection with the interpretation to
be given to the all States formula, the Secretary-General has on a
number of occasions stated that there are certain areas in the world
whose status is not clear. If he were to receive an instrument of
accession from any such area, he would be in a position of considerable
difficulty unless the Assembly gave him explicit directives on the areas
coming within the "any State" or "all States" formula. He would not
wish to determine, on his own initiative, the highly political and
controversial question of whether or not the areas whose status was
unclear were States. Such a determination, he believed, would fall
outside his competence. He therefore stated that when the "any State" or
"all States" formula was adopted, he would be able to implement it only
if the General Assembly provided him with the complete list of the
States coming within the formula, other than those falling within the
"Vienna formula." 2a
The phrase "other than those falling within the 'Vienna formula"' means that
for the Secretary-General, ambiguity lies only with those states that do not satisfy

238. U.N. Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, Summary of Practice of the SecretaryGeneral as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties,

79, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.l (1999) [hereinafter

Summary of Practice]. The "Vienna formula" is drawn from the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. According to Article 81 of that instrument, "[t]he present Convention shall be open for
signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 81, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
239. Schabas, supranote 2 (citing Summary of Practice).
240. Summary of Practice, supranote 238, 1 81, at 23.
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the "Vienna formula." Hence the Secretary-General's depository practice "makes
it clear that admission to UNESCO would be satisfactory as far as the SecretaryGeneral is concerned" to enable Palestine to ratify the international treaties for
which the Secretary-General acts as depositary. 4 1 Schabas proceeds to note,
"[UNESCO] membership is 'fully representative of the international community'
and any guidance from the General Assembly would be 'substantially identical' to
the position taken by UNESCO .. .. Thus, nothing stands in the way of Palestine
acceding to the Rome Statute except Palestine itself."242
In its preliminary examination of Palestine's declaration transferring
jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court for "acts committed on the territory
of Palestine since 1 July 2002," pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, the
Prosecutor deferred its determination of Palestine's status as a state. It did so in its
3 April 2012 update on the "Situation in Palestine," and left the question of
Palestine's status as a state for the purpose of the Rome Statute to the U.N. bodies,

or, the Court's Assembly of State Parties.243 The Prosecutor set out his rationale as
follows:
In accordance with article 125, the Rome Statute is open to accession by
"all States", and any State seeking to become a Party to the Statute must
deposit an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. In instances where it is controversial or unclear whether
an applicant constitutes a "State," it is the practice of the Secretary-

General to follow or seek the General Assembly's directives on the
matter. This is reflected in General Assembly resolutions, which provide
indications of whether an applicant is a "State." Thus, competence for
determining the term "State" within the meaning of article 12 rests, in
the first instance, with the United Nations Secretary General who, in
case of doubt, will defer to the guidance of the General Assembly.
[T]he current status granted to Palestine by the United Nations General
Assembly is that of "observer," not as a "Non-member State." The
Office understands that on 23 September 2011, Palestine submitted an
application for admission to the United Nations as a Member State in
accordance with article 4(2) of the United Nations Charter, but the
Security Council has not yet made a recommendation in this regard.
While this process has no direct link with the declaration lodged by
Palestine, it informs the current legal status of Palestine for the
interpretation and application of article 12.
The Office could in the future consider allegations of crimes committed
in Palestine, should competent organs of the United Nations or

241. Schabas, supranote 2.
242. Id.
243. Situation in Palestine, supra note 3, TT 1-2.
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eventually the Assembly of States Parties resolve the legal issue relevant
to an assessment of article 12.24
The Prosecutor's position was that Palestine must await a decision of the U.N.
General Assembly, or alternatively Palestine's application for full U.N.
membership, which was shelved by the Security Council in late 2012, to satisfy the
Prosecutor's self-assigned criteria for a self-referral under Article 12(3), and that
UNESCO membership in itself is not sufficient. Pursuant to this rationale, the 29
November 2012 General Assembly resolution granting Palestine "non-member
state status" in the United Nations resolves this requirement. The current
International Criminal Court Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, articulated the present
state of affairs at a public conference in March 2013: "the ball is now in the court
of Palestine;" "Palestine has to come back;" and, "we are waiting for them."245
Notwithstanding the Prosecutor's update and the particular question of the
International Criminal Court, Palestine's full membership of UNESCO creates a
precedent to be relied on for it to join other U.N. specialized agencies, as well as to
accede to international treaties. For instance, Palestine can move beyond
UNESCO treaties by ratifying UNCLOS, whose formula in Article 305(l)(a)
indicates that it is open for signature by "all States;" as noted, the SecretaryGeneral, the depository of UNCLOS, considers this to include those covered by the
"Vienna formula."
As part of its membership of UNESCO, in January 2011, Palestine submitted
accession instruments to four UNESCO conventions, which it has now ratified: the
1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, the 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage, the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural
Heritage, and the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions. In March 2012, it also acceded to the 1970
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which it has now ratified, and a
the 1954 Hague Convention and its two protocols, which are being processed at the
time of writing. Gaining access to further institutional frameworks within
UNESCO, and claiming the substantive rights guaranteed in these instruments,
provides Palestine with further means to assert its sovereign rights over its
internationally-recognized territory. At the very least, the legitimate Palestinian
representatives would be able to claim respect for their rights to control, protect
and explore their cultural and natural heritage, as well as take part in deliberations
that might entail Palestinian heritage located within the internationally-recognized
territory of Israel.

244. Id.
5, 7-8.
245. The current ICC Prosecutor made these statements during a public discussion held at the
Academie Diplomatique Internationale in Paris on March 20, 2013. John V. Whitbeck, Palestine and
the ICC, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (April 16, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/2
01341561759725150.html.
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An example of a readily-accessible UNESCO mechanism that Palestine could
use to further protection for its heritage is the World Heritage List. In this respect,
the UNESCO field office in Ramallah has focused on building the capacity of
Palestinian institutions in view of the future implementation of the World Heritage
Convention.246 An Inventory of Palestinian Heritage of Potential Outstanding
Universal Value, consisting of twenty sites, was submitted to the World Heritage
Committee in 2005.247 On 26 January 2011, the Palestinian Ministry of Tourism
and Antiquities submitted the nomination file to the World Heritage Centre for
Bethlehem's old city, 248 which was approved in June 2012 when Bethlehem's
Nativity Church and Pilgrimage route became the first Palestinian sites to be
included on the List. 249 According to a December 2012 report, UNESCO is
currently also considering the inclusion of the ancient terraces of the West Bank
village of Battir for inclusion on the List. 250 A file for the old city of Hebron is
currently under preparation. 251
Having ratified the World Heritage Convention,252 Palestine's inventory can
become official and the nomination of sites for inscription on the World Heritage
List can be initiated.253 Normally, the nomination process takes a number of
years.254 The nomination of sites entails substantial work on their documentation
to demonstrate that proper legal and management provisions exist to ensure their
conservation. In June 2011, Palestine submitted information to the World Heritage
Committee on progress made in the implementation of the activities in favor of the
protection of certain sites. 255 Despite Israel's inclusion of sites located in

246. Hamdan Taha, World Heritage in Palestine: From Inventory to Nomination, THIS WEEK IN
PALESTINE (Mar. 2011), http://thisweekinpalestine.com/details.php?id=3349&ed=192&edid=192.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Bethlehem & the Nativity: The Story of Inscribing Bethlehem on the World Heritage List,
BETHLEHEM IS WORLD HERITAGE, http://www.bethlehem-whs.pna.ps/index.php?option-comcontent&
view-article&id=54&Itemid=55 (last visited May 8, 2013).
250. Nit Hasson, UNESCO Likely to Recognize West Bank Village's Terraces as Heritage Site,
HAARETZ (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/unesco-likely-to-recognizewest-bank-village-s-terraces-as-heritage-site.premium- 1.482857.
251. Chiara De Cesari, World Heritage and National Sovereignty: On Palestine's UNESCO Bid,
LEIDEN-STANFORD HERITAGE NETWORK (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.networkedheritage.org/2011/12/0
6/world-heritage-and-national-sovereignty-on-palestine%E2%80%99s-unesco-bid/.
252. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151. Palestine ratified the Convention in December 2011; its
membership became active in March 2012. U.N. Office of International Standards and Legal Affairs,
Ratification by Palestine of the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage,UNESCO.ORG (Jan. 16, 2012), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID-48775&

URLDO-=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html.
253. Palestineand the World Heritage Convention, UNESCO.ORG (Dec. 12, 2011), http://whc.une
sco.org/en/news/821.
254. Id. See Sam Litton, Note, The World Heritage "In Danger" Listing as a Taking, 44 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 219, 219 (2011) (discussing in detail the "In Danger" listing regime).
255. World Heritage Comm., United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Convention Concerning the Protection of the Palestinian Cultural and Natural Heritage, June 19-29,
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Palestinian territory on Israel's Ministry of Tourism list of sites, UNESCO has
held the unequivocal position that no site in the Palestinian territory can be listed
by Israel.256
UNESCO's conventions offer a framework of control and protection through
the law over Palestine's cultural and natural heritage. By defining the relations
between the parties in terms of their control and rights over cultural and natural
heritage, UNESCO's framework ensures that the sovereign population remains in
relative control of their cultural property and heritage during armed conflict and
prolonged belligerent occupation. Palestine's pending ratification of the 1954
Hague Convention and its First Protocol, as well as the 1999 Second Protocol,
would also mandate the restitution of artifacts removed from the occupied
Palestinian territory, located in the hands of individuals or institutions in Israel or
third states. Palestine's inclusion in these international fora would further
compliance by third party states, signatories to UNESCO's conventions, who could
be required to undertake the seizure of imported artifacts originating in occupied
territory, prohibit their exhibition in national museums and, in some cases, demand
their return to Palestine.257 The Sinai Agreement could be taken as a template to
ensure that artifacts from the occupied territories, which have been processed and
documented in particular by the Israel Museum, are returned to Palestinian hands.
Concurrently, the Palestinian Department of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage can
coordinate with the International Council of Museums to put museums worldwide
on notice with regards to illegally removed artifacts and their international
exhibition.
Palestine can also ratify the 1970 UNESCO Convention and UNIDROIT
1995 to protect against future theft or illegal export. UNIDROIT 1995 provides a
forum for the restitution of stolen goods and the return of illegally exported goods
outside Palestine through the domestic courts of states parties. Finally, under the
Underwater Heritage Convention, which Palestine has ratified, it can assert control
over its territorial seas and establish a contiguous zone up to twenty-four nautical
miles for the protection of underwater cultural heritage. Palestine also has the
option of ratifying UNCLOS that would underline sovereignty over territorial seas
and allow the proclamation of a contiguous zone for a range of discovery activities.
2011, Item 11 of the ProvisionalAgenda: Protection of the PalestinianCulturaland Natural Heritage,
U.N. Doc. WHC-11/35.COM/l (May 27, 2011).
256. See Press Release, UNESCO, Executive Board Adopts Five Decisions Concerning
UNESCO's Work in the Occupied Palestinian and Arab Territories, UNESCO Press Release (Oct. 21,
2010), availableathttp://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/executiveboard
adopts five_decisionsconcerningunescoswork in the occupied.palestinian andarab territories/
(stating that UNECSO classified Rachel's Tomb/Bilal bin Rabah as a mosque and said that it forms "an
integral part of the occupied Palestinian territory").
257. Another venue open to Palestine in this regard is UNESCO's Intergovernmental Committee
for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of
Illicit Appropriation. See Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of CulturalProperty
to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, UNESCO.oRG,
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URLIED-35283&URLDO-DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=
201.html (last updated Sept. 23, 2010, 7:55 AM).
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Most recently, Palestine has become a full member of the International Union
for Conservation of Nature,258 an important step given the effects that the
Separation Wall, settlements, and their ensuing infrastructure have had on the
Palestinian landscape. One of the most urgent steps, recalled by the UNESCO
Ramallah office, is the drafting and promulgation of a new Palestinian law on
cultural heritage protection, which would be widely sensitized to ensure the
effective combat of looting of sites; notably, enforcement activities for such a law
would be limited so long as Israel maintains effective control over the territory.
Effective protection for Palestinian heritage can only be attained by
reconnecting the Palestinian people with their cultural and natural heritage. The
UNESCO framework combines to support the principal Palestinian interest of
regaining control and possession over cultural heritage, and ensuring that it is
managed under Palestinian sovereignty and governed by Palestinian law, in
accordance with international standards. Along with its ratification of the
specialized UNESCO instruments, Palestine should seriously consider the
ratification of other international treaties, including human rights conventions,
which would provide an important complement to the UNESCO framework by
strengthening protection for cultural rights, inter alia. The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights displays the "Vienna formula", reading in
Article 26(1): "The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of
the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies."
VII. CONCLUSION
UNESCO membership represents an important progression for Palestine. By
asserting its possession of rights, claiming respect for these rights, and engaging in
legal relations-through accession to international organizations and conclusion of
treaties-Palestine is both substantiating and operationalizing its international legal
personality. In doing so, Palestine is also gaining additional tools to assert the
rights it formally enjoys and should be able to exercise, as an internationally
recognized state, with well over 130 bilateral state recognitions. Indeed, the
effects of Palestine's membership of UNESCO and its accession to UNESCO's
international conventions are broader than its specific thematic focus.
Palestine's UNESCO membership has facilitated its participation as an
observer in the June 2012 meeting of the State Parties to the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, which was objected to by Canada, the United States and Israel, the
latter referring to the upgrade as an act of "political posturing."25 9 The 29

258. Nasouh Nazzal, Palestine Becomes Member of International Union for Conservation of
Nature, GULF NEWS (Feb. 12, 2012), http://gulfnews.com/news/region/palestinian-territories/palestinebecomes-member-of-intemational-union-for-conservation-of-nature-1.979595.
259. Press Release, Dep't. of Pub. Info., Law of Sea Convention States Parties Open Session Amid
Praise for Tribunal's Landmark Boundary Ruling, Seabed Disputes Chambers' Advisory Opinion, U.N.
Press Release SEA/1986 (June 4, 2012). See also Press Release, Dep't. of Pub. Info., Law of Sea States
Paikties Fill One More Seat on Continental Shelf Commission, As Work Continues to Hammer Out
Budget for International Tribunal, U.N. Press Release SEA/1972 (June 7, 2012).
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November 2012 General Assembly resolution has, in turn, furthered this process
by strengthening Palestine's status as a state in international law, including for the
purpose of the International Criminal Court Prosecutor's self-assigned
requirements.
The initial implications are the imposition of a wide protective framework
around Palestine's cultural and natural heritage, as well as an established
mechanism for restitution and prevention of future theft or illegal export of
artifacts. Palestine should seek to fortify this protection framework by ratifying
other international rights conventions guaranteeing the enjoyment of social and
cultural rights. Such steps not only constitute an expression of Palestinian
sovereignty in the spirit of what is termed Palestine's "U.N. bid," but also
represent a means of moving beyond the cultural property protection framework to
propel the integration of the State of Palestine within the international legal order.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the conclusion of World War II several new states have been created as
a result of unilateral non-colonial ("UNC") secession.' These include Bangladesh
(Pakistan), Eritrea (Ethiopia), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia, Kosovo (Yugoslavia), and South Sudan (Sudan). 2
Some well-known examples of attempted UJNC secession include Serbian Krajina
(Croatia), Chechnya (Russian Federation), Gagauzia (Moldova), Transnistria
(Moldova), Abkhazia (Georgia),3 and South Ossetia (Georgia).4
These

* Dr. Glen Anderson is a Lecturer in law at Newcastle University Australia and has previously been
employed at the School of Law Macquarie University Australia. He has also published on the definition
of secession in international law and relations with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review (publication forthcoming) and the use of force and unilateral non-colonial
secession with the Connecticut Journal of International Law (publication forthcoming).
1. Secession can be unilateral or consensual. In the case of the former, secession occurs without
the existing state's consent. By contrast, consensual secession receives the existing state's imprimatur.
Consensual secession can be conceptually subdivided into constitutional and politically negotiated
secession. Secession may occur in a colonial or a non-colonial context, as any new assertion of
sovereignty over a colonial territory or part of an existing state involves a modification to the
sovereignty of the metropolitan power or existing state respectively. For scholars who propound that
secession may occur in a colonial or a non-colonial context, see HANNA BOKOR-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 53 (1978); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION

OF STATES ININTERNATIONAL LAW 330, 370 (2d ed. 2007); INGRID DETTER DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 14-16 (1st ed. 1974); THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELFDETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 180-81 (1997); FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICAN
CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND
SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY INAFRICA 235-36 (2003); PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2002); Christine Haverland, Secession, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 384, 384-87 (10th ed. 1987); Patrick Thomberry, Self-Determination and
Indigenous Peoples: Objections and Responses, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 39, 52-54 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000); Frank
Przetacznik, The Basic Collective Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations as a
Prerequisitefor Peace, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 49, 103 (1990-91).
2. South Sudan might alternatively be considered a consensual secession, given that it was
ultimately achieved by way of a referendum. See Anthony J. Christopher, Secession and South Sudan:
an African Precedentfor the Future,93 S. AFR. GEOGRAPHICAL J. 125, 125-132 (2011) (explaining that
an agreement regarding a constitutional means of attaining secession was effective); Peter Radan,
Secessionist Referenda in InternationalandDomestic Law, 18 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLS. 8, 8-21
(2012). It should be noted, however, that this vote was the ultimate culmination of "the longest civil
conflict on the continent [of Africa]." Khalid Medani, Strife and Secession in Sudan, 22 J. DEMOCRACY
135, 135 (2011). The secession of South Sudan might therefore be classified as unilateral in substance.
3. Abkhazia may eventually become a successful UNC secession, given that the Russian
Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu, and Tuvalu extended recognition on 26 August
2008, 5 September 2008, 10 September 2009, 15 December 2009, 23 May 2011, and 18 September
2011 respectively. But see Jelena Radoman, FutureKosovo Status - Precedent or UniversalSolution, 3
W. BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER 14, 17 (2006). For discussion of the Abkhazia conflict in general,
see Antje Herrberg, Conflict Resolution in Georgia: A Synthesis Analysis with a Legal Perspective,
CRISIS MGMT. INITIATIVE (CMI) (2006), http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CMIGeorgia
conflictresolutionsynthesisanalysis.pdf
4. South Ossetia may eventually become a successful UNC secession, given that the Russian
Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Tuvalu have extended recognition on Aug 26, 2008,
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examples-along with many others-demonstrate that UNC secession is an
important method of state creation.
The present article examines whether a right to UNC secession is contained in
United Nations ("U.N.") declaratory General Assembly resolutions, and if so, what
might be the legal effect of such a right. Examination of declaratory General
Assembly resolutions is critical to establishing a right to UNC secession in
international law.5 This is because scant-if any-support for such a right can be
found in treaty law. 6 Yet UNC secession is a well-recognised method of state
creation,7 which by its very nature leads to a sovereignty conflict between the
existing state and the (putative) secessionist state. The primary rules invoked for
the resolution of this conflict are those relating to the international law of selfdetermination. It is this body of law, as developed and applied primarily by the
U.N., which provides justification for the creation of a new state by way of UNC
secession.
Two declaratory General Assembly resolutions arguably provide a qualified8
right to UNC secession for peoples: The Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations9 ("Friendly Relations
Declaration") and the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the United Nations'o ("Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration"). The article's first half
examines the textual content of these instruments asking two interrelated
questions: first, "what does the term 'peoples' mean?"; and second, "does the law
of self-determination provide peoples-however defined-with a right to UNC
secession?"" Both questions are controversial, with various scholars arguing

Sept. 5, 2008, Sept. 10, 2009, Dec. 15, 2009, and Sept. 19, 2011 respectively. For discussion of the
South Ossetia Conflict in general, see Radoman, supra note 3; Herrberg, supra note 3; Gerard Toal,
Russia's Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia, 49 EuRASIAN
GEOGRAPHY & EcoN. 670, 670 (2008), available at http://www.colorado.edu/geography/classhornepa
ges/geog_4712_fD8/ToalSouthOssetia.pdf.
5. On the ability of declaratory General Assembly resolutions to influence legal norms generally,
see Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J. 226, 70 (July 8);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 193
(June 27).
6. Such a right can arguably be construed from the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, particularly Articles 20(2) and 20(3). African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul
Charter), art. 20, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58. In any event, this instrument only has narrow application
being solely binding upon African Union states. The African Charter does not establish a general
international legal right to UNC secession.
7. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supranote 1, at 375.
8. The right is qualified in the sense that it is not open ended; it is only available to peoples who
have been subject to sustained and systematic discrimination "of any kind" by their existing state. See
G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. Doc. AIRES/50/6 (Oct. 24, 1995) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 50/6]. The right
contained in these declaratory instruments therefore has a relatively high threshold to meet.
9. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
10. G.A. Res. 50/6, supranote 8.
11. When examining the precise parameters of self-determination in the instruments that follow,
orthodox canons of interpretation will be employed. Whenever possible, key words and phrases will be
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forl2 and against the extension of "peoples" to the non-colonial context and a
right of peoples to UNC secession respectively.
The article's second half investigates the legal effect of declaratory General
Assembly resolutions from a variety of perspectives, including whether they (1)
constitute authentic interpretations of the U.N. Charter, (2) create binding
customary law, (3) serve to create general principles of international law, and (4)
can create new law by way of consensus. This investigation is vital to precisely
understanding the legal effects of textually articulated rights in declaratory General
Assembly resolutions. This is especially the case given the implications of UNC
secession: can declaratory General Assembly resolutions create a right that even
partly undermines the well-established principles of state sovereignty and
territorial integrity?
The article concludes that the Friendly Relations Declaration and Fiftieth
Anniversary Declaration articulate a qualified right to UNC secession, but that this
right will only gain legal effect by way of customary law. Furthermore, it is
determined that a customary law right to UNC secession will only be legally
perfected by state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions. In other words
state practice in relation to UNC secessionist disputes, particularly grants of
recognition to UNC secessionist groups, must be concomitant with the qualified
right to UNC secession articulated in declaratory General Assembly resolutions.
II.

THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS ("FRIENDLY RELATIONS
DECLARATION")

The Friendly Relations Declarationl 4 was adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in October 1970, and as the name suggests, enumerates principles of
international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states. I5

construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning, with regard for the particular instrument's
"object and purpose," as laid down by Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
When, however, key words and phrases remain "ambiguous or obscure," resort will also be made to the
travaux prdparatoires (preparatory work, normally of a documentary nature) and proc~s verbaux
(preparatory work, documenting oral debate), as enumerated by the Vienna Convention in Article 32(a).
Id. art. 32(a).
12. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 119-20

(1999); RADAN, supranote 1, at 52.
13. See Guyora Binder, The Case for Self-Determination, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 223, 238 (1993);
Donald L. Horowitz, A Right to Secede?, in SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION 50, 64 (Stephen
Macedo & Allen Buchanan eds., 2003).
14. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9.
15. These principles include (1) the prohibition on the threat or use of force, (2) the peaceful
settlement of disputes, (3) non-intervention, (4) the duty to cooperate, (5) equal rights and selfdetermination, (6) the sovereign equality of states, and (7) good faith and the fulfilment of obligations.
Id. at pmbl., Ti (a)-(g); Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 713 (1971). See generally V.S.
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Principle 5 deals with the "equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and
given its centrality to the present article is reproduced in extenso below:
[1] By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have
the rights freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
[2] Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to
render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the
responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the
implementation of the principle, in order:
(a) to promote friendly relations and co-operation among States;
and
(b) to bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to
the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned;
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as
well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the
Charter.
[3] Every State has a duty to promote through joint and separate action
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in accordance with the Charter.
[4] The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by the people.
[5] Every State has a duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the principle of
their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In
actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the
exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to
seek and receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter.
[6] The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has,
under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the
State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the
Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or non-self-governing
MANI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DEBATES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG STATES (1993) (giving a detailed analysis of these principles).
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territory have exercised their right to self-determination in accordance
with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.
[7] Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race,
creed or colour.
[8] Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State
or country.' 6
A. The Meaning of "Peoples"
Although the word "peoples" is mentioned in the Declaration's preamble,' 7
Principle 1,18 and Principle 3,19 the first significant application of the term occurs
in Principle 5, paragraph 1:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have
the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter. 20
Paragraph 1 thus mentions "State[s]" and "peoples" as two separate concepts. It
also creates a nexus between "peoples" and "cultural development," the latter of
which resembles some aspects of the definition of a nation. 21 Additionally,

16. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, at 123-124.
17. Id. at pmbl.
18. Id. at 122 ("The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations . . .. Every State has the duty to refrain
from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence.").
19. Id. at 123 ("The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter .... The use of force to deprive people of their
national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of nonintervention.").
20. Id. at 123 (Principle 5 is "[t]he principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.").
21. "Culture," consisting of language and customs, has long been associated with national
identity. For a similar argument regarding the nexus between "peoples" and "cultural development" in
the context of the U.N. Charter and Article 73(a), see RADAN, supra note 1, at 31. The link between
"culture" and "peoples" also finds support at page 123 of the Friendly Relations Declaration: "[t]he use
of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights
and of the principle of non-intervention." G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 123 (emphasis added).
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paragraph I declares that "all peoples" 22 enjoy the right to self-determination,
which prima facie indicates that "peoples" is an expression of broad and general
applicability extending to the colonial and non-colonial context.23
A similar conclusion is reached by examination of Principle 5, paragraph 2,
which once again mentions "State[s]" and "peoples" as two distinct concepts.24
Furthermore, sub-paragraph 2(b) indicates that peoples may exist in a colonial
context, and then supplements this with the addendum that "subjection of peoples
to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" is contrary to the U.N.
Charter.25 Unless the latter phrase is pleonastic, it would seem to indicate that
peoples can also exist in a non-colonial context, as situations of "alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation" are not unique to colonisation.
Principle 5, paragraph 4 reiterates, the content of Principle VI of Resolution
154126 regarding the methods by which a people may exercise their right to
external self-determination.27

However, unlike Principle VI, the paragraph does

not explicitly seek to limit the application of its content to colonial peoples. This
difference is crucial, as it arguably opens the possibility for paragraph 4 to apply to
non-colonial peoples. Paragraph 4 would thus seem to comport with the meaning
of "peoples" as deduced from paragraphs 1 and 2.
Principle 5, paragraph 5 deals with the duty of "states" to refrain from action
that would deprive "peoples" of their right to self-determination. The paragraph's
phraseology therefore implicitly reaffirms that states and peoples are two distinct
concepts. Furthermore, if it is accepted that paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 imply that
peoples may exist in a colonial and non-colonial context, it follows that the
directive contained in paragraph 5 must also apply to peoples in a colonial and
non-colonial context.
Principle 5, paragraph 6 deals exclusively with peoples in a colonial context,
as indicated by the opening phrase, "[t]he territory of a colony or other Non-SelfGoverning Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the
22. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 123 (emphasis added).
23. See gukovi6, who when contemplating the meaning of "peoples" within the Friendly Relations
Declaration notes that "[i]n the end the opinion prevailed that the right of peoples to self-determination
had a universal character and that this right belonged to all peoples regardless of whether they had
gained independence or not." Olga gukovid, Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of
Peoples, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION 323, 346 (Milan gahovid ed., 1972) (emphasis in original).
24. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 123-124.
25. Id. at 124.
26. Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists
to Transmit the Information Called for under Article 73e of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Principle
VI, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960). This resolution served as the interpretative
counterpart to the 1960 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
27. Principle VI of Resolution 1541 states, "A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have
reached a full measure of self-government by: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free
association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State." G.A. Res. 1541,
supranote 26, at 29.
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territory of the State administering it." 28 The fact that paragraph 6 explicitly
confines its purpose to colonial peoples is significant for the fact that the other
paragraphs preceding it do not explicitly confine their purpose to colonial peoples.
This is further inferential evidence that the preceding paragraphs-1, 2, 4, and 5refer to peoples beyond the colonial context.
Paragraph 6 continues by noting "such separate and distinct status under the
Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory
have exercised their right of self-determination . . . .29 Crucially, paragraph 6
would seem to indicate that only one people can exist within a non-self-governing
territory, as the plural "peoples" is not employed. 30 This drafting is inconsistent
with Articles 73, 73(b), and 76(b) of the U.N. Charter, all of which indicate that
more than one people may inhabit a non-self-governing territory. 31 It is also
inconsistent with Principles 2, 7(a), 8, and 9 of Resolution 1541, all of which
32
suggest that more than one people can inhabit a non-self-governing territory. On
balance, therefore, the failure of paragraph 6 to use the plural term "peoples"
probably constitutes a drafting error.
Principle 5, paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 arguably moves beyond the
colonial context when employing the term "peoples":
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour.33
Paragraph 7 hence links its content to "sovereign and independent States," which
would, on balance, seem to refer to "States"-not non-self-governing territories.
Although it may be argued that metropolitan powers34 are "States" responsible for
non-self-governing territories, this does not seem to be the primary objective of
paragraph 7. This reasoning is not negated by the subsequent phrase: "States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples as described above," which necessarily requires that all
28. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Paragraph 6 is consistent only with Principle VII(b) of Resolution 1541, which states, "The
associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside
interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the
people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free
association agreed upon." G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 26, at 29-30.
32. Id. at 29-30.
33. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
34. A "metropolitan" power is a state which has responsibility for a non-self-governing territory
as enumerated in Principles V and VI of Resolution 1541. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 26, at 29.
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other paragraphs before paragraph 7 must be considered-as paragraphs 1, 2, 4,
and 5 indicate-that peoples may exist in a colonial and non-colonial context.
Only paragraph 6 restricts its discussion of peoples to the non-self-governing or
colonial context. It would thus seem highly probable that paragraph 7 is
addressing its comments to sovereign states, which by implication confirms the
applicability of the term "peoples" to the non-colonial context.
Paragraph 7 does, however, contain some drafting problems. This is because
although it applies the term "peoples" to the non-colonial context, taken literally, it

suggests that only one people may constitute a sovereign state. This is revealed by
the phrase "thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory . . . ."35 If it is accepted that "peoples" may refer to

national groups within non-self-governing territories and states, as indicated by
Articles 73, 73(b), and 76(b) of the U.N. Charter and Principles 2, 7(a), 8, and 9 of
Resolution 1541, it would seem that the drafting of paragraph 7 is incorrect. This
is because the phrase "whole people belonging to the territory" suggests that there
may only be one people within a state. Moreover the phrase "without distinction
as to race, creed or colour," which proceeds the phrase "whole people belonging to
the territory," suggests that states are not monolithic units and comprise sub-state
groups.36 Paragraph 7 should perhaps have used the phrase "thus possessed of a
government representing all peoples belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour." This use of the plural "peoples" would bring
paragraph 7 unambiguously into line with other prior U.N. instruments, including
the U.N. Charter, which the Friendly Relations Declaration was drafted to be in
accordance with, as indicated by the latter's extended title-Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance With the Charterof the UnitedNations.

35. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124 (emphasis added). Pentassuglia states that "[a] narrow
reading of the clause [at page 124] is suggested by the 'whole people' formula: it is precisely the whole
people, not individual groups comprising it, to be entitled to react to oppressive regimes." Gaetano
Pentassuglia, State Sovereignty, Minorities and Self-Determination: A Comprehensive Legal View, 9
INT'L J. MINORITY & GRP. RTS. 303, 311 (2002); loms argues that "even though the whole people may
have a right of self-determination under the Declaration, a part of that whole may not have any separate
right." Catherine J. lorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty,
24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 199, 260 (1992). Thonberry has argued that "the point is that 'whole'
territories or peoples are the focus of rights, rather than ethnic groups . . . ." Patrick Thornberry, SelfDetermination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of InternationalInstruments, 38 INT'L & COMP.

L.Q. 867, 877 (1989).
36. Radan, for example, has noted that "[tihis 'without distinction' provision implies the existence
of different groups as parts of a state's entire population. If there was no recognition that such groups
could exist within a state, the 'without distinction' provision would be superfluous." RADAN, supranote
1, at 60. Duursma has similarly noted "'[t]he whole people' of paragraph 7 of the Declaration means
either that one State can have but one people, or that within a State more than one people can coexist.
The latter meaning seems correct if we read it in combination with the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of race, creed or colour." JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES 25 (James Crawford et al. eds., 1996).

354

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 41: 3

B. A Right ofPeoples to UNC Secession?

Principle 5, paragraph I specifies "[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights

and self-determination of peoples . . . all peoples have the right freely to determine

. . . their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development . . ." Paragraph I thus makes clear that self-determination applies to
"all peoples," which has been determined in the previous section to
include
colonial and non-colonial peoples.37 Paragraph 1 also reveals that selfdetermination is a right, declaring, "every State has the duty to respect this right."38
The use of the words "duty" and "right" strongly suggests that there are remedies
for the breach of such a right.39 However, examined in isolation, paragraph 1

provides little insight as to whether potential remedies might include UNC
secession.

Principle 5, paragraph 2 affirms the applicability of the right of peoples to

self-determination in cases of colonialism and situations of "alien subjugation,
40

domination and exploitation."
Although the phrase "alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation" includes colonial situations, it also captures noncolonial situations. Beyond this finding, however, paragraph 2 fails to yield
further information.
Principle 5, paragraph 4 enumerates the ways in which a people might pursue
their external self-determination, namely, the establishment of "a sovereign and
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people." 41 As
observed in the previous section, paragraph 4, although based upon the text of
Resolution 1541, does not restrict its application specifically to non-self-governing
peoples. In other words, paragraph 4 is deliberately unspecific as to which types of
peoples its content applies. This generates the conclusion that one of the modes of
external self-determination-the establishment of "a sovereign and independent
State"-may apply to colonial and non-colonial peoples, with the latter by
necessity opening the possibility of UNC secession.

Principle 5, paragraph 5 deals with the duty of states "to refrain from any

forcible action which deprives peoples . .. of their right to self-determination and
freedom and independence." 42 Paragraph 5-like paragraph 4-is deliberately
unspecific as to the types of peoples its content is applicable to, with the logical
corollary that it likely applies to colonial and non-colonial peoples. It follows that
where a breach of internal self-determination has occurred, the afflicted people
37. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, at 123.
3 8. Id.
39. Here the Latin maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (there cannot be a right without a remedy) is
relevant. See generally Olga ukovid, Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples, in
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION
323,
331-332 (Milan ahovid ed., 1972).
40. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
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should not be forcibly deprived of their right to remedy this situation by the pursuit
of external self-determination, as indicated by the words "freedom and
independence." By implication, therefore, paragraph 5 would seem to endorse
unilateral colonial ("UC") and UNC secession.43
Principle 5, paragraph 7 provides the clearest grounds for UNC secession,
with an a contrario reading indicating that only those "States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people

belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour"44 will be
guaranteed their "territorial integrity or political unity."45 Paragraph 7 thus
stipulates that if a state does not represent the whole population, or discriminates
on the grounds of "race, creed or colour," 46 it is in violation of the right to selfdetermination and therefore illegitimate. 7 In order to rectify this situation,
secessionist activities that would "dismember or impair, totally or in part the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States" appear
to be implicitly endorsed.48 A priori, paragraph 7 contains a right to UNC
secession.
This right is a qualified one, however, with paragraph 7 stipulating that noncolonial peoples may only "dismember or impair, totally or in part the territorial
integrity and political unity of sovereign States" when they are subjected to
discrimination on the grounds of "race, creed or colour." 49 This prompts the
question: what exactly do the latter three terms mean? As the Declaration's
travauxprdparatoiresandprocks verbaux provide little or no guidance, it has been
left to eminent scholars to formulate their own definitions.
Cassese has provided one of the best known analyses. He argues that the
terms "race" and "colour" express an identical concept-race-and represent a
43. The implications of this paragraph for unilateral non-colonial secession are, with perhaps the
exception of Castellino's circumspect comments, universally unacknowledged by scholars who instead
prefer to focus on the more textually obvious paragraph 7 of principle 5. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL
POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-COLONIAL 'NATIONAL' IDENTITY 39-40 (2000).
44. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, at 124.
45. Id.
46. Id. Such behaviour would likely offend Articles 2, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 2, 7(a)(i), possibly 13(1) and 15(1)(a)
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights arts. 2, 14, 17-18, 24-27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 2, 7(a)(i), 13(1), 15(l)(a), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
47. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
48. W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-Determination, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 349, 362-63
(Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995); RADAN, supra note 1, at 52-53; LEE C.
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 92-93 (1978); Rosenstock, supra
note 15, at 732; M. Rafiqul Islam, Secession Crisis in PapuaNew Guinea: The ProclaimedRepublic of
Bougainville in InternationalLaw, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 453, 456-61 (1991); Jordan J. Paust, SelfDetermination:A DefinitionalFocus, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS 3, 7 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980).
49. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, at 124.
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pleonasm originating from Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human
Rights.o Cassese strictly construes "race" as only connoting physical somatic
differences, explicitly rejecting any definition that encompasses factors such as
language or culture.5 1 He further postulates that the meaning of "creed" is
restricted to "religious beliefs,, 5 2 rather than the broader definition provided by the
Oxford English Dictionary: "a set of opinions on any subject."5 3 Cassese arrives at
this conclusion by arguing that if "creed" encompassed the broader Oxford
definition, "a set of opinions on any subject," a government not representing the
opinions of a people, even if democratically elected, could be interpreted as
violating that people's right to self-determination. 54 He therefore concludes that
the right to UNC secession contained in paragraph 7 is activated only on the
grounds of racial or religious discrimination against a people.5 5
Cassese's first point-that the terms "race" and "colour" represent a
pleonasm-is convincing for the following reason: it is difficult, if not impossible,
to imagine a situation where two or more peoples may be of a different colour,
whilst at the same time not also constituting a different race.
Less convincing, however, is Cassese's narrow definition of "race," which is
confined to physical somatic differences. As Radan points out, prior to the
adoption of the Friendly Relations Declaration in 1970, the words "race" and
"nation"-the latter of which incorporates sociological elements, such as language
and culture-were often used interchangeably.5 6 To illustrate this point, Radan
quotes Hobsbawm:
[W]hat brought 'race' and 'nation' even closer was the practice of using
both as virtual synonyms, generalizing equally widely about
'racial'/'national' character, as was then the fashion. Thus before the
Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904, a French writer observed,
agreement between the two countries had been dismissed as impossible
because of the 'hereditary enmity' between the two races.5 7

50. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights provides that "[e]veryone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent,
trust, non-self-goveming or under any other limitation of sovereignty." Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). See CASSESE, supra
note 12, at 112.
51. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 112.
52. Id.
53. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1157 (2d ed. 1933).
54. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 112-13.
55. Cassese does not use the word "people" in his analysis of the terms "race, creed or colour."
Although, as Radan asserts, "it is hard to see how [Cassese] could deny [that a group is a people], given
that only peoples have the right to self-determination." RADAN, supra note 1, at 56 n.132.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Id. (quoting ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME,
MYTH, REALIrY 108-09 (1990)). Brownlie also agrees with this interpretation, asserting "[tihe concept
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This same tendency is also prevalent in the U.N. Charter's travaux
prdparatoires,which demonstrate that on numerous occasions the word "race" was
used interchangeably with "peoples." 8 In the Summary Report of the Sixth
Meeting of Committee 11/4 of 17 May 1945, for example, a sentence appeared
stating:
[n]othing in the Charter should contravene the principle of the equality
of all races; and their right to self-determination, whether it resulted in
independence or not, should be recognized.
The synonymy between "races" and "peoples" evident above is important, as the
Charter's travaux also reveals that the word "peoples" captures the concept of
"nations." 60 Adding further weight to the argument for an expansive interpretation
of the word "race" is the definition provided by the Oxford English Dictionary: "a
tribe, nation or people, regarded as of common stock." 6 '
Further evidence of the synonymy between "races" and "nations" is provided
by the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Article 1 of which contains the most widely accepted definition of
"racial discrimination" stating:
[i]n this convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any
distinction, exclusion or restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin.62
It follows that the notion of racial discrimination encompasses distinction or
exclusion based upon and related to "national or ethnic origin." It may be
reasonably inferred then that the term "race" not only connotes physical somatic
differences, but also other factors associated with nationality and ethnicity, such as
language, culture and customs. Although proponents of a restrictive interpretation
of "race" may argue that the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination does not constitute text of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, it could hardly be suggested that the most important international

of [a people's] distinct character depends on a number of criteria which may appear in combination.
Race (or nationality) is one of the more important of the relevant criteria, but the concept of race can
only be expressed scientifically in terms of more specific features, in which matters of culture,
language, religion and group psychology predominate." Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern
InternationalLaw, 9 BULL. AUSTL. Soc'Y LEGAL PHIL. 104, 108 (1985).
58. RADAN, supra note 1, at 58. See also, e.g., United Nations Conference on International
Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26, 1945, Belgian Delegation Amendment to Paragraph 2 of
Chapter 1, 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.374/17 (Vol. 6) (May 17, 1945); United Nations Conference on
International Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26, 1945, New Uruguayan Proposals on
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2 (Vol. 3) (May 5, 1945).
59. United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945, Summary Report of the Sixth
Meeting of Committee 11/4, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.404/17 (Vol. 10) (May 17, 1945).
60. RADAN, supranote 1, at 58-59.
61. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 87 (8th ed. 1933).
62. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 1, 1 1,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3940.html.

358

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 41: 3

document expounding on matters of racial discrimination should be ignored, or
63
even worse, contradicted, when construing paragraph 7.
Thus, to confine the meaning of "race" purely to physical somatic differences,
as Cassese advocates, is unjustified. The term "race" should also be read as
connoting other factors associated with nations, such as language, culture, and
customs. It is entirely conceivable therefore, that linguistic, cultural, and
customary discrimination could be covered by paragraph 7. 4 A priori, peoples
subjected to linguistic, cultural, or customary discrimination within sovereign
states could be entitled to UNC secession.
Cassese's interpretation of "creed"-confined only to religious groups-is
more convincing. As noted above, if the broad definition of creed were to be
accepted-"a set of opinions on any subject"-a government not specifically
representing the opinions of a people, even if democratically elected, could be
interpreted as violating that people's right to self-determination. This in turn
would open the possibility for unlimited UNC secession, having chaotic and
destabilizing implications for international politics-hardly the intention of
drafters. "Creed" should thus be understood as only endorsing UNC secession
where a people experience religious discrimination.65
To recapitulate, paragraph 7 only guarantees the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states conducting themselves "in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a

government representing the whole population belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour."66 The words "race," "creed," and "colour"
clearly encompass racial, linguistic, cultural, customary, and religious
discrimination. A priori, a prima facie right to UNC secession exists in cases of
racial, linguistic, cultural, customary, and religious discrimination. Paragraph 7
therefore has a wide operational ambit and is not confined merely to racially
discriminatory regimes.67

63. This fact is further reinforced by the case of Iran v. United States, where the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal indicated that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT")
allows analysis of other legal documents in the relevant subject area when construing an instrument's
parameters. Iran v. United States, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984). Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT
provides that when construing the meaning of an instrument, "any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties" may be utilized. Id.; see also MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 935 (6th ed. 2008).

64. This is a finding explicitly ruled out by Cassese, who argues "the right of internal selfdetermination embodied in the 1970 declaration is a right conferred only on racial or religious groups
living in a sovereign State which are denied access to the political decision making process; linguistic
or national groups do not have a concomitant right." CASSESE, supra note 12, at 114 (emphasis in
original).
65. This is supported by a holistic examination of "creed" within the Oxford English Dictionary,
which suggests that the primary meaning of the term is confined to religious belief. See OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1157. Paragraph 7 ought to have, therefore, used the word
"religion" rather than "creed" to avoid confusion and ambiguity.
66. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, at 124.
67. The primary example of such a regime would be apartheid South Africa.
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It should be noted, however, that although paragraph 7 explicitly qualifies the
right to UNC secession to discrimination based on "race, creed or colour," four
further implicit qualifying conditions are also likely attached. First, as Cassese has
correctly observed, the right will only be exercisable where the discrimination is of
a deliberate, sustained, and systematic nature, with "the exclusion of any likelihood
for a possible peaceful solution within the existing state structure." ,68 Thus,
isolated instances of discrimination, or unwitting application of discriminatory
principles by a government against a people, will not automatically invoke a right
to UNC secession. An additional level of dolus, or intentional malice, such as
flagrant disregard for fundamental human rights, is necessary. These requirements
operate as a general "threshold test" for the operation of paragraph 7 rights,
ensuring that UNC secession is only permitted under especially egregious
conditions.
A second and related qualifying condition arguably implicit in paragraph 7although almost universally unacknowledged by scholars-is that the deliberate,
sustained,
and
systematic
discrimination
must
possess
sufficient
contemporaneousness. In other words, there must be a sufficient temporal nexus
between the alleged discrimination and the resultant claim for UNC secession.
Without this requirement, UNC secession would be permitted based on human
rights abuses that might have occurred hundreds of years earlier.6 9 The precise
time necessary for the expiration of a right to UNC secession is obviously
debatable, although it is submitted here that a minimum time of ten to fifteen years
from the cessation of abuses would be required. Certainly, a short time period,
such as five years, should not jeopardize a valid claim. 70
A third qualifying condition arguably implicit in paragraph 7 is that any state
established by UNC secession must ensure that the human rights of minoritiesespecially those minority groups that were previously part of the oppressive
majority-are protected, preferably by way of constitutional structures. This
condition, which might for convenience be termed the "internal consistency

68. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 120. For similar comments, see Dietrich Murswiek, The Issue ofa
Right to Secession - Reconsidered, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 21, 26 (Christian

Tomuschat ed., 1993); Katherine Doehring, Self-Determination, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 56, 66 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994); Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Spirit and Letter
of the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples: Reflections on the Making of the United
Nations Draft Declaration, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-

DETERMINATION 67, 76 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000).
69. Goodwin has remarked, "[t]he integration of Mercia into the emerging English nation at the
point of the sword of the King of Wessex was probably no laughing matter, even by 10th century
standards; could it be used as a basis for a claim to secede from its southern neighbours?" Morag
Goodwin, From Province to Protectorateto State? Speculation on the Impact of Kosovo's Genesis
upon the DoctrinesofInternationalLaw, 8 GERMAN L. J. 1, 6 (2007), available at http://www.germanla
wjoumal.com/index.php?pagelD=11&artllD786. See also G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, at 124.
70. Goodwin, although pondering the length of time necessary for the expiration of a qualified
right to unilateral non-colonial secession, does not suggest an answer. Goodwin, supranote 69, at 6-7.
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principle," would ensure that the law of self-determination cannot, under any
circumstances, be utilized to foster or perpetuate human rights violations. 7
Finally, any UNC secession pursuant to paragraph 7 would be required to
comply with the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territorial claim, a government, capacity to enter relations
with other states and independence. 72 It would also have to fulfil the criteria for
statehood based on compliance with peremptory norms, in particular, the
prohibition of the illegal use of force.
Failure to satisfy one or more of these
conditions, with the possible exception of effective government,74 would obviously
be fatal to any UNC secession attempt, preventing the attainment of statehood and
precluding existing states from granting critically important recognition.75
71. The internal consistency principle is arguably implicit in General Assembly Resolution
54/183, which prohibits "ethnically based division" and "cantonization" in Kosovo, and hence
discrimination by the majority ethnic group (ethnic Albanians) against other minorities. G.A. Res.
54/183,
7, U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/183 (Feb. 29, 2000). The principle may also be considered as
informing the European Community's Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, promulgated in
late 1991 in response to political events in Europe. The Guidelines enumerate that European
Community member states will "adopt a common position on the process of recognition of ... new
States, which requires," inter alia, "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and
minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE." Danilo
Turk, Recognition of States: A Comment, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 6, 72 (1993). In a purely philosophical
context, an alternative approach to the protection of newly created minorities has been mooted by
Hannum, namely, that they should "enjoy the same right of secession or self-determination that was
asserted by the seceding population." Although philosophically appealing, it is submitted here that it is
probably going too far to read such a condition into paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration.
Hurst Hannum, A Principled Response to Ethnic Self-Determination Claims, in JUSTICE PENDING:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND OTHER GOOD CAUSES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ERICA-IRENE A. DAES 263,
271 (Gudmundur Alfredsson and Maria Stavropoulou eds., 2002). See also Hurst Hannum, The Specter
of Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self-Determination, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at
17, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53801/hurst-hannum/the-specter-of-secessionresponding-to-claims-for-ethnic-self-de.
72. RADAN, supra note 1, at 21, 245; Garth Nettheim, 'Peoples'andPopulations' - Indigenous
Peoples and the Rights of Peoples, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 105, 120 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
On the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness generally, see, for example, IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-72 (7th ed. 2008); CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 45-46;
JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (1987); Thomas D. Grant, Defining

Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 413-14
(1999).
73. On the criteria for statehood based on compliance with peremptory norms generally, see, for
example, Crawford, supra' note 72, at 107; DUURSMA, supra note 36, at 127-28; DAVID RAkl,
STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 156, 167 (2002).
74. Regarding the "compensatory force principle," see RAIC, supranote 73, at 104, 364.
75. See RADAN, supra note 1, at 245; Lawrence M. Frankel, International Law of Secession: New
Rules for a New Era, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 521, 550 (1992); Holly A. Osterland, National SelfDeterminationand Secession: The Slovak Model, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 655, 676-78 (1993); Ved
P. Nanda, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination:Revisiting Self-Determination as an International
Law Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 446
(1997). Lloyd argues the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness played an important role in the
recognition of the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics. David 0. Lloyd, Succession, Secession and
State Membership in the United Nations, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 761, 792-94 (1994).
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The view that UNC secession may be permitted in the event of deliberate,
sustained and systematic discrimination, although clearly antithetical to a statecentric international legal order, is not entirely without precedent. Paragraph 7
does, for example, draw a modicum of support from comments made by the
Commission of Jurists and the Commission of Rapporteurs in the 1920 Aaland
Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden. The dispute arose with the collapse
of the Russian provisional government in October 1917, when Finland-that
included the Aaland Islands-asserted its independence and the islands' Swedish
inhabitants simultaneously sought reunification with Sweden, appealing to the
right of peoples to self-determination.
The Commission of Jurists observed,
"Positive international law does not recognise the right of national groups, as such,
to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple
expression of a wish, any more than it recognises the right of other States to claim
such separation."7 7
Significantly, this finding was followed by a statement that the Commission:
does not give an opinion concerning the question as to whether a
manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power, to the detriment of a
section of the population of a State, would, if such circumstances arose,
give to an international dispute, arising therefrom, such an international
character that its object should be considered as one which is not
confined to the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned.

The above quotation clearly indicates that domestic disputes between segments of
a state's population may assume an international character in the event of
"manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power." 79 It follows that if a segment
of a state's population were subjected to deliberate, sustained and systematic
discrimination, with no prospect for domestic resolution, a right to UNC secession
might arise.
The Commission of Rapporteurs also denied the existence of an unqualified
right to UNC secession, stating:
[i]s it possible to admit as an absolute rule that a minority of the
population of a State, which is definitely constituted and perfectly
capable of fulfilling its duties as such, has the right of separating itself
76. See JAMES BARROS, THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION: ITS SETTLEMENT BY THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS 60-65 (1968); MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 33; Philip Marshall Brown, The Aaland Islands
Question, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 268-69 (1921); Charles Noble Gregory, The Neutralization of the
Aaland Islands, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 64 (1923); Tore Modeen, V6lkerrechtliche Probleme der AlandInseln, 37 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 604, 604 (1977), available at http://www.zaoerv.de/37_1977/37_197
7 3 4 a 604_619.pdf; Tore Modeen, Aaland Islands, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 1-3 (12th ed. 1992); Norman J. Padelford and K. Gosta A. Andersson, The Aaland Islands
Question, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 465, 469 (1939).
77. Report of the Int'l Comm. ofJurists Entrustedby the Councilof the League ofNations with the
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the AalandIslands Question, League of
Nations Doc. C.20/4/238 1920 VII (1920).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id.
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from her in order to be incorporated in another State or to declare its
independence? The answer can only be in the negative. To concede to
minorities, either of language or religion or to any fractions of a
population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they
belong, because it is their wish or good pleasure, would be to destroy
order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in
international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the

very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.80
However, like the Commission of Jurists, the Rapporteurs did not completely
rule out UNC secession:
The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms part and
its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or
the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees [of linguistic,
religious and social freedom].8 '
UNC secession therefore appears to be implicitly endorsed when a "State
lacks either the will or power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees" of
linguistic, religious, and social freedom for a segment of its population.82 In this
sense, both Commissions' comments resemble-albeit circumspectly-the content
of paragraph 7, namely, that state sovereignty and territorial integrity is only
guaranteed in the absence of deliberate, sustained, and systematic discrimination,
and that should such abuses occur, UNC secession constitutes a legitimate ultimum
remedium.83
It might also be argued that the law of decolonization provides further implicit
support for a qualified right to UNC secession. It is undeniable, for example, that
post-1945, the colonization of peoples by imperial powers was regarded as
undesirable. Preambular paragraph I of the 1960 declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 84 ("Colonial Declaration")
describes colonialism as an impediment to "social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom."85 Preambular paragraph 7 similarly asserts that colonialism
"prevents the development of international economic co-operation, [and] impedes
the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples."86 Finally,
preambular paragraph 9 portrays colonialism as tantamount to institutionalized
80. Report Presentedto the Council of the League by the Comm. of Rapporteurs,at 28, League of
Nations Council Document B7.21/68/106 (1921).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Many commentators overlook or obscure these aspects of the Aaland Islands reports. See, e.g.,
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF

CONFLICTING RIGHTS 29 n.86 (1990); Lawrence S. Eastwood Jr., Secession: State Practice and
InternationalLaw After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L

L. 299, 302 (1993).
84. G.A. Res. 1514, supranote 26,
85. Id.
86. Id.

11.
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segregation and discrimination.
The foregoing collectively imply that
colonialism is inherently unjust, whether examined from an economic, social, or
cultural perspective. In order to remedy this injustice, instruments such as the
Colonial Declaration, Resolution 1541, and the Friendly Relations Declaration
declare that primafacie, complete independence should be granted to the peoples
so affected. The law of decolonization therefore functions in a remedial manner,
attempting to eliminate situations of economic, social, and cultural oppression. In
this sense then, the import of Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration operates as a logical extension of the decolonization doctrine.
Accordingly, the notion that territorial integrity and state sovereignty might be
violable under certain strict conditions does not appear entirely anomalous.89
Finally, Principle 5, paragraph 8 declares "[e]very State shall refrain from any
action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial
integrity of any other State or country." 90 The opening words of the paragraph"[e]very State"-suggest that the content of the paragraph applies only to statesnot peoples. This is hardly surprising, given that the entire Declaration is directed
at friendly relations and cooperation among states.91 Thus, paragraph 8 does not in
any way prejudice the qualified right to UNC secession contained in paragraph 7,
which is exercisable by peoples. 92
The Friendly Relations Declaration therefore allows self-determination to
predominate over state sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event of
deliberate, sustained, and systematic discrimination against peoples. By doing so,
the Declaration draws a link between internal self-determination and external selfdetermination: the neglect of the former provides justification for the invoking of
the latter, which may be exercised by UNC secession. 93 This is a seminal
development, challenging-albeit modestly-the incontrovertibility of state
sovereignty and territorial integrity.

87. Id.
88. The other options posited by such instruments include free association with an independent
state and integration with an existing state. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
89. Indeed some scholars, such as Franck and Crawford, have propounded the doctrine of
"internal colonization," which potentially allows peoples within states to unilaterally secede. See Tom
Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in THEMES AND THEORIES: SELECTED
ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND WRITINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 828, 830 (Rosalyn Higgins ed., 2009);
James Crawford, Outside the Colonial Context, in SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 1,

13-14 (W.J. MacArtney ed., 1988).
90. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, at 124.
91. The Declaration's preamble also makes this point: "[r]eaffirming, in accordance with the
Charter, the basic importance of sovereign equality and stressing that the purposes of the United
Nations can be implemented only if states enjoy sovereign equality and comply fully with the
requirements of this principle in their international relations." Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
92. See RADAN, supra note 1, at 56; MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 76; Robin C.A. White, SelfDetermination:Timefor a Reassessment?, 28 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 147, 159 (198 1).
93. See CASSESE, supra note 12, at 120; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees ofSelf-Determination
in the UnitedNations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304,305-06 (1994).
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In addition to Cassese 94 and Radan, 95 numerous other scholars have broadly
concurred with the foregoing analysis. 96 The significance of paragraph 7 was also
noted by the International Commission of Jurists in its 1972 study, The Events in
East Pakistan 1971.97 After stating that paragraph 7 gave primacy to the principle
of territorial integrity, the Commission further remarked:
[i]t is submitted, however, that this principle is subject to the
requirement that the government does comply with the principle of
equal rights and does represent the whole people without distinction. If
one of the constituent peoples of a state is denied equal rights and is
discriminated against, it is submitted that their full right to selfdetermination will revive. 9 8

94. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 119-20 ("Although secession is implicitly authorized by the
Declaration, it must however be strictly construed, as with all exceptions. It can therefore be suggested

that the following conditions might warrant secession: when the central authorities of a sovereign State
persistently refuse to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically
trample upon their fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within
the framework of the State structure. Thus a denial of the basic right of representation does not give rise
per se to the right of secession. In addition, there must be gross breaches of fundamental human rights,
and, what is more, the exclusion of any likelihood for a peaceful resolution within the existing State
structure.").
95. RADAN, supra note 1, at 52 ("The very essence of paragraph 7 is that a state's territorial
integrity is assured only under certain conditions. These conditions require a state to conduct itself in
such a way that certain groups within the state are not subjected to particular discrimination. If groups
are subjected to discrimination they are entitled to secede.").
96. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 48, at 92; CASSESE, supra note 12, at 118-20; CRAWFORD, supra
note 1, at 119; C. Lloyd Brown-John, Self-Determination, Autonomy and State Secession in Federal
Constitutional and InternationalLaw, 40 S. TEX. L. REv. 567, 588 (1999). See also James Crawford,
Right of Self-Determination in InternationalLaw, in PEOPLES' RIGHTS 57 (Philip Alston ed., 2001);
HtCTOR GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS

RESOLUTIONS 10 (1980); Neil Finkelstein, George Vegh & Camille Joy, Does Quebec have a Right to
Secede at InternationalLaw?, 74 CAN. B. REV. 225, 260 (1995); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination
Under InternationalLaw: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 269-70
(1981); Paust, supra note 48, at 7; M. K. Nawaz, Bangladesh and InternationalLaw, 11 INDIAN J. INT'L
L. 251, 256 (1971); Islam, supra note 48, at 458; Don Johnson, Toward Self-determination-A
Reappraisalas Reflected in the Declarationon Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.145, 153
(1973); Otto Kimmich, A 'Federal' Right of Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW OF SELFDETERMINATION 91 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Kirgis, supra note 93, at 308; P. H. Kooijmans,
Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 42 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. R. 211, 216 (1996); Roman
Krys, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, 63 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCES

ET POLITIQUES 289, 297 (1985); H6ctor Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination:Implementation
of United Nations Resolutions, at 10, U.N. Doc. AIE/CN.4/Sub.2/405 (June 20, 1980); Jimdnez de
Ardchaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third ofa Century, in RECUEIL DES COURS 110 (1978); Robert
McCorquodale, Self-DeterminationBeyond the Colonial Context, 4 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 598, 603604 (1992); Murswiek, supra note 68, at 27; MUSGRAVE, supra note 1, at 76; Raid, supra note 73, at
323; M. G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra in Retrospect,
10 TEX. INT'L L. J. 321, 337 (1975).
97. The Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, 1971:
A Legal Study (1972), available at http://nsm I.nsm.iup.edu/sanwar/Bangladesh%2OGenocide.htm.
98. Id. See also RADAN, supra note 1, at 61.
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It follows that UJNC secession is permitted in circumstances where peoples are
subject to discrimination.
Commensurate comments regarding paragraph 7 were rendered by Judge
Yusuf in his Separate Opinion in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion:99
This provision [Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration] makes it clear that so long as a sovereign and independent
State complies with the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, its territorial integrity and national unity should neither be
impaired nor infringed upon. It therefore primarily protects, and gives
priority to, the territorial preservation of States and seeks to avoid their
fragmentation or disintegration due to separatist forces. However the
saving clause in its latter part implies that if a State fails to comport
itself in accordance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, an exceptional situation may arise whereby
the ethnically or racially distinct group denied internal selfdetermination may claim a right of external self-determination

or

separation from the State which could effectively put into question the
State's territorial unity and sovereignty. 00
Judge Yusuf thus interpreted paragraph 7 as making a linkage between the denial
of internal self-determination and the right of peoples to exercise external selfdetermination by way of UNC secession. His comments thus represent a
qualification upon the traditional principles of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
There are some scholars, however, who deny that paragraph 7 endorses UNC
secession. Binder, for example, after reviewing paragraphs 1 and 7, has asserted,
"the Declaration recognized a right of secession not for peoples at all, but for those
territories that happened to be recognized by the United Nations as colonies."' 0
He later concludes "[b]eyond the decolonization context . . . the Declaration
completely absorbed the nationalist component of self-determination into the
sovereignty of existing states."l 02
These observations are manifestly incorrect. Paragraphs 1 and 7 do not restrict
the meaning of the word "peoples" only to colonial situations. On the contrary, as
pointed out above, paragraph I explicitly states that "all peoples" have the right to
99. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 112 (July 22) (separate opinion of Judge Yusuf).
100. Id. See also id. IN182-84 (separate opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade). But see id.1 21-25.
See generally Helen Quane, Self-Determinationand Minority Protection After Kosovo, in KOsovo: A
PRECEDENT?: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 181, 205-06 (James Summers ed., 2011);

John R. Alban, Signal and Affirm: How the United Nations Should Articulate the Right to Remedial
Secession, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 218-221 (2012); Evan G. Brewer, To Break Free from
Tyranny and Oppression: Proposinga Model for a Remedial Right to Secession in the Wake of the
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 245 (2012).
101. Binder, supra note 13 (emphasis in original).

102. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
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self-determination, a point previously affirmed by Article 2 of the Colonial
Declaration and common Article 1(1) of the International Covenants on Human
Rights. Furthermore, when Principle 5 does focus exclusively on colonial peoples,
as in paragraphs 2(b) and 6, this fact is explicitly made clear. It is also difficult to
understand how Binder could overlook the basic meaning of paragraph 7, namely,
that only those "States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a

government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour"' 03 are entitled to their "territorial integrity or
political unity."l 04 As indicated by italics, paragraph 7 refers to "States," not nonself-governing territories. Clearly then a literal interpretation of the Declaration's
text cannot sustain Binder's "anti-secession" arguments.
Shaw has proffered a similar argument claiming:
[i]f the principle [of self-determination] exists as a legal one, and it is
believed that such is the case, the question arises then of its scope and
application. As noted above, U.N. formulations of the principle from
the 1960 Colonial Declaration to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law and the 1966 International Covenants on Human
Rights stress that it is the right of "all peoples." If this is so, then all
peoples would become thereby to some extent subjects of international
law as the direct repositories of international rights, and if the definition
of "peoples" used was the normal political-sociological one, a major rearrangement of international law principles would have been created. In
fact, that has not occurred and an international law concept of what
constitutes a people for these purposes has evolved, so that the "self' in
question must be determined within the accepted colonial territorial
framework. Attempts to broaden this have.not been successful and the
U.N. has always strenuously opposed any attempt at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country. 05
As the above quotation reveals, Shaw is subtly misrepresenting the claim made by
proponents of a qualified right to LNC secession, by omitting mention that such a
right is in fact qualified. By doing so, Shaw implicitly suggests that to allow such
a right would be tantamount to anarchy. This is an overstatement. Furthermore, as
with Binder, his claim that the meaning of "peoples" is confined to the colonial
context cannot be supported by a literal interpretation of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, especially paragraphs 1 and 7.

103. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. SHAw, supra note 63, at 256. See also Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and
Boundaries,8 EURO. J. INT'L L. 478, 483 (1997); Malcolm N. Shaw, Self-Determination and the Use of
Force, in MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND

SELF-DETERMINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PATRICK

THORNBERRY 35, 40 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005).
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Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn by Shaw, Binder, and others o0 prompt
the questions: why did paragraph 7 fail to endorse explicitly a qualified right of
UNC secession? Why must the legitimacy of UNC secession be extracted by an a
contrario reading?10 7 The answer lies in the drafting of the Declaration itself,
which as the travaux prdparatoiresreveals, was dominated by two diametrically
opposed positions: those states, which favoured the inclusion of a right to
unilateral secession, and those states that did not. The communist bloc, for
instance, argued that the right to self-determination included an inherent and
unqualified right to UNC secession.108 Many western and African states, however,
felt that self-determination did not include such a right, qualified or otherwise.
With the opposing viewpoints unable to agree, the representative for the
Netherlands suggested a compromise:
The real problem [is] whether the firm determination to safeguard the
concept of the territorial integrity of sovereign States should go so far as
to exclude under all circumstances the possibility of the existence or
emergence of the right to self-determination [that is the right of
secession] on the part of a given people within a given State. So long as
adequate provision was made against abuse, the Committee would not
serve the cause of justice by excluding the possibility that a people
within an existing or future State would possess sufficient individual
identity to exercise the right to self-determination. If, for example-in
the opinion of the world community-basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms which imposed obligations on all States,
106. CASTELLINO, supra note 43, at 40; Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War
World: A New InternalFocus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 740 (1995); Horowitz, supra note 13, at 6367; lorns, supra note 33, at 261; Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of SelfDetermination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101,
118 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Johan D. van der Vyver, The Right to Self-Determinationand its

Enforcement, 10 ISLA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 427 (2004). Other scholars also seem to deny the
secessionist implications of paragraph 7, but are less explicit in their reasoning. Hannum, for instance,
seems to believe that paragraph 7 does not provide a qualified right to secession. Interestingly though,
he argues (without mentioning the Friendly Relations Declaration), that international law should permit
secession in situations analogous to that enumerated by paragraph 7. See Hurst Hannum, The Right of
Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773, 776-77 (1998).
Higgins, after mentioning paragraph 7, concludes that state sovereignty and territorial integrity prevails
over a right to secession. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
How WE USE IT! 121 (1994). Myall also seems to deny the significance of paragraph 7, stating "the
principle of national self-determination . . . cannot be invoked-at least not with any hope of securing
widespread support-by dissatisfied minorities within existing states." James Myall, Non-Intervention,
Self-Determinationand the New World Order, 67 INT'L AFF. 421, 424 (1991).
107. Rosenstock has correctly observed that Principle 5 of the Friendly Relations Declaration
"contains some tortured phraseology." Rosenstock, supra note 15, at 733.
108. Unqualified in the sense that a people need only decide to secede by referendum. No
additional criteria, such as egregious human rights violations, or discrimination on the basis of "race
creed or colour," was stipulated. A joint draft of paragraph 1 by the Soviet Union, Romania, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia demonstrates this position: "[e]ach people has the right to determine freely their
political status, including the right to establish an independent national state." See BUCHHEIT, supra
note 48, at 91.
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irrespective of their sovereign will, were not being respected by a
certain State, vis-i-vis one of the people living within its territory,
would one in such an instance-whatever the human implicationswish to prevent the people that was fundamentally discriminated against
from invoking its right to self-determination [and hence, that people's
right to secede?] 09
A qualified right to UNC secession-enlivened by the denial of "basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms"-thus became the solution to break the deadlock
between either extreme. In order to satisfy those states opposed to a right of UNC
secession, paragraph 7 was carefully worded to omit any explicit mention of such a
right, even though an a contrarioreading reveals it was implicitly endorsed under
certain circumstances. The arguments proffered by scholars such as Eastwood that
"[t]here are no United Nations documents that expressly recognize a general right
of [UNC] secession stemming from the concept of self-determination" therefore
constitute a gross over-simplification." 0 As Rosenstock has correctly observed,
the fact that paragraph 7 requires an a contrario reading to reveal the legitimacy of
UNC secession "should not be misunderstood to limit the sweep and liberality of
the paragraph.""'
C. Conclusion-The FriendlyRelations Declaration
Examination of the Friendly Relations Declaration reveals that the term
"peoples" is not necessarily synonymous with the entire population of a non-selfgoverning territory or state and may include national groups within non-selfgoverning territories and states. Principle 5, paragraph 7 provides a qualified right
to UNC secession in the event that a people experience deliberate, sustained and
systematic discrimination on the basis of "race, creed or colour" which includes
racial, linguistic, cultural, customary, and religious discrimination.
III. THE DECLARATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS ("FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY DECLARATION")

In October 1995, the General Assembly adopted the Fiftieth Anniversary
Declaration,11 2 which repeated, mutatis mutandis, the text of Article 2 of the
3
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action."

109. RAit, supranote 73, at 320.
110. Eastwood, supra note 83, at 303.
111. Rosenstock, supra note 15, at 732.
112. G.A. Res. 50/6, supranote 8.
113. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action-a non-General Assembly instrumentwas adopted unanimously by the U.N. World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993. The Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, however, was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly
in Resolution 48/121. G.A. Res. 48/121, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/121 (Dec. 20, 1993).
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A. The Meaning of "Peoples"
Although "peoples" is mentioned in the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration's
preamble, 1 4 the first significant application of the term occurs in Article 1, which
provides that the U.N. will, inter alia,
[c]ontinue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples,
taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or
other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognize
the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right to selfdetermination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging
any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction of any kind.' 15
Article 1 contains two sentences. The first sentence provides that "all peoples"
have the right to self-determination, which primafacie, indicates that "peoples" is
a term of broad and general applicability. This interpretation is confirmed by the
remainder of the first sentence, which recognizes the "particularsituation of
peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign
occupation."' 16 The phrase "colonial . . . domination" is clearly referring to
colonial situations of the type targeted and defined in the Colonial Declaration and
accompanying Resolution 1541.
The phrase "alien domination," although
including colonial situations, is necessarily broader, extending to the non-colonial
context where peoples are subjected to alien or foreign rule. The phrase "foreign
domination" most likely refers to situations of foreign occupation and exploitation,
and therefore also captures peoples in a colonial and non-colonial context. The
first sentence of Article 1 thus indicates that peoples may exist in a colonial and
non-colonial context. It fails, however, to indicate whether peoples are necessarily
synonymous with the entire population of a state or non-self-governing territory, or
may also include national groups within non-self-governing territories and states.
No explicit reference is made, for example, to the articulation of the "selfdetermination of peoples" in any earlier U.N. instruments, such as the Friendly
Relations Declaration.
The second sentence of Article I reiterates, mutatis mutandis, Principle 5,
paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration, with an a contrario reading
revealing that only those "sovereign and independent States conducting themselves
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
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territory without distinction of any kind" will be guaranteed their "territorial
integrity or political unity.""'7 The second sentence of Article I thus links its
content to "sovereign and independent States"-not non-self-governing territories.
Although it might be argued that metropolitan powers are "states" responsible for
non-self-governing territories, this does not seem to be the overall objective of the
second sentence of Article 1.
As with Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration,
however, the second sentence of Article 1 of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration
does contain some drafting irregularities. This is because if taken literally, it
indicates that only one people may constitute a sovereign state. This is revealed by
the phrase, "thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory.""' 8 The use of the singular "people" as opposed to the
plural "peoples" can most likely be attributed to the fact that the second sentence
of Article 1 was based on Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration. If, however, it is accepted that "peoples" may refer to national groups
within non-self-governing territories and states, as indicated by instruments
antedating the Friendly Relations Declaration, such as the U.N. Charter (Articles
73, 73(b), and 76(b)) and Resolution 1541 (Principles 2, 7(a), 8, and 9), it would
seem that the drafting of Article 1 is incorrect, as the phrase "whole people"
suggests there may only be one people within a state. Moreover, the phrase
"without distinction of any kind," which proceeds the phrase "whole people
belonging to the territory," suggests that states are not monolithic and comprise
sub-state groups."' 9 On balance, therefore, the phrase "whole people" most likely
represents a drafting oversight.
B. A Right ofPeoples to UNC Secession?

The first sentence of Article 1 provides that the U.N. will, inter alia,
"continue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples." 20
Immediately, therefore, it is clear that Article 1 casts self-determination as a
"right," thereby strongly implying that there must be remedies for a breach of this
right.' 2' It is uncertain from examination of the first sentence, however, whether
potential remedies include a right to UNC secession.
The second sentence of Article 1, however, does contain a right to UNC
secession, with an a contrario reading providing that only those "sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the equal rights and
self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the

117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See DUURSMA, supra note 36, at 25; RADAN, supra note 1, at 60.
120. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 8, art. 1.
121. Here the Latin Maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium (there cannot be a right without a remedy), is
applicable.
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whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind" are
guaranteed their "territorial integrity or political unity."l 22
It will be recalled that this text is substantially identical to Principle 5,
paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration. There is one important
difference though: the phrase "without distinction as to race, creed or colour" has
been replaced by the broader expression "without distinction of any kind." Article
1 thus removes the ambiguity and interpretative tedium associated with the words
"race, creed or colour" confirming that any form of discrimination against a people
is unacceptable. Thus, although the right to UNC secession contained within
Article 1 is qualified, it is perhaps slightly less qualified than the comparable right
contained in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration. In any
event, Article I would seem to capture racial, linguistic, cultural, customary,
religious, or other forms of discrimination along ethnic or national lines. This
would of course capture a broad spectrum of human rights abuses, whether in
moderato (political, cultural and racial discrimination) or in extremis (ethnic
cleansing, mass killings and genocide).
As with the Friendly Relations Declaration, however, Article 1 arguably
contains four implicit qualifying conditions. First, the right to UNC secession will
only be exercisable where the discrimination is of a deliberate, sustained, and
systematic nature with "the exclusion of any likelihood for a possible peaceful
solution within the existing state structure."1 23 Thus, isolated instances of
discrimination or unwitting application of discriminatory principles by a
government against a sub-state group will not automatically invoke a right to UNC
secession by the group affected. Second, the discrimination in question would
have to possess sufficient contemporaneousness. Third, the internal consistency
principle would mandate constitutional protections for newly created minorities.
Finally, the UNC secession effectuated would have to comply with the criteria for
statehood based on effectiveness and compliance with peremptory norms.
C. Conclusion-TheFiftieth Anniversary Declaration

Examination of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration reveals that the term
"peoples" is not necessarily synonymous with the entire population of a non-selfgoverning territory or state and may include national groups within non-selfgoverning territories and states. Furthermore, the Declaration provides a qualified
right to UNC secession for sub-state national groups subject to deliberate,
sustained and systematic discrimination "of any kind."
IV. SUMMATION OF DECLARATORY GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

The instruments examined above indicate, on balance, that the term "peoples"
is not necessarily synonymous with the entire population of non-self-governing
122. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 8, art. 1.
123. CASSESE, supra note 12, at 120. See also Doehring, supra note 68, at 66; Murswiek, supra
note 68, at 26.
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territory or state and may include national groups within non-self-governing
territories and states. Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration and Article 1 of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration provide a right to
UNC secession. This right is a qualified one and will only be enlivened where
non-colonial peoples are subject to deliberate, sustained, and systematic
discrimination "of any kind."1 24 This formulation captures a broad spectrum of
human rights abuses, whether in moderato (political, cultural and racial
discrimination) or in extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings and genocide).
A. Legal Effect of DeclaratoryGeneralAssembly Resolutions
An investigation of the legal effects of declaratory General Assembly
resolutions facilitates an understanding of the precise impact of the qualified right
to UNC secession contained in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration and Article 1 of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration.1 25 The legal
potency of declaratory General Assembly resolutions has been the subject of
considerable scholarly debate. One school of thought, sometimes referred to as the
"traditional" school, denies that declaratory General Assembly resolutions have
legal effect. 126 The other school, sometimes referred to as the "progressive"
school, argues that such resolutions do have legal significance.1 27 Although the
General Assembly is not a legislature, it is nonetheless submitted here that there
are four possible ways declaratory resolutions influence the law-making process:
as authentic interpretations of the U.N. Charter, as evidence of state practice
(customary law formation), as general principles of international law, and by
indicating international consensus. 128 With the exception of consensus, these

124. Although the Friendly Relations Declaration used the phrase "race, creed or colour" this has
arguably been replaced by the broader expression "discrimination of any kind" and is therefore used
here for summative purposes. See G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 8, art. 1..
125. Surprisingly almost every scholarly analysis of a right to UNC secession in declaratory
General Assembly resolutions fails to examine this issue. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination
and Secession UnderInternationalLaw, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 309-11, 314-15 (2001).
126. See, e.g., LEO GROSS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 214-20 (1984);
G.W. Haight, The New InternationalEconomic Orderand the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, 9 INT'L LAW. 591, 597 (1975).
127. See, e.g., OBED Y. AsAMoAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1966); BLAINE SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS IN OUR CHANGING WORLD 53-76 (1991). As Saffo has suggested "[i]t is
axiomatic that the General Assembly possesses no formal competence to attribute binding legal force to
externally directed resolutions. At the same time, however, it is equally true that such recommendations
often have undeniable legal or political effects quite out of proportion to their formal recommendatory
status." Paul Laurence Saffo, The Common Heritageof Mankind: Has the GeneralAssembly Createda
Law to Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 TUL. L. REv. 492, 508 (1979).
128. As Sloan has suggested, "every resolution ... is part of the raw material from which custom is
made and therefore a material source of international law." SLOAN, supra note 127, at 41. Similarly,
Lukashuk of the Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences, has remarked that if General
Assembly Resolutions lacked any binding force, they would be rendered "senseless, and the United
Nations would have lost an important instrument for influencing international relations . . . ." I.I.
Lukashuk, Recommendations of InternationalOrganisationsin the InternationalNormative System, in
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methods are included in Article 38(1)(a)-(c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), which is generally regarded as the most authoritative
statement on sources of international law.129
1.

Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions as Authentic
Interpretations of the U.N. Charter: Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute
of the ICJ

It is possible that declaratory General Assembly resolutions may gain legal
effect if they constitute authentic interpretations of the U.N. Charter, which itself is
a treaty and valid source of international law under Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute
of the ICJ.130 The putative basis for such interpretations is found in Articles 10,
11(1), and 13(l)(a) of the Charter. 1 31 The former states:
[t]he General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and
functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except
as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members
of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such
questions or matters.1 32
Article 11(1) provides:
[t]he General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security,

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 35 (W.E. Butler ed., 1987). See also HANNA

(1978);
INGRID DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 13-14 (1st ed. 1974); J.G.
STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-53 (9th ed. 1984); Gregory Marchildon &
Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of Secession Under Canadian and InternationalLaw, 32 VA. J. INT'L
L. 583, 604 (1992).
129. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 ("The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d)
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.").
130. The term "authentic" is used here, as opposed to "authoritative" as on balance, the former
seems to be the most correct. See INGRID DETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 227-29 (1994);
Oscar Schachter, Interpretation of the Charter in the Political Organs of the United Nations, in LAW,
BOKOR-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 71-74

STATE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS KELSEN 271 (Salo

Engel & Rudolf A. Mtall eds., 1964); Kay Hailbronner & Eckart Klein, Functions and Powers:
Article 10, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 237 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994);
Jean-Frangois Gareau, Shouting at the Wall: Self-Determination and the Legal Consequences of the
Construction ofa Wall in the OccupiedPalestinianTerritory, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 489, 500 (2005).
131. Binder, for example, explicitly characterizes the Friendly Relations Declaration as an
authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter: "[t]he Declaration on Friendly Relations, defining the
right of self-determination, is generally viewed as an authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter."
Binder, supra note 13, at 236 n.52. See also G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 9, at 124.
132. U.N. Charter art. 10.
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including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of
armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.133
Article 13(l)(a) provides:
[t]he General Assembly shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of:
a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and
encouraging the progressive development of international law
and its codification.' 34
The central question, therefore, is whether a qualified right to UNC secession
might gain legal effect by expression in a declaratory resolution purporting to
interpret the U.N. Charter through Articles 10, 11(1), or 13(1)(a). The most likely
declaration to fulfil this requirement is the Friendly Relations Declaration, which
declares principles of international law, friendly relations, and cooperation among
states in accordance with the UN. Charter.13 Examination of the Declaration's
draft history strongly suggests that it was intended to operate pursuant to Article
13(1)(a) of the U.N. Charter. Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1815,136 for instance,
enunciated that the General Assembly "[r]esolves to undertake, pursuant to Article
13 of the Charter a study of the principles of international law concerning friendly
relations and cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter with a view
to their progressive development and codification, so as to secure their more
effective application." 37 A later instrument relevant to the drafting of the Friendly
Relations Declaration-Resolution 1966 '-also implicitly alluded to Article
13(1)(a) in its preambular paragraph:
[rjecalling its resolutions 1505 (XV) of 12 December 1960, 1686 (XVI)
of 18 December 1961 and 1815 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, which
affirm the importance of encouraging the progressive development of
international law and its codification and making it a more effective
means of furthering the purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1
and 2 of the U.N. Charter.' 39
Finally, if any doubt need be eradicated, the sixteenth preambular paragraph of the
Friendly Relations Declaration explicitly describes the seven principles contained
therein as the "progressive development and codification" of international law.140
Thus, it is clear that the principles contained in the Declaration are designed to
operate pursuant to Article 13(l)(a) of the U.N. Charter.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. art. 11, para. 1.
Id. art. 13, para. 1.
The long title of the Declaration reflects such a linkage. See G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9.
G.A. Res. 1815 (XVII), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/17/1815 (Dec. 18, 1962).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
G.A. Res. 1966 (XVIII), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1966 (Dec. 16, 1963).
Id.
G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, pmbl.
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At this point it is apposite to note that the Friendly Relations Declaration has
been invoked and endorsed by subsequent declaratory General Assembly
resolutions, such as the Definition of Aggression, 4 1 the Declaration on the
42
Admissibility of Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States,1 the Manila
43
Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,1 the Declaration on the
Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or
Use of Force in International Relations,'" the Declaration on the Prevention and
Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and
45
Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field, and the Fiftieth
Anniversary Declaration. Accordingly, it can be argued that these instruments also
purport to operate vicariously pursuant to Article 13(l)(a).
The next question, therefore, concerns the actual scope and intent of Article
13(1)(a). Does it allow for authentic interpretations of the U.N. Charter by the
General Assembly ("GA")? Scholars, such as Hailbronner and Klein, are of the
clear opinion that it does not:
Of course, the resolutions of the GA could have a binding effect if the
GA were entitled to make authentic and binding interpretations of the
Charter. Such a power was, however, expressly denied the. GA at the
founding conference in San Francisco. The Belgian proposal already
made at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, namely to incorporate a
provision to that effect into the Charter, was unsuccessful. Judgments of
the ICJ thus far have not contradicted this point. In the advisory opinion
of July 20, 1962 . . . (Expenses case), the ICJ acknowledged that every

organ itself must in the first instance interpret the specifications of its
competence as laid down in the Charter; there is, however, no mention
of a binding effect on the member states. It follows that the GA does not
enjoy a privilege of interpretation; this would require an alteration to the
Charter under Arts. 108 and 109.146
When trying to assess the scope of Article 13(l)(a), it is worth recalling that
Article 13(1) provides that the General Assembly "shall initiate studies and make
recommendations." 47 Article 13(1) does not, therefore, mandate that the General
Assembly may make legally binding determinations. On the contrary, it merely
suggests the Assembly may adopt a recommendatory role.148 This more limited
141. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
142. G.A. Res. 36/103, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981).
143. G.A. Res. 37/10, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/10 (Nov. 15, 1982).
144. G.A. Res. 42/22, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/22 (Nov. 18, 1987).
145. G.A. Res. 43/51, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/51 (Dec. 5, 1988).
146. Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 130, at 237-38 (citations omitted). See also Villiger who
notes, in perhaps less equivocal terms, that "[r]esolutions can, of course, have certain effect. They may
amount to an authoritative-though not necessarily authentic-interpretation of the Charter." MARK E.
VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 125 (2d ed. 1997).

147. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. I (emphasis added).
148. VILLAGER, supra note 146, at 124.
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scope is supported by the wording of Article 13(l)(a), which provides that such
recommendations are designed to "encourag[e] the progressive development of
international law and its codification."l 49 The use of the words "encourage" and
the phrase "progressive development" both suggest that Article 13(l)(a) is
predominantly concerned with the development of international law de lege
ferenda. Article 13(1)(a) does, however, also include the word "codification,"
which may arguably denote a more positivist de lege lata function. When trying to
determine the difference between the terms "progressive development" and
"codification" it is useful to consider the maiden report of the Committee on the
Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification 5 0 (the
Committee of Seventeen):
The Committee recognized that the tasks entrusted by the General
Assembly to the Commission might vary in their nature. Some of the
tasks might involve the drafting of a convention on a subject which has
not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law
has not been highly developed or formulated in the practice of States.
Other tasks might, on the other hand, involve the more precise
formulation and systemization of law in areas where there has been
extensive State practice precedent and doctrine. For convenience of
reference, the Committee has referred to the first type of task as
'progressive development' and to the second type of task as
'codification.' The Committee recognizes that the terms employed are
not mutually exclusive, as, for example, in cases where the formulation
and systemization of the existing law may lead to the conclusion that
some new rule should be suggested for adoption by States . ...

For the

codification on international law, the Committee recognized that no
clear-cut distinction between the formulation of the law as it is [lex lata]
and the law as it ought to be [lexferenda] could be rigidly maintained in
practice. It was pointed out that in any work of codification, the codifier
inevitably has to fill the gaps and amend the law in light of new
5

developments.1

1

The foregoing would therefore seem to indicate that instruments adopted by the
General Assembly under Article 13(l)(a) may contain elements of both lex lata
and lexferenda.

149. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1(a).
150. The Committee was established by General Assembly Resolution 94 (1). G.A. Res. 94 (I), 1 3,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/94 (I) (Dec. 11, 1946). Based on the maiden report of the Committee, the General
Assembly at its second session established the International Law Commission and approved its statute
via General Assembly Resolution 174 (II). G.A. Res. 174 (II), .4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 21,
1947). See Carl-August Fleischhauer, Article 13, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 265, 268 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
151. Report of the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its
Codification on the Methods for Encouragingthe Progressive Development of InternationalLaw and
its Eventual Codification,41 AM. J. INT'L L. 18, 20, 22 (1947). See also Fleischhauer,supra note 147.
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This conclusion is supported by examination of Article 15 of the Statute of
the International Law Commission,1 52 which defines "progressive development" as
"the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which law has not yet been
A priori "progressive
sufficiently developed in the practice of States."'5
development" may involve legal innovation beyond lex lata and thus constitute lex
ferenda. The same Article defines "codification" as "the more precise formulation
and systemization of rules of international law in fields where there has already
been extensive state practice, precedent and doctrine."l 54 A priori,"codification"
signifies the transfer of lex lata from jus non-scriptum to jus scriptum.15 5
Bearing in mind the foregoing observations, it is submitted here that the view
of scholars such as Arangio-Ruiz and Witten regarding the legal status of the
Friendly Relations Declaration is to be preferred. The former, for example, has
observed:
[t]he impact of the declaration on existing international law-and in
particular on the law of the United Nations (and mainly on the
Charter)-can thus be described in the sense that the declaration could
be considered per se neither as a part of customary or general
international law, nor as an authentic determination or interpretation of
custom or treaty. The declaration places itself below general-written
or unwritten-international law, below existing treaties, and, in
particular, below the Charter of the United Nations.
That does not exclude, of course, that the declaration could have an
'impact on the formulation, development and application of rules of
56
international law, whether customary or conventional.1

Witten has similarly concluded:
[t]he Declaration is tentative and ambiguous as to its very status. It
declares that, 'the principles of the Charter which are embodied in this
Declaration constitute basic principles of international law,' but does not
grant the actual Principles of the Declaration the same status . .. . The

Declaration, therefore, perceives itself as aspirational rather than
57
programmatic, as a guide rather than a mandate.'

This position is informed by analysis of Article 2 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, which provides:

152. G.A. Res. 174, supranote 150, art. 15.
153. Id.

154. Id. See also Review of the Multilateral Treaty Making Process (Paragraph2 of General
Assembly Resolution 32/48), [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 183, 187, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/325.
155. VILLIGER, supra note 146, at 102.
156. GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (1979).
157. Roger M. Witten, The Declaration on Friendly Relations, 12 HARv. INT'L L.J. 509, 517
(1971).
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[n]othing in this declaration shall be construed as prejudicing in any
manner the provisions of the Charter or the rights of peoples under the
Charter taking into account the elaboration of these rights in this
declaration.' 58
Hence, Article 2 specifies that the Declaration does not enjoy a status equal to the
U.N. Charter, and furthermore, when construing the Charter's provisions, the
Declaration is clearly disqualified as an interpretative source. As Arangio-Ruiz
has poignantly noted, "the Charter is not tampered with by the declaration except
by way of exhortation."'59 A priori, the Declaration is not an extension of the
Charter.
Article 3 further holds that "[t]he principles of the Charter which are
embodied in this declaration constitute basic principles of international law."1 60
When read in conjunction with Article 2, which stipulates that the Declaration is of
no prejudice to the Charter's provisions, it is clear that only the content of the
Charter itself is regarded as international law pursuant to Article 38(1)(a) of the
Statute of the ICJ. 161
This interpretation of the Friendly Relations Declaration would seem to be
implicitly supported by the ICJ's reasoning in Nicaraguav. the United States of
America.162 Here-in the context of customary law-it was held that the assent by
states to the Friendly Relations Declaration afforded a primafacie indication as to
their opinio juris relating to matters contained therein.' 63 However, the ICJ ruled
that this presumption could be overcome in the event of conflicting state practice
As such, the ICJ effectively ruled that
in terms of physical acts and omissions.
the Friendly Relations Declaration is not to be viewed in terms analogous to the
Charter itself.
This then leads to the consideration of whether the qualified right to UNC
secession contained in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations
Declaration could be validly incorporated into international law under the
combined operation of Article 13(l)(a) of the U.N. Charter and Article 38(l)(a) of
the Statute of the ICJ. Obviously, if the foregoing analysis is to be adopted, then
G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 9, at 124.
ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 156, at 96.
Id.
But see Oscar Schachter, The Relation ofLaw, Politics and Action in the United Nations, 109
RECUEIL DES COURS 169, 186 (1963) ("[t]he question of primary interest to the international lawyer has
generally been the extent to which the interpretations reached by, or within, the political organs are to
be regarded as legally authoritative when the organ has not been accorded the competence to make
binding decisions. In considering this, one might start with the principle that an 'authentic'
interpretation of a treaty by the parties is legally binding on them to the same degree as the treaty itself.
I believe it is generally accepted that this conclusion would hold for an interpretation of the Charter
adopted by all the Members (or even 'by the overwhelming majority' except for some abstentions) in
the General Assembly; the interpretation would be characterized by international lawyers as having the
same legal force as the Charter itself.").
162. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supranote 5.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 107-08.
158.
159.
160.
161.

UNILATERAL NON-COLONIAL SECESSION

2013

379

only those matters contained within both the U.N. Charter and the Friendly
Relations Declaration can be considered lex lata. Matters beyond the scope of the
U.N. Charter cannot simply become lex lata by textual elaboration in the Friendly
Relations Declaration. It can be noted at this point that the U.N. Charter in Article
1(2) enshrines the "principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" but
that the drafting committee explicitly ruled out any grounds for unilateral secession
of any type through this provision: "the principle conformed to the purposes of the
Charter only in so far as it implied to the right of self-government of peoples, and
not the right of secession."165 Other aspects of the U.N. Charter, such as Chapters
XI and XII, implicitly suggest that self-determination equates with selfgovernment, which effectively means that metropolitan powers should
consensually grant self-government or independence to non-self-governing
peoples. Hence, it can be concluded that a right to UNC secession cannot be
incorporated into international law under the combined operation of Article
13(l)(a) of the U.N. Charter and Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the ICJ.
2.

Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions as Customary Law:
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ

The following section discusses the legal status of declaratory General
Assembly resolutions vis-a-vis customary law. Specifically, it examines four
questions: first, whether statements, such as those contained in declaratory General
Assembly resolutions, constitute customary law; second, whether various types of
state practice are accorded different weight; third, whether textual repetition of a
doctrine is necessary for solidification of a customary rule; and fourth, how the
requirement of opiniojurisimpacts upon customary law formation.
i. Are Statements Included Under Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the
ICJ?
Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ lists "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice" as one source of international law., 66 The debate
over the precise definition of "general practice" has been extensive and
controversial. D'Amato, for example, has adopted a restrictive interpretation of
general practice whereby only physical acts qualify: "a claim is not an act . . . .
Claims . . . although they may articulate a legal norm cannot constitute the material

component of custom."l 67 This restrictive view, which would seem to deny the
salience of declaratory General Assembly resolutions as evidence of state practice,

165. United Nations Conference on International Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26, 1945,
Summary Report of Sixth Meeting of Committee I/I, 1(A), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.343 1/1/16 (Vol. VI)
(May 16, 1945) (emphasis added). See BUCHHEIT, supra note 48, at 73-74; W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra
note 48, at 353.
166. See BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 4; SLOAN, supranote 127, at 53.
167. ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM

(emphasis added).

IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 88 (1971)
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has been supported by Judge Read's Dissenting Opinion in the Fisheries Case
68

(U.K. v. Norway):1

Customary international law .

.

. cannot be established by citing cases

where coastal States have made extensive claims, but have not
maintained their claims by the actual assertion of sovereignty over
foreign ships [physical acts] . . . . The only convincing evidence of

State practice is to be found in seizures, where the coastal State asserts
its sovereignty over trespassing foreign ships.' 6 9
Still, this relatively narrow view has been ignored by subsequent ICJ cases, such as
the Asylum Case,'70 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,171 Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (U.K. v. Iceland),172 Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco Case
(United States v. France), Nicaraguav. the United States ofAmerica,174 and the
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,'7 5 all of which viewed claims-and not just
physical acts and omissions-as relevant to the field of state practice.
A slightly different interpretation of Article 38(1)(b) has been proffered by
Thirlway, who argues that state practice can include claims and other
diplomatic/political statements, but only if they relate to concrete situations and are
not merely in abstracto.'7 6 Accordingly, general statements of principle such as
that espoused in declaratory General Assembly resolutions are not included under
this definition:
[T]he occasion of an act of State practice contributing to the
formation of custom must always be some specific dispute or
potential dispute.
The mere assertion in abstracto of the existence of a legal right
or legal rule is not an act of State practice; but it may be adduced
as evidence of the acceptance by the State against which it is
sought to set up the claim, of the customary rule which is alleged
168. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 191 (Dec. 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Read).
169. Id. at 191.
170. Asylum (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (indicating the ICJ regarded the
actual exercise of diplomatic asylum and official views expressed in relation to diplomatic asylum as
both constituting valid examples of state practice).
171. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den./Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32-33, 47, 53 (Feb.
20).
172. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 47, 56-58, 81-88, 119-120, 135, 161 (July
25). In this case textual arguments between states in diplomatic correspondence or conferences on the
law of the sea were held to constitute state practice.
173. Rights of Nationals of The United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176,
200, 209 (Aug. 27). Here the ICJ looked for evidence of custom in diplomatic correspondence and
conference records.
174. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, IT 188-89, 191,
202, 205.
175. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, $T68-73.
176. H. W. A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE CONTINUING ROLE OF CUSTOM IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF CODIFICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1972).
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to exist, assuming that State asserts that it is not bound by the
alleged rule. More important, such assertions can be relied on as
supplementary evidence both of state practice and of the
existence of the opinio juris; but only as supplementary
evidence.
Practice or usage consists of an accumulation of acts which are
material or concrete in the sense that they are intended to have an
immediate effect on the legal relationships concerned.'"
Thirlway's argument does, however, suffer from a number of deficiencies. It
would seem obvious, for instance, that when a state makes a statement in
abstracto, it may actually be intending the remark to apply to a specific situation.
For reasons of diplomacy though, the state making the statement may feel it is
simply more expedient to refrain from specific mention of the particular target
dispute or issue. On the other hand, a state's stance on a particular issue may be
shaped not by the specific issue at hand, but instead the desire to solidify a general
principle. Hence, a reaction to a concrete and specific situation may be shaped by
principles in abstracto. When viewed this way, Thirlway's arguments, although
interesting, appear unjustifiably narrow. 78
Not surprisingly perhaps, Thirlway's views have not been reflected in judicial
reasoning. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,'79 for example, the ICJ
indicated that statements in abstracto could lead to the formation of a customary
rule of international law, provided such statements were framed de lege lata and
not de lege ferenda.80 Similar reasoning was employed in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland),'8 ' where the ICJ cited a resolution passed by
the 1958 United Nations Law of the Sea Conference and an amendment tabled at
the 1960 Conference as state practice that had contributed to the creation of a
customary rule of international law.182 In the Barcelona Traction Case,'83 Judge
Ammoun, in his Separate Opinion, stated:
[t]he positions taken up by the delegates of States in international
organizations and conferences, and in particular in the United Nations,
naturally form part of State practice .

.

. [and] amount to precedents

contributing to the formation of custom.184

177.
178.
(1976).
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 58.
See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 47 BlIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 4
North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 171.
Id. at 38.
Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 172, at 26.
Id.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5).
Id. at 302-03.
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Similar views have been expressed in the South West Africa Cases,185
Nicaraguav. the United States ofAmerica,'8 6 and the Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion.187

The more appropriate view, therefore, is that statements, whether in relation
to concrete situations or in abstracto, provided they are framed de lege lata, are
capable of contributing to customary rules of international law. This broader view
has attracted support from numerous scholars. Akehurst, for example, has defined
state practice as "any act or statement . .. from which views [about customary law]
can be inferred", which includes physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto
(such as General Assembly resolutions), national laws, national judgments and
omissions. Customary law can also be created by the practice of international
organizations."188 Bailey has similarly maintained that "customary law consists of
the rules established by the general practice of states, which certainly includes their
diplomatic acts and public pronouncements."l 89 Dixon has adopted an analogous
definition: "state practice includes, but is not limited to, actual activity (acts and
omissions), statements made in respect of concrete situations or disputes,
statements of legal principle made in the abstract, such as those preceding the
adoption of a resolution of the General Assembly, national legislation and the
practice of international organizations."o90 Other scholars adopting similarly broad
Higgins,194 Asamoah,' 95
definitions include Villiger,' 9 ' Brownlie,' 92 Shaw,'
97
96
Castaneda,1 and Arangio-Ruiz.'

185. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 291-92 (dissenting opinion
of Judge Tanaka).
186. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, % 188-89, 191,
202, 205.
187. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supranote 5, 1"68-73.
188. Akehurst, supra note 178, at 10. See also GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 68 (2006).
189. Sir Kenneth Bailey, Making InternationalLaw in the United Nations, 61 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 233, 235 (1967). Dixon shares a similar view. See MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (6th ed. 2007). Sloan further suggests that as international organizations
are subjects of international law, organizational practice also bears upon the creation of custom. See
SLOAN, supranote 127, at 72.
190. DIXON, supranote 189, at 31.
191. Villiger elaborates that, "State practice includes any act, articulation or other behaviour of a
state, as long as the behaviour in question discloses the State's conscious attitude with respect to its
recognition of a customary rule." VILLIGER, supra note 146, at 16.
192. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 6.
193. SHAW, supra note 63, at 82.
194. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4-7 (1963).
195. OBED Y. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 52-5 7 (1966).
196. JORGE CASTA1fEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 168-69 (Leland M.

Goodrich & William T.R. Fox eds., 1969).
197. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 156, at 40.
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ii. Various Forms of State Practice and the Relative Weight Thereof
Having determined that statements such as those contained in declaratory
General Assembly resolutions do constitute a valid source of customary law under
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ, a further point of discussion is the
relative weight that might be afforded to different types of practice. In other
words, should the physical acts and omissions of states be accorded a higher
priority than statements, be the latter in abstracto or otherwise? If such a hierarchy
exists, it may be that the content of the declaratory General Assembly resolutions
such as the Friendly Relations Declaration, which contains a qualified right to
UNC secession, might be wholly negated or at least nullified by contrary physical
acts and omissions.
Very few scholars have examined this question in any detail. Akehurst,
however, has suggested that "[t]here is no compelling reason for attaching greater
importance to one kind of practice than to another."198 Similar remarks have been
made by Arangio-Ruiz, who has noted:
United Nations practice as a whole, inclusive of Assembly
recommendations, is an integral part of the practice of States. It is only
for reasons of practical convenience or scientific analysis that one
distinguishes between the practice of States in the United Nations and
States' practice at large; and it is only for such reasons that one may
want to isolate either United Nations practice as a whole or United
Nations resolutions from States' practice at large. In so far as United
Nations practice, and notably United Nations declarations are
concerned, the ascertained inexistence of any contractual or customary
rule qualifying Assembly declaratory resolutions as binding legal
instruments and the obvious inexistence of any rule qualifying United
Nations practice in a wide sense as of special legal value, exclude the
existence of any legal distinction either of United Nations practice as a
whole or of Assembly recommendations from States' practice at
large.199
Hence, it seems that any attempt to discredit the relative value of declaratory
General Assembly resolutions vis-d-vis state practice at large is misguided. It must
be noted though that where a conflict exists between different types of state
practice, this will almost certainly prevent the formation of a customary rule.
iii. The Impact of Repetition
A further question requiring examination is to what extent the repetition of a
certain practice-such as the drafting of multiple declaratory General Assembly
resolutions supporting a qualified right to UNC secession-contributes to the
crystallization of a customary rule of international law. Intuitively it would seem
that repetition of a practice-be it statements or physical acts and omissions198. Akehurst, supra note 178, at 21.
199. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 156, at 44.
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should be a precondition for the solidification of a customary rule. Surprisingly
though, analysis of case law suggests that repetition is not always a conditio sine
qua non. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case,200 for example, the ICJ
indicated that limited practice may bring about the establishment of a new
customary rule of international law, particularly when the new rule is relatively
uncontroversial or established in vacuo. 201 When a new rule is more controversial,
however, such as a qualified right to UNC secession, more extensive practice
seems necessary. In this regard it should be noted that a qualified right to UNC
secession has been articulated by the Friendly Relations Declaration and Fiftieth
Anniversary Declaration. This repetition certainly bolsters claims that a customary
rule of international law has been primafacie created.202 Once again, though, it
must be considered whether other forms of state practice, such as physical acts and
omissions, conflict with the aforementioned instruments. If a conflict does exist,
then this will thwart the creation of a customary rule.
iv. OpinioJuris
One final element of customary law requiring analysis is opinio juris.203
Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ refers to "a general practice accepted as
law."204 The phrase "accepted as law" seems to imply that a practice will only
become customary law when accompanied with the requisite psychological belief
that such a practice is rendered obligatory.205 In many ways then, the requirement
of opinio juris is tautologous, requiring that states consider a given practice or
omission law before it is recognized as such.206 Regardless of these theoretical and
conceptual difficulties, the requirement of psychological belief is a necessary
ingredient for the formation of customary law. How this requisite psychological
component is identified depends on the nature of the dispute under consideration.
When dealing with relatively uncontroversial subject matter, the ICJ has, as

200. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 171, at 45.
201. Id. An example of a new rule established in vacua might be the creation of space law. See
Akehurst, supra note 178, at 13. But see Peter Malanczuk, Space Law as a Branch of International
Law, 25 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 160-61 (1994).
202. South West Africa, supra note 185, at 291-93 (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka)
(concluding that an accumulation of resolutions could precipitate the formation of a customary rule of
international law).
203. The Latin phrase "opinio juris" also referred to as "opinio juris sive necessitatis" was first
coined by the French scholar Frangois Gdny to differentiate legal custom from mere social usage. On
the subject of opiniojuris, see SHAW, supra note 63, at 84-89; Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power,
Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE
21ST CENTURY 531, 531-32 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
204. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 129, art. 38(l)(b) (emphasis added).
205. BROWNLIE, supranote 72, at 8; DIXON, supra note 189, at 34.
206. DIXoN, supra note 189, at 35. D'Amato remarks "[blow can custom create law if its
psychological component requires action in conscious accordance with law pre-existing the action?"
D'AMATO, supra note 167, at 66. Triggs has noted "the test of opiniojurisis circular." TRIGGS, supra
note 188, at 49.
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evidenced by the Gulf of Maine Case,207 been willing simply to equate opiniojuris
with general practice.208 When the subject matter is controversial, however, the
ICJ has imposed a more exacting test to determine the requisite psychological
belief. It is submitted that the latter approach is the most relevant to the present
study, which is concerned with the controversial subject of UNC secession.
Regarding this second approach to opinio juris, three cases are particularly
instructive, the first of which is the Lotus Case. 209 Here the Permanent Court of
International Justice ("PCIJ")stated:
[e]ven if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the
reported cases were sufficient to prove in point of fact the circumstances

alleged by the Agent for the French Government, it would merely show
that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal
proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged
to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being a
conscious duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an

international custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that
States have been conscious of having such a duty; on the other hand ...
there are other circumstances calculated to show the contrary is true.210

As Brownlie has suggested, the above reasoning applies with equal relevance to
proactive state conduct.2 1 1
A very similar approach was taken in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Case,212
where the ICJ stated that in order for a customary rule of international law to be
created,
[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to evidence a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive
necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are

conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or
even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are
many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol,
which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by
considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any
3
sense of legal duty. 2 1

207. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 1.C.J. 246, 29394 (Oct. 12).
208. BROWNLIE, supranote 72, at 8.
209. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 18 (Sept. 7).
210. Id. at 28; see also BRowNLIE, supranote 72, at 9.
211. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 9.
212. North Sea Continental Shelf, supranote 171, at 44.
213. Id. See BROWNLIE, supranote 72, at 9; VILLIGER, supranote 146, at 47; Akehurst, supranote
178, at 31-32.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

386

VOL. 41: 3

Hence, it follows that a particular (ongoing) practice will become customary law
provided it is accompanied by the requisite psychological belief.
In the later case of Nicaragua v. the United States of America,214 the ICJ
reiterated this traditional formulation when it stated:
[i]n considering the instances of the conduct above described, the Court
has to emphasize that, as was observed in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases, for a new rule of customary law to be formed, not only must
the acts concerned 'amount to a settled practice,' but they must be
accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis. Either the State
taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must have
behaved so that their conduct is 'evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The
need for such as belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is
implicit in the very notion of the opiniojurissive necessitates.'215
However, Nicaragua also developed a new variant of opinio juris relating
specifically to declaratory General Assembly resolutions. This new variant
contained a two-stage test: first, that opinio juris could be primafacie deduced
from widespread state acceptance of declaratory General Assembly resolutions,
such as the Friendly Relations Declaration, and second, that such opinio juris
would be legally perfected by concomitant state physical acts and omissions. The
first stage of the test was enunciated by the ICJ as follows:
[O]piniojurismay, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter
alia,the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards certain
General Assembly resolutions, and particularly resolution 2625(XXV)
entitled 'Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning

Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations.' The effect of consent to the text of
such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a 'reiteration or
elucidation' of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the
contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the
rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves.2 16
The Court continued:

As already observed, the adoption by States of this text [the Friendly
Relations Declaration] affords an indication of their opinio juris as to
customary international law on the question. 21 7

214.
215.
216.
217.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5.
Id. 207.
Id. T 188.
Id. T 191. Franck has opined that "[t]he effect of this enlarged concept of the lawmaking force

of . . . General Assembly resolutions" is that it "may well . . . caution states to vote against

'aspirational' instruments' if they do not intend to embrace them totally and at once, regardless of
circumstance." Thomas M. Franck, Some Observations on the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive

Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT'L L 116, 119 (1987). Whilst Franck's observation is valid, as Judge
Schwebel pointed out in a 1972 Hague lecture, the Friendly Relations Declaration was "adopted by

2013

UNILATERAL NON-COLONIAL SECESSION

387

The second stage of the test was enunciated by the Court when determining
the binding nature of the principle of non-intervention:
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of declarations by States accepting the
principle of non-intervention, there remain two questions: first, what is
the exact content of the principle so accepted, and secondly, is the
practice sufficiently in conformity with it for this to be a rule of
customary international law? 21 8
This new variant of opinio juris-fashioned with direct reference to declaratory
General Assembly Resolutions-would seem to contradict the more traditional
formulation, as expressed in the Lotus Case and North Sea Continental Shelf Case,
which provided that opinio juris could only be ascertained after a succession of
consistent state acts or omissions accompanied by the requisite psychological
belief that such acts or omissions were rendered legally obligatory.
As
commentators such as Schachter have observed, this new variant of opiniojuris
was seen by some critics as standing custom[ary law] on its head. In
place of a practice that began with the gradual accretion of acts and
subsequently received the imprimatur of opiniojuris, the Court reversed
the process: an opinio juris expressed first as a declaration would
become law if confirmed by general practice.219
Accordingly, without a synchronicity between declaratory General Assembly
resolutions and state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions, a binding
rule of customary law cannot be created.
It is clear that Article 38(1)(b) of the Statue of the ICJ includes statements
such as those contained in declaratory General Assembly resolutions. It is clear
also that textual statements are not per se subordinated to other forms of state
practice, such as physical acts and omissions. All forms of state practice are
relevant to the formation of a customary rule and must be considered concurrently.
Repetition of a certain practice strengthens the claim that a customary rule of
international law has been created, although this repetition must be accompanied
by the requisite opinio juris. As indicated by Nicaragua v. the United States of

acclamation and accepted by the General Assembly as declaratory of international law." Schwebel
holds the same opinion regarding the Definition of Aggression. S.M. Schwebel, Aggression,
Intervention and Self-Defence, 136 RECUEIL DES COURs 411, 452 n.1 1 (1972). Supporting this view,
Schachter remarks that "[m]ost states, including the United States, refer frequently to this resolution
[the Friendly Relations Declaration] as an authoritative expression of the law of the Charter and related
customary law." Oscar Schachter, Just War and Human Rights, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1989).
218. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, 205. Earlier, the
Court noted that "[t]he existence in the opinio juris of States of the principle of non-intervention is
backed by established and substantial practice." Id. at 106, 202.
219. Schachter, supra note 203, at 531-32. Rijpkema has similarly noted in the context of
Nicaragua that "[t]his term [opinio juris] which refers to the legal convention of States, is apparently
given a broader meaning than usual in the Nicaraguacase. It transpires that manifestations of States'
legal conventions do not necessarily need to relate to acts of States which constitute a settled practice in
order to be identified as statement of opinio juris." P. P. Rijpkema, Customary Law in the Nicaragua
Case, 20 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 91, 92-93 (1989).
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America,220 where a conflict exists between various forms of state practice, opinio
juris cannot be decisively determined from textual elaboration alone: an enquiry of
state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions is also necessary.221 If,
therefore, state physical acts and omissions are concomitant with the qualified right
to UNC secession contained in instruments such as, inter alia, the Friendly
Relations Declaration and Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration, a de lege lata legal
right would be established under Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ.
3.

Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions as General Principles
of International Law: Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ

Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ lists "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" as a source of international law. 222 As with
Article 38(1)(b), the precise scope and meaning of this provision is
controversial.223 The orthodox view, favoured by scholars such as Brownlie,224
229 de Lupis,230 and Virally, 231
Dixon,225 Shaw,226 Glahn,227 Guggenheim, 228
maintains that the section merely alludes to rules and principles common to all
developed legal systems. Such rules and principles include the notions that
persons are entitled to go before an impartial court to settle disputes and have the
right to be heard before judgment is pronounced. It was also suggested by Judge
McNair in the International Status of South West Africa Case 232 that certain
substantive domestic law concepts might be incorporated into international law
under Article 38(1)(c). 233 Thus, legal concepts such as trusts (InternationalStatus
of South West Africa Case),234 subrogation (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions

220.
221.
222.
223.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5.
Id. 188, 189, 191, 202, 205.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 129, art. 38(1)(c).
SLOAN, supra note 129, at 77; G.J.H VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 131-51 (1983); Hermann Mosler, GeneralPrinciples of Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 90-92 (7th ed. 1984).
224. BROWNLIE, supranote 72, at 18.
225. DIXON, supranote 189, at 39.
226. SHAW, supranote 63, at 99.
227. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-24 (5th ed. 1986).
228. Paul Guggenheim, Contribution a l'histoire des sources du droit des gens, 94 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 79 (1958).
229. F.A. Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20, 20-51
(1957).
230. DETTER, suprb note 130, at 200-03.
231. Michel Virally, The Sources of InternationalLaw, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 116, 143-48 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968).
232. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July 11).
233. Id. at 148; DIxON, supra note 189, at 39. See also Lord McNair, The General Principlesof
Law Recognized by CivilizedNations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1-19 (1957).
234. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148 (July 11)
(separate opinion of Sir Arnold McNair).
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Case), 235 and limited liability (Barcelona Traction Case)236 might be incorporated
under this section. Further, general notions of equity have been incorporated in
cases such as the Diversion of Water from the Meuse Case (Netherlands v.
Belgium),237 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,238 FrontierDispute Case (Burkina
23924
Faso v. Mali),29
and FisheriesJurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland).240
In addition to these overarching rules and principles derived from domestic
legal systems, it has been suggested that Article 38(l)(c) enlivens general
principles peculiar to the international system. 241 This would include notions such
as the sovereign equality of states and the right of any state to exclusive control
over its sovereign jurisdiction.242 Article 38(l)(c) may also allow the incorporation
of more progressive general principles, such as the notion that states are prohibited
from inflicting environmental pollution upon the territory of other states.24 3 In the
244
Nuclear Test Case (New Zealand v. France)
for example, Judge Weeramantry
suggested that there is "a fundamental principle of environmental law which must
be noted. It is well entrenched in international law . . .. that no nation is entitled by

its own activities to cause damage to the environment of any other nation." 245
Clearly, Judge Weeramantry was appealing to the operation of Article 38(1)(c) to
support his position. If, therefore, it is acceptable to appeal to Article 38(1)(c) in
the environmental realm, the question arises whether the provision can also be
enlivened to incorporate a qualified right to UNC secession vis-a-vis declaratory
General Assembly resolutions.
With the growth of human rights law since the U.N.'s inception, it may be
arguable that certain general principles of international law have developed
enshrining the right of individuals and peoples to freedom from persecution and
systematic unremitting discrimination. Indeed the U.N. instruments hitherto
examined provide tangible evidence that human rights law is an immutable (and
ever growing) force within contemporary international law. From this premise,
235. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3, at 17-18
(Aug. 30); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 472.
236. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, supra note 183, at 154-55 (separate opinion
of Judge Tanaka); see also BROWNLIE, supranote 72, at 18; SHAW, supranote 63, at 105.
237. Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth v. Beig.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 at 73, 77
(June 28) (individual opinion by Judge Hudson). See SHAW, supra note 63 at 106; BROWNLIE, supra
note 72, at 25-26; TRIGGS, supranote 188, at 89.
238. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 171, at 53-54.
239. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 1.C.J. 554, 631-63 (equity in territorial delimitation).
See DIXON, supra note 189, at 40; SHAW, supra note 63, at 108-109.
240. Here the ICJ sought "an equitable solution derived from the applicable law." Fisheries
Jurisdiction, supra note 172, at 33. See DIXON, supra note 189, at 40; SHAW, supra note 63, at 107
n.159.
241. DixoN, supranote 189, at 41.
242. Id. at 40-41.
243. Id.
244. Request for Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of Court's Judgment
of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 346 (Sept. 22) (dissenting opinion
of Judge Weeramantry).
245. Id. at 346-47; DIXON, supra note 189, at 43.
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therefore, can it be extrapolated that a qualified right to UNC secession exists
pursuant to Article 38(l)(c)?
To propound such a view would certainly be contrary to orthodoxy. Some
scholars though, such as Fitzmaurice, maintain that section 38(l)(c) is designed to
incorporate natural law doctrines which have supervening legal validity, such as
the protection of human rights and the prohibition of genocide. 246 According to
this view, it is perhaps feasible to include a qualified right to UNC secession as a
general principle.
The view that a combination of natural law doctrines and declaratory General
Assembly resolutions might provide grounds for a qualified right to UNC
secession is, however, highly controversial. As scholars such as Dixon have
argued, although principles such as respect for human rights and the prohibition of
genocide are universal, their legal authority is, in the main, derived from treaty and
customary law-Articles 38(l)(a) and (b) respectively. 247 Questions such as "how
should natural law be determined?" and "to what extent can states rely upon their
individual subjective natural law interpretations?" pose significant conceptual
problems. In short, it is very difficult to argue persuasively that a combination of
natural law doctrines and declaratory General Assembly resolutions might create a
general principle of international law that would be binding upon the international
community.
An alternative strategy for incorporating a right to UJNC secession under
Article 38(1)(c) is the notion that declaratory General Assembly resolutions, by
virtue of propounding certain overarching legal principles, ipso facto, constitute a
valid source of international law. Schermers, for example, has suggested:
[t]o a large extent, all law making resolutions of the universal
organizations adopted by a vast majority of States represent general

principles of law recognized by civilized nations, the adoption in itself
constituting recognition.248
Mendelson suggests a slightly more cautious interpretation:
[I]n certain very limited circumstances a General Assembly Resolution
may constitute, or bring about the birth of, a principle of international
law [pursuant to Article 38(1)(c)].2 49
However, like the natural law arguments explored above, this approach is
beset with difficulties. To equate principles espoused in declaratory General

246. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regardingthe Formal Sources of InternationalLaw,
in SYMBOLAE VERZUL 174 (F. M. van Asbeck, et al. eds., 1958).
247. DIXON, supra note 189, at 40. For a brief critique of natural law, see Youri Rechetov,
InternationalResponsibility for Violations of Human Rights, in U.N. LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
Two ToPIcs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 237, 237-38 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
248. HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: FUNCTIONING AND LEGAL
ORDER 613 (1972).
249. Maurice Mendelson, The Legal Character of General Assembly Resolutions: Some
Considerations of Principle, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 95,
102-03 (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980).
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Assembly resolutions with general principles of international law overlooks the
inherently political nature of the General Assembly and incorrectly assigns it a
primarily legislative role. The dangers of taking such an approach are manifold:
states will be less inclined to accept progressive declaratory General Assembly
resolutions, and this in turn will stymie the evolution of international law pursuant
to section 38(l)(b). Furthermore, the view of Schermers and Mendelson also
seems to impute a similar function to Articles 38(1)(b) and 38(1)(c), thereby
rendering the latter somewhat pleonastic. Not only that, but it also dispenses with
many of the legal criteria traditionally associated with section 38(1)(b) such as
opiniojuris and the need for synchronicity between declaratory General Assembly
resolutions and state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions, as outlined
by the ICJ in Nicaraguav. the United States of America.250 Thus, to assert that a
qualified right to UNC secession can be elevated to a general principle of
international law pursuant to Article 38(1)(c) is conceptually problematic.
In light of the difficulties associated with natural law and quasi-legislative
interpretations, the view of scholars such as Arangio-Ruiz, Hailbronner, and Klein
regarding Article 38(1)(c) is to be preferred. The former, for example, has
asserted:
[i]n conformity with the finding that Assembly resolutions are not
binding legal instruments, declarations are not per se sufficient to create
principles of international law. This follows from the fact that principles
become part of the body of international law only in so far as they enter
therein through the law-making processes of international society:
mainly.. . through custom or agreement. 251
Hailbronner and Klein have similarly suggested that "it is not possible to classify
the content of the resolutions of the GA under Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute."252
Hence, it is most probable that Article 38(1)(c) refers to rules and principles
common to developed domestic legal systems. Accordingly, the qualified right to
UNC secession contained in declaratory General Assembly resolutions would be
more appropriately incorporated into international law under Article 38(1)(b).
4.

Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions as "Consensus":
Beyond Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ

Moving beyond the traditional sources of international law contained in
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, it is arguable that declaratory General
Assembly resolutions also constitute sources of international law purely on the
basis of consensus. Falk, for instance, has postulated that consensus is replacing
consent as the basis of international legal obligations. 253 Other scholars, such as
250. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5, % 188-89, 191,
202, 205.
251. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supranote 156, at 70. See also DIXON, supra note 189, at 40-41.
252. Hailbronner & Klein, supranote 130, at 239.
253. Falk has written that "there is discernible a trend from consent to consensus as the basis of
international legal obligations." Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-LegislativeCompetence ofthe General
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D'Amato, appear somewhat sympathetic to this position, suggesting that consensus
is international law.254
This prompts the question: what exactly does "consensus" mean? Sloan has
suggested that "consensus is a method for reaching a decision without voting in the
absence of formal objection." 255 Suy has similarly suggested that consensus
connotes a positive attitude to the substance of a text and that "fundamental
reservations would be contrary to the very idea of the non-objection procedure." 256
D'Amato has defined consensus as "complete unanimity" or "near unanimity with
a few abstentions. ,,257 Importantly, "consensus" was defined in Article 161(8)(e)
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as "the absence of
any formal objection." 258 This definition has been adopted mutatis mutandis by
Article 2(4), Note 1 of Annex 2 of the 1994 World Trade Organization's
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.259
It would thus seem that the widespread acceptance of declaratory General
Assembly resolutions with "the absence of any formal objection" would perhaps
satisfy the criteria of consensus as a non-orthodox mode of law creation.
According to this view instruments such as the Friendly Relations Declarationwhich were adopted without formal objection-may impose binding obligations
upon the world community. Hence, the qualified right to UNC secession espoused
in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration may impose a
binding legal obligation upon states.
Whether consensus is a viable mode of international law creation is a moot
point. For such a proposition to be prima facie accepted, the content of the
declaration must propound the law de lege lata, not de legeferenda. Furthermore,
state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions must be concomitant with the
rule of law propounded, except in the rare situation where no previous example of

Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 785 (1966). See also Christoph Schreuer, Recommendations and the
Traditional Sources of InternationalLaw, 20 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 116, 116 (1977). But see Heinz
Guradze, Are Human Rights Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly Law Making?, 4
HUM. RTS. J. 453, 457 (1971); N.G. Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the
GeneralAssembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 349, 351-52 (1970).
254. Anthony D'Amato, On Consensus, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 106, 121 (1970). See also Samuel A.
Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L.
444, 447 (1969). But see N.G. Onuf, Further Thoughts on a New Source of International Law:
ProfessorD'Amato 's 'Manfest Intent', 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 774, 774-82 (1971).
255. SLOAN, supranote 127, at 87.
256. Eric Suy, Consensus, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 51 (Rudolf

Bernhardt ed., 1981).
257. See D'Amato, supra note 254, at 106. It should be noted, though, that this definition is
inferred from a reading of his article as a whole.
258. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 161(8)(e), Dec. 10, 1982, available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/conventionagreements/texts/unclosfUNCLOS-TOC.htm.
259. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2(4), note
1, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 ("The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter
submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is
taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.").
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state practice exists, as with space law. 26 Hence, where state practice in terms of
physical acts and omissions is clearly and overwhelmingly contrary to the textual
content of such an instrument, it is unlikely that a binding rule of law could be said
to have solidified by way of consensus.261 For this reason, it is submitted that the
consensus approval of declaratory General Assembly resolutions containing a
qualified right to UNC secession probably does not impose concrete legal
obligations. Even if one were to discount the role of state physical acts and
omissions, there is still the lingering conceptual problem of assigning the General
Assembly a quasi-legislative function, which member states do not have any
reason to accept in positive legal terms. Indeed most state action vis-c'a-vis support
for various resolutions-declaratory and non-declaratory-is granted under the
proviso that the General Assembly is primarily a forum for political expressionnot a legislative chamber.262

260. See generally BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 136-46 (1997).
261. Sloan seems to implicitly acknowledge this constraint. See SLOAN, supra note 127, at 88.
262. Nowhere in the text of the U.N. Charter, for instance, is the General Assembly attributed a
legislative function. Indeed, a proposal that the General Assembly should be endowed with a legislative
function at the 1945 San Francisco conference was resoundingly rejected. The Philippines delegation
proposed that "[t]he General Assembly should be vested with the legislative authority to enact rules of
international law which should become effective and binding upon members of the Organization after
such rules have been approved by the majority vote of the Security Council. Should the Security
Council fail to act on any of such rules within a period of thirty days after submission thereof to the
Security Council, the same should become effective and binding as if approved by the Security
Council." See United Nations Conference on International Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26,
1945, Proposed Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted by the Philippine
Delegation, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/Gl4(k) (Vol. 3), art. VIII,
9 (May 5, 1945); United Nations
Conference on International Organization, S.F., Cali., Apr. 25-June 26, 1945, Agendafor Tenth Meeting
of Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.45511/220 (Vol. 9) (May 20, 1945). This proposal was defeated
by a vote of 26-1. Falk, supra note 253, at 783; Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 130, at 237. The ICJ
has explicitly and implicitly affirmed this position. In the South West Africa Cases, the Court noted that
"[r]esolutions of the United Nations General Assembly ... are not binding, but only recommendatory in
character." South West Africa, supra note 185, at 229-30 (dissenting opinion by Judge Wellington

Koo). Similar remarks were made by the Court in its Namibia Advisory Opinion. Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Nothwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 6, 280-81 (Jan. 26) (dissenting
opinion by Judge Fitzmaurice). The Court implicitly affirmed such an interpretation in Nicaragua v. the
United States ofAmerica. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5,
99-101, 106-08. For the articulation of the argument that the General Assembly is not a legislative
forum, see the comments of Robert Rosenstock, acting as the U.S. Representative to the Sixth (Legal)
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, namely, "[m]y government finds this statement startling
because it is open to the interpretation that this General Assembly, by its adoption of controverted
resolutions, 'develops' principles which arguably are of a legal character. This is an interpretation of the
powers and practice of this Assembly which is not accepted by my government, and which does not
conform to the United Nations Charter or to international law. This Assembly is not a lawmaking
body." John A. Boyd, Contemporary Practiceof the United States, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 375, 377 (1978)
(quoting Press Release, U.S./U.N., U.N. Press Release 112(77) (Nov. 11, 1977)).
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B. Distillation
The legal effect of declaratory General Assembly resolutions has been
examined from four perspectives: treaty law (Article 38(l)(a) of the Statute of the
ICJ and Article 13(1)(a) of the U.N. Charter), customary law (Article 38(1)(b) of
the Statute of the ICJ), general principles (Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the
ICJ), and consensus. Of the four approaches, customary law appears, on balance,
to be the most appropriate and orthodox avenue for declaratory General Assembly
resolutions containing a qualified right to UNC secession to gain concrete legal
effect. Suggestions, for example, that the Friendly Relations Declaration might
constitute an authentic interpretation of the U.N. Charter are not supported by close
analysis of the latter's Article 13(l)(a). Similarly, arguments pertaining to the
incorporation of a qualified right to UNC secession via general principles, although
interesting, do not withstand conceptual scrutiny and are clearly discordant with
the preponderance of conventional legal opinion. Likewise, the unorthodox appeal
to consensus, made by scholars such as Falk and D'Amato, also seems
unsatisfactory. This is not to assert that the latter three methods are entirely devoid
of all merit for incorporating a qualified right to UNC secession in international
law; rather, that they are less likely to command widespread support and respect
from legal scholars and states alike.
V.

CONCLUSION

A qualified right to UNC secession is contained in Principle 5, paragraph 7 of
the Friendly Relations Declaration and Article 1 of the Fiftieth Anniversary
Declaration. It has been demonstrated that this right is most appropriately given
legal effect under Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ. It remains, therefore,
to investigate whether such a customary law right would be legally perfected by
concomitant state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions, as indicated by
the ICJ in Nicaragua v. the United States of America.263 Such an investigation
would include, but not be limited to, acts of recognition in relation to UNC
secessionist disputes. Furthermore, it remains to be determined whether a general
customary law right to UNC secession would be enlivened by oppression against
peoples both in moderato (political, cultural, and racial discrimination) and in
extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and genocide). It will be recalled that the
textual articulation of the qualified right to UNC secession would appear to capture
both classes of oppression.
Although it is not the present article's purpose to venture an extended opinion
as to state practice in terms of physical acts and omissions, the following tentative
observations might nonetheless be made. It would seem that collectively UNC
secessionist case studies such as Bangladesh, the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus ("TRNC"), Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kosovo, and South Sudan indicate
that only when human rights violations by the existing state are particularly

263. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 5,
202, 205.

188-89, 191,
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extreme will a right to secession be perfected in international customary law. If
correct, this means that state practice in terms of recognition only supports UNC
secession when the people within the seceding entity have been subject to
oppression in extremis. This is perhaps explicable by the reluctance of states to
endorse freely a method of state creation that might undermine the well-entrenched
principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Although at present positive international law may only recognise a right to
UNC secession in response to the most egregious human rights violations, at a
normative level, this position must surely be open to question. In a fundamental
sense, states exist for the benefit of human beings, rather than vice versa. Should a
state cease to bestow the proper degree of human dignity upon its citizens, then it
is submitted that the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity must
yield to the right of peoples to self-determination. Put more overtly, in a normative
sense, there are strong reasons to argue that a right to UNC secession should be
available not just in response to human rights abuses in extremis, but also in
moderato. This position would seem to be reflected in the textual formulations of
the Friendly Relations Declaration and Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration. It would
also seem commensurate with the increasing emphasis being placed upon human
dignity and human rights throughout the international legal order.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: To PROTECT STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
DR. JASMEET GULATI* AND IVAN KHOSA**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Is itpossible to resist evil without succumbing to the dangers of
righteousness?
This question, posed by Tzvetan Todorov, aptly sums up the debate over the
issue of humanitarian intervention.' The heart of the debate is the perceived
conflict between the notion of state sovereignty and the concept of humanitarian
intervention. While NATO's intervention in Kosovo was seen as a direct attack
upon the state sovereignty, the silence of the international community to intervene
in Rwandan genocide at the same time has also been criticized as a failure of the
community of nations to protect the lives of those people. Many jurists seem to
contend that these two concepts can never co-exist.2 They hold humanitarian
intervention as inconsistent with the concept of sovereignty. However, as former
Secretary-General Kofi Annan asserted in September 1999, "if humanitarian
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?" 3
This paper does not intend to suggest that the principle of sovereignty of
individual states is violable in favor of humanitarian intervention. Rather, it tries
to demonstrate that when an authority appointed to enforce sovereignty starts to
violate that sovereignty, the international community must step in to stop the
violation of this impregnable principle. This argument centrally rests on a standard
assumption that the concept of sovereignty is separable from the authority
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University, India; Ph.D. (International Criminal Law, Panjab University); L.L.M., Fellow-Cambridge
Commonwealth Trust (Public International Law, University of Cambridge); M.A. (Public
Administration, Panjab University); Management Development Program (Indian Institute of
Management).
** Ivan Khosa is an Undergraduate Student of Law, University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab
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1. Jennifer M. Welsh, Conclusion: Humanitarian Intervention After 11 September, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 176 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004)

[hereinafter Welsh, After 11 September] (quoting Tzvetan Todorov, Amnesty Lectures (Feb. 1, 2001)).
2. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT 1-2 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT], available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICIS
S%20Report.pdf.
3. Id. at 2.

397

398

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 41: 3

appointed as sovereign. The authority appointed as a sovereign is the one
governing its people, and could be termed as government. The purpose of
government is to secure the people's rights. Thus, the sovereign is meant to
protect the rights and interests of its citizens. Therefore, if the sovereign engages
in policies that threaten the basic purpose for the enforcement of sovereignty, he
will be said to be violating the sovereignty of his state and his people. Due to this,
sovereignty can no longer vest in its violator, and he will not be able use its
inviolability as a defense when international actors intervene on humanitarian
grounds to protect the sovereignty of that state by preventing the ruling sovereign
from violating it. This paper will also explicate the basic purpose of sovereignty
along with the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, and Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter along with various moral and ethical limitations in the context
of humanitarian intervention.
A. Research Methodology

This paper is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the basic
concept of humanitarian intervention. Here, we will argue that the basic criticism
of this concept revolves around the principle of state sovereignty. The second
section tries to delineate the core features of sovereignty that have survived the
interpretations of numerous jurists throughout history. The third section discusses
the legality of humanitarian intervention by testing its validity using the core
features of sovereignty in light of other principles, including self-determination
and non-intervention. The final section highlights the emerging doctrine of
responsibility to protect and its acceptance of a genial relation between the concept
of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.
B. Scope and Limitations

The research is limited to only one aspect of humanitarian intervention,
namely, its relation with the concept of sovereignty. Most of the issues raised in
this paper are only incidental to this main issue of sovereignty and its relation to
humanitarian intervention. In this paper we do not deal with other disputes
regarding humanitarian intervention-for example, the debate whether sufficient
state practice and opinio juris exists to establish humanitarian intervention as a
customary law or not. Also, because the topic of sovereignty is very vast and
extensive, the research is limited to only a few important jurists of sovereignty, and
further, to only their main ideas.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In the last two decades, the issue of humanitarian intervention has emerged as
one of the most hotly debated topics amongst both theorists and practitioners of
international law.4 This paper seeks to answer one straightforward question-is

4. Jennifer M. Welsh, Introduction, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
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there actually any conflict between the concept of humanitarian intervention and
the protection of state sovereignty, especially in the situation of grave humanitarian
crises that is posed by the ruling sovereign himself? However, before starting with
the main arguments, it is important to define the concept of humanitarian
intervention in order to make clear the end and scope of the matter that is to be
discussed.
A. HumanitarianInterventionDefined
J. L. Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as:
[T]he threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of
the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens,
without the permission of the government of the state within whose
territory force is applied.5
According to James Pattison, there are four defining conditions of
humanitarian intervention.6 First, humanitarian intervention is always a forcible
military intervention that is carried out without the consent of the government of
the state. The lack of consent and forcible nature distinguishes it from the
humanitarian assistance, which involves relief work done by international actors
(mainly non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross or Oxfam) that is done with the consent or at the request of the
government.8 The second defining condition is that "humanitarian intervention
takes place where there is actual or impending grievous suffering or loss of life." 9
Intervention after the occurrence is not allowed.
Third, humanitarian intervention must have a humanitarian purpose.10 It
should only be carried out with the purpose of "preventing, reducing, or halting
actual or impending loss of life and human suffering.""
This also means
intervention that is mainly for self-defense may not be a humanitarian intervention.
The use of force in self-defense has its origin in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
wherein use of force is legal only if the armed attack has occurred against the state
using force. 12 The use of force in humanitarian intervention is merely for the
protection against violations of human rights in another state.13 This feature
distinguishes between a humanitarian intervention and the War on Terror. While
humanitarian intervention is aimed toward protecting against loss of life in the
5. J. L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 15, 18 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).
6. JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
WHO SHOULD INTERVENE 25 (2010).

7. Id.
8. Id. at 26.
9. Id. at 27.

10. Id. at 27.
11. Id.
12. U.N. Charter art. 51.
13. PATTISON, supra note 6, at 27.
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target state, the War on Terrorism is mainly concerned with eliminating the risk
posed by some militants of the target state to the citizens of the intervening state.14
Thus, the War on Terror may be argued as being limited only to self-defense.
Finally, humanitarian intervention is always carried out by an external power.' 5 A
state using force to protect its own territory from rebels is not an example of a
humanitarian intervention, as it comes under the domestic jurisdiction of a state.1 6
B. Sovereignty: The Biggest Limitation In The Legitimacy OfHumanitarian
Intervention
It is conspicuous that the acceptability of the concept of humanitarian
intervention can only rest upon its legal validity.' 7 It seems that any test for
corroborating or refuting the legality of humanitarian intervention mainly rests
upon the interpretation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which has codified the
customary norms of "state sovereignty" and "non-intervention."' 8
Proponents in favor of establishing the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention argue that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter does not expressly bar
humanitarian intervention because the prohibition under Article 2(4) of the Charter
only applies when the use of force is in a "manner inconsistent with the [p]urposes
of the United Nations." 9 However, the duty to prevent human rights violations is
consistent with the aforementioned purposes. 20 This is because preventing these
violations is, at its essence, about "reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental human
rights" and "sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge of war," text that is
found in the Preamble to the U.N. Charter and is indicative of the purposes of the
United Nations. 2 1 This is highlighted in Article 1(3) of the Charter.22
Other provisions of the U.N. Charter, such as Article 5523 and 56,24 also
reflect the importance of protecting human rights as a fundamental purpose and
14. See Welsh, After 11 September, supra note 1, at 180-83.
15. PATTISON, supra note 6, at 27.

16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 11, 14-15 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004) (describing intervention by

another state more as a "qualified prerogative" than a right).
18. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
19. Id.
20. See Sarah Joseph & Joanna Kyriakakis, The United Nations and Human Rights, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1, 1-2 (Sarah Joseph & Adam McBeth eds.,
2010).
21. U.N. Charter pmbl.
22. Id. art. 1, para. 3 ("The Purposes of the United Nations are ... [t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.").
23. Id. art. 55 ("With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote . .. universal respect for, and
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objective of the United Nations. Another argument justifying the validity of
humanitarian intervention relates to the customary nature of humanitarian
intervention and how it is validated by state practice and opiniojuris.25 A foreign
office minister of the United Kingdom wrote that a limited use of force without the
Security Council's express authorization is justifiable in support of the purpose
laid down by the Council when that is the only means to avert an immediate and
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.26
Critics of humanitarian intervention have also used Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter to formulate a major criticism that directly attacks the validity of
humanitarian intervention.
According to these critics, the principle of
humanitarian intervention conflicts with the principle of sovereignty of a state,
which is considered to be inviolable.2 7 The principle of the inviolability of
sovereignty is codified in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,28 which expressly
prohibits the use of force against the sovereignty and integrity of a state. Critics of
humanitarian intervention argue that since Article 2(4) is ajus cogens norm, 29 and
thus, that it imposes an absolute restriction on humanitarian intervention. 30
Moreover, they also reject the argument relating to customary nature of
humanitarian intervention on the premise that humanitarian intervention cannot
become a customary law because it conflicts with the jus cogens norm of territorial
sovereignty. 3 '
Countering this criticism, the central thesis of this paper is built around the
concept of sovereignty, discussing it thoroughly in subsequent parts. But before
discussing this thesis, let us look at the second criticism regarding the ethics of
humanitarian intervention. This criticism deals with the actual motive of the

observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.").
24. Id. art. 56 ("All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.").
25. State practice prior to the U.N. Charter may include British, French and Russian intervention
in Greece (1827), American intervention in Cuba (1898), French intervention in Syria (1860), and
Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian intervention in Macedonia (1912). State practice after the adoption of the
U.N. Charter may include NATO's intervention in Kosovo (1999), intervention in Iraq by western
troops (1991), and U.N. intervention in Somalia under Security Council Resolution 794 (1992).
26. See Geoffrey Marston, United Kingdom Materialon InternationalLaw 1999, 1999 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 387, 587 (1999).
27. Sir Adam Roberts, The United Nations and HumanitarianIntervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 71, 76 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
28. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
1 190 (June 27) (separate opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh) (holding that the prohibition of the use of
force against territorial sovereignty is ajus cogens norm).
30. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 27.
31. The second argument was also rejected by another counter-argument citing that none of the
intervention that took place after the Charter was adopted was held legal by the international committee,
even though none of it was severely condemned by the Security Council of the U.N. This argument is
not dealt in detail in this paper, as it is secondary to the argument of inviolability of sovereignty and
requires its own separate research.
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intervening state. Critics argue that a state is primarily concerned with the interests
of its own citizens, whereas the interests of the citizens of the other state are
always secondary in nature. 32 Therefore, a state would never engage in
humanitarian intervention, as it is not beneficial for its own citizens.33
However, James Pattison has tried to counter this argument by distinguishing
between the intentions of the intervening state, and its corresponding motives for
the intervention.34 Pattison argues that the "intentions" of the intervening state
means having a humanitarian purpose of "preventing, reducing, or halting the

humanitarian crisis," whereas a "motive" is the "underlying reason for undertaking
the humanitarian intervention. "35 This "reason" may involve considerations such
as political gains to ending regional animosity.36 Critics argue that because no
state possesses a genuine and selfless humanitarian motive for intervention, there
can be no such thing as humanitarian intervention.37 On the contrary, Pattison
argues, "humanitarian motives, unlike humanitarian intentions, are not a defining
condition of 'humanitarian' intervention."3 8 He continues by explaining "an
intervener can be engaged in 'humanitarian intervention' without possessing a
humanitarian motive."39 Moreover, since it is very difficult to determine true
motives of the intervening state, humanitarian motives have little definitional or
normative significance. Therefore, until the intervening state possesses genuine
humanitarian intentions, we can say that the humanitarian intervention is genuine.
As such, it is quite evident that the only major hindrance in the interpretation
of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as supporting humanitarian intervention is the
limited and parochial interpretation of the term "sovereignty." If this limitation is
removed, then a sound, persuasive, and legally based argument can be constructed
in support of humanitarian intervention. Other concerns, such as the relation of
humanitarian intervention to the concepts of self-determination and nonintervention, are all incidental to the main limitation of sovereignty, and are
addressed along with it. The subsequent parts of this paper will explore whether
the true concept of sovereignty actually poses a limitation to humanitarian
intervention.
III. UNDERSTANDING SOVEREIGNTY

Professor Henry Shue argues that "[t]he sovereign state is a historically recent
and contingent form of human organization, invented in modem Europe and
largely imposed by Europeans upon the remainder of the modem world." 40 It is a
32. K Mills, Sovereignty Eclipsed?: The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Access and Intervention, J.
OF HUMANITARlAN AsSISTANCE (July 4, 1997), http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/l 11.
33. PATTISON, supra note 6, at 132-33.
34. Id. at 154.
35. Id. at 154-55.
36. Id. at 154.
37. Id. at 155.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Shue, supra note 17, at 11.
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highly complex concept both for political thinkers and legal jurists that has many
definitions, many of them also contradicting each other.41 Since humanitarian
intervention has a relationship with the concept of sovereignty, to begin, let us
evaluate the core aspects of sovereignty.
A. Core Aspects OfSovereignty
There are four core aspects of sovereignty that are common to almost all of its
definitions and evaluations. Each will be addressed in turn to prove the validity of
humanitarian intervention.
1. Sovereignty Is A Power
Despite the changing definitions of sovereignty throughout history, one aspect
that is generally accepted by all jurists is that sovereignty is a "power." For
instance, Greek philosopher Aristotle, in his work Politics,recognized sovereignty
as a "supreme power existing in the state," which may be "in the hands of one, or a
few, or of many." 42 This power may vest in some person, in a group of persons, in
artificial institutions created by men, or even in the general will of the people, as
argued by Rousseau.43 At this stage, we can say that this power composes the
"intangible aspect of sovereignty," which is bestowed in the "tangible aspect of
sovereignty," meaning in the physical authority in the form of men and
institutions."

2. Power Is Vested Through Some Contract
The next question that arises is how this power is vested in different
authorities that are asserted by various thinkers. On this issue, "[tihere is a general
agreement in the postulation of an original contract as the foundation of the
sovereign power." 45 As argued by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau:
Whatever the divergence of opinion respecting the exact terms of this
contract, or the effect of the agreement when made, there is a general
admission of the formation of a contract at some time or other, in some
form or other. The contract might be one between government and
people, as argued by many of the Monarchomachs; or a social contract
organizing the people, followed by a further agreement between people
and government, as with Pufendorf; or, again, the single contract in
which the sovereign and the State are created simultaneously. 46
This aspect of sovereignty makes it quite evident that the sovereign power, or the
"intangible aspect of sovereignty," was originally separate from the sovereign
41. See id. at 13-14.
42. C. E. MERRIAM, JR., HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU 5 (Batoche
Books 2001) (1900).
43. Id. at 19.
44. See id. at 46.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id.
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authority, or "the tangible aspect of sovereignty." The contention that the
sovereign authority is born with sovereign power cannot be upheld. The correct
position is that the sovereign power is delegated to the sovereign authority through
a contract, the nature of which is still disputed among various jurists.
3. The Sovereign Is Only To Enforce The Sovereign Power
As it is established that sovereign power is given to the sovereign authority
through some kind of contract, the question that begs our attention is why there
was a need to create sovereign authorities to which all sovereign powers are
delegated. French writer Philippe de Mornay speculated as to "why kings were
established in first place and for what essential purpose."47 He felt confident that
"men would not have surrendered their natural liberty .. . had they not anticipated
great advantages. ,,48 Roman philosopher Marcus Cicero tries to answer this
question by arguing that the final, and most important, development of a
community or a state is that "the various members composing it must come to an
agreement about the law which is to govern their conduct and relations toward one
another." 4 9 According to him, this led to the formation of a sovereign to make laws
effective in the realm of human action.5 0 In other words, the sovereign power is
given to an authority for the sole purpose of enforcing that power in the real world.
Thus, the sovereign authority is only a tangible representative of the "intangible
aspect of sovereignty." Sovereign authority only subsists to enforce sovereign
power. This tangible authority may change from a theocracy to an autocracy, or it
may shift toward a democracy, but its function remains the same-to enforce the
sovereign power, which is intangible and unchanging. Therefore, we can conclude
that the root of sovereignty lies in the sovereign power and not the sovereign
authority, which is a flexible concept.
4. The Sovereign Cannot Go Against The Objectives Of The Sovereign
Power
Because the sovereign authority is only created to enforce the sovereign
power, the question of whether the sovereign can go against the objectives sought
by the enforcement of sovereign power must largely be answered in the negative.
This aspect of sovereignty is otherwise known as the "rule of law." There are
disputations among various jurists regarding all the objectives sought by the
enforcement of sovereign power. Despite contradictions, one common objective
contained in all the theories about sovereignty and rule of law is "the protection of

47. Philippe du Plessis-Mornay, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RESISTANCE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: THREE TREATISES BY HOTMAN, BEZA, & MORNAY 169
(Julian H. Franklin ed. and trans., 1969).
48. Id.
49. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH 51 (Oskar Piest ed., George Holland
Sabine & Stanley Barney Smith trans., 1950).
50. Id.
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life of men," which is regarded as the most basic purpose for creating a state and
sovereignty.
Various jurists have unanimously held that the sovereign cannot go against
this objective. Jurists have tried to limit the sovereign in many ways to ensure that
it cannot violate this objective. For example, Johannes Althusius, the founder of
the concept of popular sovereignty, defined sovereignty as "[t]he highest and most
general power of administering the affairs which generally concern the safety and
welfare of the soul and body of the members of the State."52 According to
Althusius, the "government owes its existence to a contract which if not express
must be presumed, and whose terms if detrimental to the people's right are to be
regarded as null and void." 53 Hugo Grotius assumed that the "rules governing the
organization and behavior of states exist ultimately for the benefit of the actual
subjects of the rights and duties concerned, individual human beings."54 Further,
he tried to limit sovereignty by divine law, natural law, law of nations, and any
contract signed with the people. 5
French philosopher Jean Bodin, who
propounded the absolutist theory of sovereignty, also tried to protect the objective
of protecting the life of men by trying to limit the sovereign by "the laws of God,
of nature, and of nations."5 6
Many other jurists used the concept of "rule of law" to limit the sovereign
authority. According to them, the objectives for the enforcement of sovereign
power are the "laws," against which the sovereign cannot act. "Plato insisted that
the government should be bound by the law."5 7 Aristotle argued that the rule of
law is preferable, and sovereign authorities should only be made guardians and
ministers of law.5 8 Cicero, in his book The Republic, "condemned the king who
does not abide by the law as a despot who 'is the foulest and most repellant
creature imaginable."' 59 He observed, "[h]ow can anyone be properly called a man
who renounces every legal tie, every civilized partnership with his own citizens
and indeed with the entire human species."60
Social contract theorists also reflected this rule of law. According to them,
the state and the sovereign were created as a result of the "original contract"
between the members of the society.61 John Locke, an English jurist and a

51. See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supranote 2, at xi.
52. MERRIAM, supra note 42, at 9.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Carsten Stahan, Responsibility To Protect: PoliticalRhetoric Or Emerging Legal Norm, 101
AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 111 (2007) (citing HUGO GROTIUS, DE MARE LIBERUM, ch. V (Ralph Dernan
Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1609)).
55. MERRIAM, supra note 42, at 11.
56. Id. at 8.
57. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 8 (2004).

58. Id. at 9.
59. Id. at 11 (citing CICERO, THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1998)).

60. Id.
61. MERRIAM, supra note 42, at 19.
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proponent of social contract theory, argued that the authority created under the
contract only has the "power to protect and preserve, not to destroy; hence 'it is
not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the
people."' 62 If the power is used for the general good it would seem to be almost
without limit. But, if the authority acts contrary to the contract and tries to
suppress the natural rights of the citizens, it will lose its sovereignty. Locke
contended that:
Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws,
can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government,
which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie
themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and
fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace
and quiet.63
Jean Jacques Rousseau limited the sovereign by his concept of "general will"
in which, according to him, the sovereign power lies, and according to which only
the sovereign can act.M Thomas Hobbes, according to whom "the sovereign
created by the original contract wields absolute untrammeled power," also tried to
limit the sovereign by binding his conscience by natural law, and giving the
individual the right to resist if threatened by the sovereign with death.65
Thus, it is evident that jurists never envisioned sovereign authority as going
against the objectives for which the sovereign power is enforced. The powers of
the sovereign are limitless until they conflict with the basic purpose for which it
was given unlimited powers in the first place. Henry Shue, while analyzing
Kratochwil's thesis, rightly points out that the right to sovereignty is a right to do
wrong, as any right to genuine liberty must be.66 "However, it is a constrained
right to do wrong; a right to commit some wrongs but not others." 67 A sovereign is
free to commit wrongs to the extent that those wrongs do not violate the basic
purposes for which sovereignty was created. The protection of life is unanimously
considered as a basic purpose.68 Thomas Hobbes made a prominent argument that,
"the creator of law cannot be limited by the law," and therefore, the law created by
the sovereign is always subordinate to him. 69 Applying the same logic, it can be
deduced that the sovereign power that created the sovereign will always be
superior to the sovereign's authority, and thus, the sovereign can never violate it.
The creator is always superior to the creation. If sovereign power did not exist,
62. Id. at 16.
63. TAMANAHA, supra note 57, at 49 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
72-73 (1980)).
64. John B. Noone, Jr., The Social Contract and the Idea of Sovereignty in Rousseau, 32 J. POL.
696, 707 (1970).
65. TAMANAHA, supranote 57, at 47.
66. Shue, supra note 17, at 12.
67. Id. at 16.
68. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at xi ("State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.").
69. TAMANAHA, supranote 57, at 48.
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there would have been no need for a sovereign authority. Therefore, a sovereign
can have supremacy over the laws made by him but not over the law that made
him. This contention is also in consonance with the "Grundnorm" envisioned by
Hans Kelsen.7 o
B. The Sovereign Violating The Objectives OfSovereign Power
From the above discussions, we can finally draw two inferences. First, the
sovereign authority was only created to enforce the sovereign power in the realm
of human action. Second, the sovereign cannot go against the most basic objective
sought for enforcing the sovereign power, namely, protection of life of men.
Numerous jurists have asserted other objectives at different points in time that may
not be violated by the sovereign, but since the concept of humanitarian
intervention is concerned primarily to protect only the objective of protecting lives
of people, this paper will be limited to the above-mentioned objective.
The question arises as to what will follow if the sovereign authority violates
this basic purpose of the sovereign power. What if the sovereign becomes a threat
to the basic security and life of the citizens, when the sovereign was made the
implementer of sovereign power to avoid such a threat? Legal academic Fernando
Tes6n argues that "[g]overnments and others in power who seriously violate those
rights [which they were created to protect] undermine the one reason that justifies
their political power, and thus should not be protected by international law." 7 ' He
rightly says that sovereignty is not an intrinsic value, but rather is instrumental in
fulfilling its basic purpose. 72 Consequently, the sovereign power will discontinue
to be vested in the sovereign authority if that authority grossly violates the basic
purpose for which it was given power. This is in consonance with the contractual
laws of the civilized world, according to which a violation of the basic purpose
amounts to a breach of contract, resulting in its termination. This principle has
also been included in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties,
enacted inl969." If the sovereign authority violates the basic purpose for which
sovereign power was vested in him, the contract vesting the sovereign power will
stand terminated. This contingency of sovereign power is also consonant with the
basic rule of equity that "to seek equity, one must do equity." A violator of
sovereign power can never seek its benefits or protection at the same time.

70. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW & STATE 123-24 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
Russell & Russell 1961) (1945).
71. Fernando R. Tes6n, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 93 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane
eds., 2003) [hereinafter Tes6n, The Liberal Case].
72. For an extended analysis of this idea, see FERNANDO R. TES6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-66 (1998).
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(addressing the conditions for termination of treaties).
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IV. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO PROTECT SOVEREIGNTY
As contended, when the sovereign authority violates the basic purpose for
which sovereign power was vested in it, that authority ceases to be a sovereign.
By becoming a threat to the lives of the citizens, the sovereign authority ultimately
becomes a violator of sovereignty. Therefore, humanitarian intervention is sought
and carried out against this abuse of power by the sovereign authority. Hersch
Lauterpacht, in the sixth edition of Oppenheim's InternationalLaw, noted "when a
State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in
such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience
of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible."74
It can be said that every intervention is directed against the "ruling authority"
in which the sovereign power is vested. The only variable determining the legality
of that intervention is the relation of the "intervener" and the "ruling authority"
with the "sovereign power." If the sovereign power continues to be vested in the
ruling authority, then the intervention conflicts with the principle of sovereignty,
and the intervention constitutes one of the highest crimes of the international law.
However, on the other hand, if the sovereign power ceases to vest in the ruling
authority because it is violating the basic purpose of sovereignty and the
intervening state intends to protect this sovereignty from being violated by the
ruling authority, then intervention cannot be said to be violating the same
sovereignty, and thus it cannot be deemed illegal. Humanitarian intervention, as
argued by James Pattison, is only carried out to prevent gross violations of the
right of the people to life. It is carried out against the authority that has lost its
sovereign powers by violating the basic purpose of sovereignty and becoming a
Therefore, if humanitarian
threat to the lives of the people of its state.
intervention is carried out to protect against violations of the basic purpose of
sovereignty by the former sovereign authority, then by no logic of this civilized
world can the intervention be said to violate that sovereignty.
As argued earlier, a violator of sovereignty-the former sovereign authoritycannot invoke the protection of sovereignty at the same time. Comparing this to
the law of inertia or the law of friction, the concept of humanitarian intervention,
like inertia, will immediately come into effect as soon as the sovereign applies
"force" against the objectives sought by the enforcement of sovereignty. The
position of the principle of self-determination in relation to this has also been
subsequently discussed.
A. HumanitarianIntervention Only To Stop Crimes Against Humanity
If the humanitarian intervention is carried out to protect sovereignty from
being violated by the authority that has lost its sovereign power, one major concern

74. LASSA OPPENHErM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 312 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.

1955).
75. PATTISON, supranote 6, at 23-24.
76. Id.
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arises as to the exact nature and definition of the offenses that can result in the
"sovereign authority" losing the "sovereign power," and thus, justifying
humanitarian intervention. When can it be determined that the sovereign authority
has grossly violated the people's right to life and has become a threat to the
objectives sought by the enforcement of sovereign power?
It is generally agreed that the determination of whether the sovereign
authority has become a threat to the basic objective of sovereignty should not be
left solely upon the judgment of the intervening state.n Further, a sovereign
authority cannot be said to lose its sovereign power for every wrong it does with
respect to the life of its citizens. Tes6n argues that "[a]ll regimes that are morally
vulnerable to humanitarian intervention are of course illegitimate, but the reverse is
not true."7 9 Humanitarian intervention, as further reiterated by James Pattison, is
only carried out to prevent gross violations of the right to life of the people.8 0
Therefore, to protect the international order, humanitarian intervention can only be
validated against those crimes that are well established in international law as
grossly violating the right to life of the people of the state.
Due to substantive progress in the legal jurisprudence of international
criminal law, all acts grossly violating the basic security and fundamental right to
life of the people are brought under the legal concept of "crimes against
humanity."81 These crimes are systematic in nature, their commission is
widespread and massive, and they are committed directly against the civilian
population.82 The systematic, widespread, and massive nature of these crimes
directly committed against the civilians bluntly violates the most essential and
basic purpose for which sovereign power was vested in the sovereign authoritynamely, to provide security of life to the population.83 According to Cherif
Bassiouni, these crimes are termed as jus cogens crimes because they "shock the
conscience of humanity.'84 Moreover, there is an emerging recognition of the
concept of erga omnes obligations-the obligations of a state towards the
international community as a whole-with respect to the commission of these jus

77. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
78. See id. at 29; PATTISON, supranote 6, at 23.
79. Tes6n, supranote 73, at 98.
80. PATTISON, supra note 6, at 22-24.
81. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
82. Id. These characteristics have been discussed in detail in Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-941-A, Appeals Judgment, if 36-38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-asjOO0126e.pdf. See also Prosecutor v. Dragoljub
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1 -A, Appeals Judgment,
$$
93-98
(Int'l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
12,
2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf.
83. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at xi.
84. Cherif Bassiouni, InternationalCrimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69 (1996).
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cogens crimes.85 Crimes against humanity include acts like genocide, mass
murders, and mass persecutions. 86 The commission of these crimes by the
sovereign authority against civilians warrants humanitarian intervention to protect
the sovereignty of that state from being violated by the authority. In contrast, if the
intemational community fails to prove the systematic and widespread commission
of these crimes, then the intervention might not be considered as humanitarian.
B. HumanitarianIntervention Does Not Conflict With The Right OfSelfDetermination
The right to self-determination involves the right of the people to "freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."87 Critics of humanitarian intervention may argue that due to the
intervention of a foreign actor, the right to self-determination of the people of the
target state is compromised. However, Michael Walzer, a strong propagator of the
right to self-determination, agrees "when the rights of individuals within a
community are seriously threatened, such that they are no longer truly selfdetermining, outside intervention to protect basic individual rights is morally
defensible." 88 Self-determination is all about giving people an adequate chance to
determine their political status. Crimes against humanity committed by a
sovereign authority are prima facie denials of this chance. The commission of
systematic and widespread atrocities against civilians by the authority means that
the right to self-determination of the people has been eclipsed by the authority. In
fact, humanitarian intervention, by restoring the sovereignty, aims at restoring this
cherished right.
International law has recognized the existence of the principle of
humanitarian intervention, wherein a state, which is not party to the conflict, "may
decide . . . to come to the aid of the dissidents and assist them in overthrowing the

established government or even establishing a new state." 89 According to Leslie
Green, "[t]his was one of the grounds put forward by India when intervening
operations in East Pakistan that resulted in the establishment of Bangladesh
1971, followed by the latter's admission to the United Nations regardless
Pakistan's membership and its right to territorial integrity." 90

C.
in
in
of

85. Id. at 66. For ergaomnes obligations, see Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (BeIg.
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, % 32-35 (Feb. 5).
86. Article 7 of the Rome Statute discusses various crimes that fall within the requirements of
crimes against humanity while Article 6 exclusively deals with genocide. For further details, see Rome
Statute, supra note 81, arts. 6, 7.
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
88. Jennifer M. Welsh, Taking ConsequencesSeriously: Objections to HumanitarianIntervention,
in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 61 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
89. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 68 (2d ed. 2000).

90. Id.

2013

To PROTECT STATE SOVEREIGNTY

411

C. HumanitarianIntervention Does Not Conflict With The Norm OfNonIntervention
Having discussed the nature and scope of humanitarian intervention and its
relation to the concept of sovereignty, let us now determine whether humanitarian
intervention is essentially in conflict with the customary principle of nonintervention. This principle is believed to have begun with the Peace of
Westphalia, drawn up in 1648 to end the Thirty Years War in Europe." John
Vincent emphasized that the principle of non-intervention functions as a protector
of state sovereignty.92 According to Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse,
this principle "protects the internal sovereignty of one state by limiting the external
sovereignty of all other states." 93 It can be understood that the principle of nonintervention customarily protects the sovereign power from the threats of external
authorities by giving legal protection to the internal sovereign authority.
However, this principle does not seem to apply where the threat is from the
internal sovereign authority. It should be born in mind that the purpose of the
principle of non-intervention is only to protect the sovereign power from the
external sovereign. Its provisions are silent where the internal sovereign authority
threatens the sovereign power. Here, the principle of humanitarian intervention
fills the abyss by allowing the external authority to protect the sovereign power
from being violated by the internal sovereign. If the internal sovereign authority is
violating the basic purpose sought by the enforcement of sovereign power by
committing crimes against humanity against its citizens and eclipsing the right to
self-determination, then the principle of humanitarian intervention is not in conflict
Since the basic purpose of both nonwith the norm of non-intervention.
intervention and humanitarian intervention is to protect the sovereign power, these
principles cannot be held to be in conflicting with one another. While the principle
of non-intervention protects the sovereign power from an external sovereign,
humanitarian intervention protects the same from the wrath of internal sovereign.
Both are complimentary to each other. One begins where other ends. Together,
they provide complete protection to the concept of sovereignty.
Furthermore, looking at the principle of the "use of force in self-defense,"
which if proved, absolves the liability of a state from the violation of the rule of
non-intervention, 94 Fernando Tes6n argues that the basic purpose of this principle
is to protect the lives of civilians and also to defend sovereignty. 95 As
humanitarian intervention shares the same purpose of protecting civilians and the
sovereignty, Tes6n states that "any moral distinction between self-defense and
91. Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: "Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver"Revolutionary InternationalLegal Theory or Return to Rule by the GreatPowers?, 10 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 374 (2005).
92. Shue, supranote 17, at 14.
93. Id. at 14.
94. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (providing this exception to the principle of use of force and nonintervention).
95. Tes6n, The Liberal Case, supranote 71, at 99.
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humanitarian intervention . . . has to rely on something above and beyond the

general rationale of defense of persons," and of the protection of sovereignty as
well.96
D. HumanitarianIntervention Does Not Violate The Jus Cogens Norm Given
In Article 2(4) Of The UN. Charter
In the light of above stated arguments, let us finally discuss the biggest
criticism regarding humanitarian intervention involving the violation of a jus
cogens norm encompassed in the Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.97 A plain
reading of this provision shows that it chiefly incorporates three rules: (1) a
prohibition against the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence (sovereignty) of a state; (2) a prohibition against the threat
or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;
and (3) a general prohibition against the threat or use of force. 98
The first rule prohibits the violation of the state sovereignty. It is regarded as
jus cogens.99 It has already been argued that the principle of humanitarian
intervention is not a threat to sovereignty, but is instead carried out to protect
sovereignty from being violated by the ruling authority. 00 Therefore, first rule
given in Article 2(4) does not conflict with or invalidate humanitarian intervention.
The second rule prohibits the use of force in a manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations. Since humanitarian intervention is carried out to
protect the fundamental human rights of the people-which is one of the purposes
of the United Nationslol-the second rule of Article 2(4) also does not invalidate
humanitarian intervention.
The third rule deals with the general prohibition of the use of force. This rule
cannot be regarded as jus cogens because the U.N. Charter itself provides two
exceptions to this rule, namely Article 42102 and Article 51.03 On the contrary,
humanitarian intervention is carried out to stop ajus cogens crime, namely, a crime

96. Id.
97. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
98. Id.
99. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
190 (June 27) (separate opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh).
100. See discussion supra Parts III.(B), IV.(A).
101. See supranotes 20-24 and accompanying text.
102. U.N. Charter art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.").
103. U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.").

2013

To PROTECT STATE SOVEREIGNTY

413

against humanity.'0 Therefore, any law of lesser value conflicting with a jus
cogens norm has to give way to this norm.105 If these arguments are to be
accepted, then it is evident that Article 2(4) is not an impediment upon the concept
of humanitarian intervention.
E. HumanitarianIntervention:A Duty & A Right
After delineating the central argument that the principle of humanitarian
intervention does not conflict with the principle of inviolability of sovereignty, we
have outlined three issues with regard to humanitarian intervention. First, let us
consider whether humanitarian intervention is a duty or a right. From the general
discussion of this paper, whenever the ruling authority violates sovereign power, it
is the duty of the international community to intervene to protect the sovereignty.
As discussed in this paper, for this duty to arise, crimes against humanity should be
proven to have been committed by the ruling authority in order to provide
sufficient proof of the violation of the purpose of sovereignty.
However, Pattison argues that the intervening state should also have "the
right" of humanitarian intervention along with an existing duty.106 To have the
right to intervene, the intervening state needs to possess the qualities necessary for
its intervention to be justifiable.10 7 It needs, for instance, to follow international
humanitarian law, to be welcomed by the victims of intervention, and to have a
reasonable expectation of success. 108
Therefore, Pattison believes that to have a duty to intervene, the intervening
state would first need to meet these permissibility criteria so that it has the right to
intervene.109 The 2001 report of International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty ("ICISS"), The Responsibility to Protect, provided various
principles that need to be fulfilled by the intervening authority before, during, and
after engaging in humanitarian intervention.1 10
These principles include
fulfillment of a "just cause threshold," various precautionary and operational
principles, and the necessity of authorization from the United Nations."1
Second, let us address the consent of civilians who are being protected as part
of intervention. Critics of humanitarian intervention argue that the self-respect of
the people of the target state could get wounded due to the foreign intervention. 112
In response to this, Tes6n argues that since there may be a group of people that
benefits from a government prosecuting other parts of the population, the only
104. Prosecutor v. Kuprelkid, Case IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 1 520 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
105. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
106. See PATTISON, supra note 6, at 15-20.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. ICISS REPORT, supranote 2, passim.
111. Id. at xii-xiii.
112. Tes6n, The Liberal Case, supra note 71, at 106.
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people whose consent or opposition deserves consideration are the victims of the
ongoing atrocities. 13 According to him, no communal interest can validly oppose
the aid to the victims being persecuted by the ruling authority. 114 According to
Malcolm Shaw, "[o]ne variant of the principle of humanitarian intervention is the
contention that intervention to restore democracy is permitted as such under
international law."s 15 He notes, "[o]ne of the grounds given for the U.S.
intervention in Panama in December 1989 was the restoration of democracy."" 6
However, the international legal community has not accepted this contention due
to political considerations in defining the term democracy." 7
V. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO PROTECT THE SOVEREIGNTY & THE
EMERGING NORM OF RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT
To conclude, we will discuss the emerging doctrine of "responsibility to
protect." The "responsibility to protect" doctrine is a concept that includes, within
itself, humanitarian intervention as a duty to protect the sovereignty of a state." 8
The concept of "responsibility to protect" emerged in the 2001 ICISS report, The
Responsibility to Protect. The central theme of the report was "the idea that
sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable
catastrophe-from mass murder and rape, from starvation-but that when they are
unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader
community of states."ll 9 Commenting on this concept, the high-level U.N. panel
established that "emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to
protect," encompasses not only "the 'right to intervene' of any State, but the
'responsibility to protect' of every State when it comes to people suffering from
avoidable catastrophe."1 2 0 In September 2005, the concept of the "responsibility to
protect" was incorporated into the outcome document of a high-level meeting of
the General Assembly.121 Additionally, the U.N. Security Council made a
reference to this concept in its Resolution 1674, on the protection of civilians in an
armed conflict.122
The concept of "responsibility to protect" lucidly consents that sovereignty is
an intangible entity from which the sovereign is created.' 23 Furthermore, the
concept accepts supremacy of this sovereign power by stating that if the sovereign
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2008) (citing James Crawford,
Democracy and InternationalLaw, 1993 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 113, 113).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
119. See id. at viii.
120. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:Rep. of the HighLevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 201-02, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
121. 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res.60/1, T 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005).
122. S.C. Res. 1674, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (April 28, 2006).
123. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
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fails to protect sovereignty, he is deemed to have forfeited its ruling authority and
the responsibility of its protection shifts to the international community. 2 4 This
principle is expressly included in the Constitutive Act of African Union.'25 Article
4(h) of this Act provides that there is a "right of the Union to intervene in a
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity."126
Also, Article 40 and 41 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility requires the
state to cooperate in the situation of serious breach of a peremptory, orjus cogens,
norm.127 This principle of "responsibility to protect" still is at its infancy, but
slowly is congregating the general acceptance of international community.
VI. CONCLUSION: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION To PROTECT HUMANITY

The doctrine of "responsibility to protect," which has been recently
developed, may be seen as an effort to redefine the principle of humanitarian
intervention in a way that seeks to minimize the motives of the intervening powers.
There is no doubt that it reflects an important, influential trend in international
society, particularly in the context of U.N. action. Such responsibility lies not only
with states, but also with the U.N., which includes a commitment to reconstruction
after intervention. The responsibility of states to protect human rights creates a
broad obligation, and it is to that extent that humanitarian intervention can be seen
as the responsibility of states to overcome the issue of sovereignty wherein the
sovereign authority itself abuses fundamental human rights of its people.
Tes6n rightly states that a "gross violation of human rights is not only an
obvious assault on the dignity of persons, but a betrayal of the, principle of
sovereignty itself"'2 8 He argues:
The principle of non-intervention denies victims of tyranny and anarchy
the possibility of appealing to people other than their tormentors. It
condemns them to fight unaided or die. Rescuing others will always be
onerous, but if we deny the moral duty and legal right to do so, we deny
not only the centrality of justice in political affairs, but also the common
humanity that binds us all.129
This paper emphasized that the concept of sovereignty has never been an
absolute limitation on the humanitarian intervention. Vesting sovereignty in an
authority was never intended to make him invincible. As Henry Shue puts it:
If all of us do nothing to define and assign default duties for the case in
which a state does not protect its own people against [the crimes like]

124. Id.
125. Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4, July 11, 2000,
availableat http://www.au.2002.gov.zadocs/key oaulau-act.htm.
126. Id.
127. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, arts. 40-41,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, (2001).
128. Tes6n, The Liberal Case, supra note 71, at 110 (emphasis in original).
129. Id. at 129.
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genocide-even for the most common case in which the state is the
orchestrator of the genocide-then we genuinely are assigning the vital
interests and basic rights of non-compatriots zero weight in our
calculations about how to organize the planet, specifically how to
understand sovereignty. 1o
There should be no doubt that humanity is the founding pillar of any society.
No artificial concepts should be allowed, whatever they may be, if they challenge
the basic existence of humanity itself. Our arguments have demonstrated that the
ideal of humanitarian intervention is an important tool to establish humanity,
especially in today's highly polarized world. Humanitarian intervention has never
challenged the indomitability of the concept of sovereignty. In fact, humanitarian
intervention is a glorious invention of the neo-natural school, which reminds the
sovereign of its basic duty.

130. Shue, supra note 17, at 21.

THE EU's ETS AND GLOBAL AVIATION: WHY "LOCAL RULES"
STILL MATTER AND MAY MATTER EVEN MORE IN THE FUTURE
MICHAEL L. BUENGER*
I.

OVERVIEW

On January 1, 2012, the European Union ("EU") extended its Emission
Trading System ("ETS")' to a significant part of the global aviation sector 2
notwithstanding the protests of numerous states 3 and objections from some
European businesses.4 With limited exception, aircraft departing from or landing
* Ph.D. Research Candidate, Brussels School of International Studies; L.L.M., with Distinction,
University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies (2012); J.D., cum laude, St. Louis
University School of Law (1989). I wish to thank Dr. Harm Schepel and Dr. Nikolas Rajkovic of the
Brussels School of International Studies, and Fredrik Erixon of the European Center for International
Political Economy for their helpful thoughts and comments.
** The DenverJournal of InternationalLaw and Policy expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of this
article's Chinese language sources, with regard to citations, references, and translation.
1. See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Oct. 2003
Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and
Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 34 [hereinafter ETS Directive].
2. Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 Nov. 2008
Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse
Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3, 3 [hereinafter Aviation
Directive].
3. See, e.g., James Kanter, U.S. Airlines Challenge European Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (July
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/business/global/04emissions.html; Manisha Singhal &
Anindya Upadhyay, India to Oppose EU's Emission Trading System for Airlines, THE ECON. TIMES
(Aug. 1, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-01/news/29838536_1
carbon-di33oxide-emission-trading-system-indian-carriers; BLOOMBERG NEWS, China Bans Airlines
FromJoining EU Carbon Levies System, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2012, 3:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2012-02-06/china-bans-airlines-from-joining-european-union-s-carbon-emissions-system.ht
ml; Carbon-Emission Tradingfor Aeroflot Could Be Prohibited,THE Moscow TIMES (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/carbon-emission-trading-for-aeroflot-could-be-prohib
ited/453458.html; Canada's Transport Minister Firm on Stance Regarding Aviation and Maritime
Emissions With the European Commission's Vice-President Responsible for Transport, CAN.
NEWSWIRE (May 3, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.newswire.calen/story/967261/canada-s-transport-min
ister-firm-on-stance-regarding-aviation-and-maritime-emissions-with-the-european-commission-s-vicepresident-responsible-for-tra.
4. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG NEWS, European Airlines and Airbus Seek to Ease Emissions Rule,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/business/global/airbus-and-european
-airlines-seek-deal-on-emissions.html (noting that Airbus and several European airlines urge the EU to
compromise on aviation ETS). The requirement that airlines surrender carbon allowance for 2012
emissions was to be effective April 30, 2013. See Aviation Directive, supra note 2, paras. 10(b)-(c), 14.
However, in November 2012 the European Commission proposed deferring the application of the ETS
to flights in and out of Europe until after the International Civil Aviation Organisation ("ICAO")
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at an aerodrome in an EU Member State, regardless of the state of registry, origin
of flight, or actual time spent in EU airspace, will be subject to the ETS for the
entire length of the flight.' This has become known as the "Aviation Directive"
and represents a considerable step in the EU's efforts to promote its robust climate
change agenda, efforts that are marked as much by unilateralism and
extraterritoriality 6 as they are by multilateral engagement.7 The EU's unilateral
extension of its municipal law8 to the global aviation sector is unprecedented only
General Assembly in autumn 2013. See Proposalfor a Decision of the European Parliamentand of the
Council Derogating Temporarilyfrom Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the

Community, COM (2012) 697 proposal (Nov. 9, 2012). If the ICAO fails to reach agreement on a
greenhouse gas ("GHG") emission reduction scheme the EU will enforce its ETS. See Memorandum
from the European Comm'n, Stopping the Clock of ETS and Aviation Emissions Following Last
Week's Int'l Civil Aviation Org. (ICAO) Council (Nov. 12, 2012), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-12-854en.htm. However, recent developments evidenced
by the virtual collapse of European carbon prices and the European Parliament's refusal to intervene by
approving a "back-loading" price support scheme may necessitate substantial changes to the ETS. See
Carbon Trading ETS, RIP? THE EcONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com

/news/finance-and-economics/21576388-failure-reform-europes-carbon-market-will-reverberate-roundworld-ets.
5. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, Annex I. The directive applies to the bulk of international
and EU passenger and cargo air traffic that depart from or arrive at an aerodrome in a Member State.
Exempt activities include: (1) flights performed on an official mission of a reigning Monarch, the
immediate family, Heads of State, Heads of Government and Government Ministers of a country other
than a Member State; (2) military, customs and police flights; (3) search and rescue, firefighting,
humanitarian and emergency medical service flights; (4) flights performed exclusively under visual
flight rules as defined in Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention; (5) flights terminating at the aerodrome
from which the aircraft has taken off and during which no intermediate landing has been made; (6)
training flights performed for the purpose of obtaining a license or a rating provided that the flight does
not serve for the transport of passengers and/or cargo or for the positioning or ferrying of aircraft; (7)
flights performed for the purpose of scientific research or checking, testing or certifying aircraft or
equipment whether airborne or ground-based; (8) flights performed by aircraft with a certified
maximum take-off mass of less than 5,700 kg; (9) flights performed in the framework of public service
obligations imposed in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 on routes within outermost
regions or on routes where the capacity offered does not exceed 30,000 seats per year; and (10) flights
performed by a commercial air transport operator operating either (a) fewer than 243 flights per period
for three consecutive four-month periods, or (b) flights with total annual emissions lower than 10,000
tons per year.
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Shane, Under Sec'y for Policy, U.S. Dept. of Transp., Address at the
American Bar Association Forum on Air & Space Law (Oct. 4, 2007), in INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE
(Oct. 8, 2007), http://callcenterinfo.tmcnet.com/news/2007/10/08/2996105.htm (noting that forty-two of
the delegations comprising the EU and European Civil Aviation Conference entered a formal
reservation to the 2007 ICAO resolution calling on members to refrain from imposing market-based
measures on other members absent consent). See also Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani, EU Climate
Change Unilateralism,23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 469,475-76 (2012).
7. See generally Elisa Morgera, Ambition, Complexity and Legitimacy of Pursuing Mutual
Supportiveness Through the EU's External Environmental Action (Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law
Research Paper Series, No. 2012/02,2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1987055.
8. Classifying EU rules as "municipal law" may not be entirely accurate given that its rules

arguably occupy a space somewhere between purely "international" and purely "municipal" law. See,
e.g., Case C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council of the European
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in scale, not in originality, as other states have acted similarly in other areas of
legal life.9 The ETS has, however, become one of the more aggressive and
controversial examples of the unilateral use of municipal lawmaking power to
affect a wide-range of activities, peoples, and states across the globe. The rationale
for the EU's action is best summed up in the remarks of Climate Commissioner
Connie Hedegaard:
So I agree that we cannot now afford to sit in Europe and just wait for
whatever comes next in the international negotiations. That is of course
precisely why, over the past [eighteen] months or two years, the
Commission has come up with a communication on how to move our
targets, with our low-carbon roadmap and the energy roadmap; has
proposed an energy efficiency directive; has come up with substantial
Multiannual Financial Framework proposals with a substantial climate,
environment, energy-efficiency and resource-efficiency component; has
come up with a proposal on energy taxation; and has come up, as
requested, with tasks and values.... This is very much proof that we in
the Commission do not think we should sit idly waiting for the big
international agreement. We must continue to move forward in
Europe.'0

As Commissioner Hedegaard's statement demonstrates, attitudes towards the
meaning of the state, the concept of sovereignty," and the traditional mechanisms
Union, Opinion of Advocate General Poieras Maduro, % 21-22, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351(noting that the
EU Treaty "created a municipal legal order of trans-national dimensions."). In this article the term
"municipal law" includes EU rules and regulations for ease of distinction. For a general discussion on
the nature of the EU lawmaking process, see JOHN MCCORMICK, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 71-75 (2001). This rather simple distinction between international law and municipal
law as used in this article does not seek to address the more vexing issue of where on the legal spectrum
law promulgated by institutions such as the EU should rest.
9. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12, Acts of Parliament,
2003, as amended by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007 (India); Marine Mammals Protection
Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972); Amendment VIII to the Criminal Law of the
People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 25, 2011,
effective May 1,2011) arts. 20, 29, 107,164, http://www.high-time.cn/eng/chubshow.asp?bbb=20
110513154257&proid=20110520103322 (China). See also Charles W. Smitherman III, The Future of
Global Competition Governance: Lessonsfrom the Transatlantic,19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 769, 818820 (2004) (discussing extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU competition law). But see Appellate Body

Report, UnitedStates - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products, W 1-3, WT/DS38l/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Tuna-Dolphin
(2012)] (holding, in part, that U.S. "dolphin-safe" labeling provisions are inconsistent with TBT
Agreement Article 2.1).
10. Remarks of Ms. Connie Hedegaard, 2012 O.J. 122 (Jan. 18, 2012) (European Parliament
debates) (emphasis added).
11. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 11-22 (1999). Krasner

identifies four types of sovereignty: (1) domestic sovereignty referring to internal organization and
effectiveness of state authority; (2) interdependent sovereignty referring to the loss of sovereignty when
states cannot control movements of goods and ideas; (3) international legal sovereignty as juridical
equality; and (4) Westphalian sovereignty referring to principles of non-interference in internal affairs.
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of international lawmaking are undergoing dynamic changes.' 2 The advent of the
United Nations,13 the wide acceptance of human rights,14 the use of powerful
trading agreements to break down national barriers," the globalization of judicial
power,' 6 the rise of institutions such as the EU, the World Trade Organization
("WTO")17 and non-state actors,' 8 multinational humanitarian interventions,19 the
formulation of jus cogens principles, 20 and the increasing use of market-based

See also Case C-154/11, Mahamdia v. Algeria, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, It 1-3 (May
24, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:6201 ICCO154
:EN:HTML (explaining that state immunity from jurisdiction of European Courts is relative and that
states are subject to jurisdiction in relation to their non-public functions such as employee relations).
12. See generally Andrew Halpin & Volker Roeben, Introduction, in THEORISING THE GLOBAL
LEGAL ORDER 1-8 (Andrew Halpin & Volker Roeben, eds. 2009). See also Eric C. Ip, Globalization
and the Future of the Law of the Sovereign State, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 636, 641 (2010); David
Dyzenhaus, Positivism and the Pesky Sovereign, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 363, 364 (2011).
13. U.N. Charter art. 1.
14. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(II1) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec.
10 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987); Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered
into force Jan. 12, 1951).
15. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct, 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
16. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. See also C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of
Judicial Power: The Judicialization of Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1-10
(C. Neal Tate & Torbjtm Vallinder, eds. 1995); Gary Born, A New Generation of International
Adjudication, 61 DUKE L. J. 775, 782-783 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, July 27, 1957, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; International Civil Aviation Organization, Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention];
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 289 U.N.T.S. 48.
18. See e.g., Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO:
Legitimacy and the Needfor Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 575, 576 (2008) (explaining that
"[i]nstitutionally [non-state actors] are notable for establishing their own governing systems, largely
independent of state governments, with regulatory capacity to back up those obligations with
enforceable rules. Scholars in law, political science, and business have variously labeled them
'transnational regulatory systems,' 'non-state market driven' ("NSMD") governance systems, and 'civil
regulation' . . . . The goal for many NSMD governance systems is not simply to create niche markets
that apply their standards, but to promote their standards as appropriate and legitimate across an entire
market sector." (emphasis added)).
19. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/l 199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1319, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1319 (Sept. 20, 2000); S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003); S.C. Res. 1590,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005); S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C.
Res. 1976, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011); S.C. Res. 2048, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2048 (May 18,
2012).
20. See Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Jus Cogens, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1073,
1074 (2011) ("In the last two decades, abhorrence of impunity has migrated to the concept of jus
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measures ("MBMs") to regulate transnational conduct 21 represent emerging forces
that challenge the very foundations of the public international law order. Andrew
Halpin and Volker Roeben note that, "The broader canvas of globalisation extends
greater artistic license to the legal imagination. In part, this is a matter of
opportunity. In part, this is a matter of need."22 The artistic license afforded by
rapid globalization has not only affected the types of relationships and behaviors to
be regulated, i.e., subjects and subject matters, but perhaps more importantly who
decides such issues and in what breadth.
This article examines the EU's extension of its ETS to the global aviation
sector as a compelling example of how the most influential states or blocs of states
(hereinafter "states" 23) use their municipal lawmaking powers to manage behavior
well beyond their borders.24 Part I presents some context and examines the ETS,
its application to the global aviation sector, and the Court of Justice of the
European Union's ("ECJ") analysis of its legality under its view of current
principles of international law. Part II discusses the Aviation Directive as an
example of the quiet rise of municipal law as a transnational regulatory mechanism
that exists independently and apart from traditional multilateral international
lawmaking. The Aviation Directive demonstrates that while the last sixty years
has witnessed the rise of varied multilateral institutions and efforts, transnational
problems can incentivize powerful states to use their municipal lawmaking

cogens."); Aaron Fichtelberg, DemocraticLegitimacy and the InternationalCriminal Court:A Liberal
Defence, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 765, 780 (2006). But see, A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the
Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustratedby the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina,17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 32-40
(1995) (discussing the two theories of jus cogens, their origins, similarities and differences); Robert
Barnidge, Jr., Questioning the Legitimacy of Jus Cogens in the Global Legal Order, 38 ISRAEL Y.B. ON
H.R. 199, 204 (2008) (". . .description can have the effect of 'de-binding' engagements with jus cogens
from what might otherwise be considered the erstwhile formal textual constraints of article 53.").
21. See Stefan Speck, The Design of Carbon and Broad-Based Energy Taxes in European
Countries, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 31-32 (2008) (noting that Europe's increasing reliance on marketbased measures began in the 1990s).
22. Halpin & Roeben, supra note 12, at 5.
23. It is important to clarify that the EU is not a state as that term is now understood in
international law. Rather, the EU is an entity with separate international legal personality. See Treaty of
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 46A, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty] ("The Union shall have legal
personality."). The EU's legal personality includes (1) an ability to enter into agreements with other
states or international organizations and (2) a private legal personality ("legal capacity") that permits
the EU to be a party in private legal matters. See Stephen C. Sieberson, Did Symbolism Sink the
Constitution? Reflections on the European Union's State-Like Attributes, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 1, 18, 19 (2007) (describing states as having "personalities" in the international legal
community). Although not technically a state, for ease of use in this article the term "state" is used not
only to include the EU given its unique international standing, but also its significant independent
legislative and regulatory powers that extend beyond issues normally associated with merely a trading
bloc.
24. Sometimes others seek to extend municipal law to regulate transnational conduct even in the
face of state resistance to such an extension. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 101491, slip op. (U.S. April 17, 2013) (seeking to extend the jurisdiction of U.S. courts using the Alien
Tort Statute for human rights violations allegedly committed by Shell Oil in the Niger River delta).
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machinery aggressively to confront cross-border problems. This takes place even
when the international community's conventional lawmaking tools fail to achieve
desired results or prove too inexpedient. 25
II.

THE EU's AVIATION EMISSION TRADING SYSTEM

Both the authority and the source of public international law are challenged
by global forces that raise new questions regarding what exactly constitutes the
parameters of the "public," the "international" and the "law" aspects of the
system. 26 The public international law system is, in theory, premised on the notion
of multilateral legal coordination of transnational state action; that is, consent to
coordinating frameworks, such as formal treaties or generally accepted state
practices, as the mechanism for regulating state and global conduct.27 The
normative hierarchy articulated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice
largely reflects a predisposition towards both the sanctity of the state as the prime

25. See Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S.
Environmental Statutes: A Proposalfor an IntegratedJudicial StandardBased on the Continuum of
Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 90 (2006) ("International environmental law has not, however,
trumped the need for extraterritorial application of U.S. laws to protect the environment. If anything, the
need for extraterritorialapplication of U.S. environmental laws is greater now than ever before.
Application of U.S. environmental laws beyond its territorial boundaries under appropriate
circumstances can be an indispensable weapon in fulfilling the goal of meaningful environmental
protection on a global scale." (emphasis added)). See also Craig James Willy, In Defense of Green
Protectionism:Why the EU Should Put the Planet Before Free Trade, FUTURECHALLENGES (Apr. 21,
2012), http://futurechallenges.org/local/in-defense-of-green-protectionism-why-the-eu-should-put-theplanet-before-free-trade ("The question for environmentalists is: When there is no agreement
forthcoming, is there any real alternative to green protectionism?").
26. One question the international law community has struggled with is whether there is actually a
clearly identifiable normative system that can be called international law. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 997, 1003 (1998) (noting that
dualists distinguished sharply between public international law as the law of relations between states,
mocked by John Austin, as not really "law," and private international law as the law governing persons,
mocked by Austin as not really "international" although it was "law"). See also Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2601 (1997) (discussing the various
historical theories of compliance).
27. State practice or customary law arises from giving certain legal character to the perceived and
generally accepted practices of sovereign states. See Jun-shik Hwang, A Sense and Sensibility of Legal
Obligation: Customary InternationalLaw and Game Theory, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 111, 119
(2006). However, what exactly constitutes accepted custom is a fluid question. As the International
Court of Justice has observed, the period of time over which a practice or custom forms does not alone
determine whether it can be considered international law. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf
(Ger./Den. v. Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 74 (Feb. 20) (noting that "the passage of only a short period
of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international
law."). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary InternationalLaw, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115,
157-59 (2005) (discussing the concept of "instant" custom as a possible source of international law).
Customary international law has an additional problem. While it is generally accepted that states may
withdraw from treaties, the conventional thinking is that states may not withdraw from a rule of
customary international law once accepted even if the state objects. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu
Gulati, Withdrawingfrom InternationalCustom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 204 (2010).
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actor in international law and the necessity of its consent to regulation.28 Yet this
normative hierarchy of how the system is supposed to work has always been
somewhat dubious because the creation and implementation of the international
legal order is an inherently chaotic business-a contact sport if you willcomprised of many players operating from different motivations, frequently
seeking different outcomes, promoting different concepts, complying for different
reasons, and using different language with only marginal refereeing. 29 This is most
certainly true today despite the emergence of institutions designed to more
effectively broker international behavior over a vast array of subjects. The effects
of globalization and economic integration have not only led to a broadening of
political power across states, but have accelerated the growth of substantial
connections between individual behavior in one state and its impact in another.
30
Thus, notwithstanding debates on the exact economic effects of globalization, it
is evident that the political and legal order of the last sixty years is being dislodged
and replaced by various modalities of transnational regulation and that there are
various actors engaged in the regulatory enterprise.
In understanding the impact of these developments and what they may mean
for the future of public international law as a system, it is necessary to step back
from formalistic definitions and categories, (e.g. municipal law versus international
law, positivism versus natural law theory) and consider the question of what
constitutes international law from a more pragmatic relational, behavioral and
functional perspective-that is, what peoples, relationships, institutions and
activities are being regulated, by whom, and how legitimate and successful is the
regulatory effort. The legitimacy of any regulatory enterprise is hugely dependent
upon its successful implementation. As will be discussed, the globe's most
influential states have significant reserves of economic and political power
available that can be deployed to promote success and therefore add legitimacy to
28. Traditionally scholars have pointed to the Statute of the International Court of Justice as
defining the sources of international law. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26,
1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. According to Article 38, international law is comprised of (1) international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states; (2) custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; and (4) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. Some question whether this
view on the sources of international law is relevant today. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Gallant, International
Criminal Courts and the Making of Public International Law: New Roles for International
Organizationsand Individuals, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 603, 606 (2010) (noting that states contribute
to the formation of international law); Andreas Buss, The Preah Vihear Case and Regional Customary
Law, 9 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 111, 126 (2010) (discussing calls to amend the statute to address its overly
positivistic tone). See also Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters - Non-State Actors,
Treaties, and the Changing Sources of InternationalLaw, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 145 (2005)
(recognizing that consent from states contributes to the creation of international law).
29. Guglielmo Verdirame, "The Divided West": InternationalLawyers in Europe and America,
18 EuR. J. INT'L L. 553, 562 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Ruchir Sharma, Broken BRICs, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138219/ruchir-sharma/broken-brics (arguing that international
economic convergence is a myth).
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their regulatory efforts, formal categories of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
When examined from this more pragmatic viewpoint, therefore, it is clear that
formal treaties and recognized customs are not the only legal mechanisms by
which states shape global behavior. Law does not act upon institutions and
individuals in a vacuum. Accordingly, while the study of public international law
has tended to reflect an almost hypertensive concern for categorical subject matter
"fragmentation,"31 the real story in international law today is the extent to which
conventional normative mechanisms of international lawmaking, e.g., treaties and
state custom, are being augmented if not displaced by a rapidly growing list of
unconventional normative mechanisms, e.g., non-state regulators, MBMs, and the
extraterritorial application of municipal law.
The Aviation Directive is a case study in this latter development. It illustrates
that states, particularly the most powerful and influential states, 32 have a variety of
legal tools available outside of conventional international lawmaking by which to
regulate and shape global behavior, not the least of which is giving transnational
effect to their municipal laws premised upon the notion of substantial
connectedness. 33 Extending the ETS to the global aviation sector cannot be seen
simply as an act of regulating the activities of a particular industry with
commercial ties to the EU. It is, rather, an attempt to reshape global behavior 34

31. For a discussion concerning the "fragmentation" of public international law, see Int'l Law
Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 9-June 9, 2006, and Jul. 3-Aug. 11, 2006, Rep. of the Study Group of the
Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties Arisingfrom the Diversification
and Expansion of InternationalLaw, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti
Koskenniemi), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english /a cn4 1682.pdf. See also
David Kennedy, InternationalLaw: One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the
Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 641, 641 (2007) ("Over the last few years,
innumerable scholars have turned their attention to the fragmentation, disaggregation, and multiplicity
of the international legal regime."). While the "fragmentation" problem may be of great concern to
academics, this has hardly stopped the development of new legal regimes. The challenge facing
international law, as evidenced by the Aviation Directive, is not subject matter fragmentation but rather
the fact that it is the product of a segmented society; that is, a social structure (the international
community) lacking a strong central authority to coordinate the development and enforcement of law
and one whose actors place a premium on maintaining their sovereignty and autonomy. As a result,
there is a constant push and pull between the center of the global legal system evidenced in such
institutions as the U.N., WTO and ICJ, and the interests of the system's segments (states) to collaborate
in solving common problems but not at the expense of their autonomy.
32. See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, TransnationalCompetition Law and the WTO, 5 J. INT'L TRADE L.
& POL'Y 42, 46 (2006) (noting more developed economies have sufficient market "clout" to unilaterally
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in a meaningful way but smaller economies can rarely expect to make
a plausible threat to prohibit conduct by large firms that might have negative effects within their
borders).
33. One question that remains relatively unresolved is what exactly do we mean by
"transnational" and "international" law? Vicki Jackson, for example, speaks of transnational law as both
international law and the laws of foreign countries. See generally VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 1-2 (2010).
34. For example, according to 2011 figures provided by Heathrow Airport alone, 22.8 percent of
69.4 million, or 15,823,200, passengers departing or landing were on North American-oriented flights.
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while protecting domestic interests by giving extraterritorial effect to what Dan
Danielsen calls "local rules," 3 5 in spite of protests to the contrary. 36 Does this
mean that the sanctity of state is becoming irrelevant?37 Hardly.3 1 It does suggest,
however, that as interdependencies and connections between states and individuals
grow, solely formalistic notions of international law and conventional modes of
international lawmaking will not define the regulation of transnational conduct.3 9
Rather, pluralism, non-state action, extraterritoriality, and unilateralism are
becoming as much a part of the globe's legal frameworks as is traditional
multilateralism. 40 This may be an unnerving development for an international law
purist seeking clean divides between "public," "private," "international," and

About Heathrow Airport, HEATHROW, http://www.heathrowairport.com/about-us/facts-and-figures (last
visited Mar. 4,2012).
35. Dan Danielsen, Local Rules and a Global Economy: An Economic Policy Perspective, 1
TRANSN'L LEGAL THEORY 49, 49-50 (2010). See also Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. and
Others v. Sec'y of State for Energy and Climate Change, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 1 147
(2011) [hereinafter Air Transport Case], available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.js
f?text=&docid=l 10742&pagelndex=0&doclang-EN&mode=req&dir-&occ=first&part-l&cid=55150
("Admittedly, it is undoubtedly true that, to some extent, account is thus taken of events that take place
over the high seas or on the territory of third countries. This might indirectly give airlines an incentive
to conduct themselves in a particular way when flying over the high seas or on the territory of third
countries, in particular to consume as little fuel as possible and expel as few greenhouse gases as
possible."). See also Nico KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAw 4 (2010) ("The classical distinction between the domestic and intemational
spheres that had sustained them is increasingly blurred, with a multitude of formal and informal
connections taking the place of what once were relatively clear rules and categories.").
36. See, e.g., Air Transport Case, supra note 35,
156 ("Contrary to the view taken by the
claimants in the main proceedings and the associations supporting them, Directive 2008/101 does not,
either in law or in fact, preclude third countries from bringing into effect or applying their own
emissions trading schemes for aviation activities.").
37. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 15, WT/DSI 1/8/AB
/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (noting that the WTO Agreement is a contract and a self-evident exercise of sovereign
power in pursuit of national interests).
38. See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 22 (2001) (noting that the "nation-state remains of supreme
importance"). See also DAVID J. BEDERMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147-50
(2008) (noting that the Westphalian model of the nation-state is tested but it has not collapsed or been
rendered irrelevant).
39. See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Domestic Responses to Transnational Crime: The Limits of
National Law, 23 CRIM. L.F. 275, 289-90 (2012) (discussing the growth of transnational crime and the
increased use of municipal law, but challenging the desirability of this development); Jay Ellis,
ExtraterritorialExercise of Jurisdictionfor Environmental Protection: Addressing FairnessConcerns,
25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 397, 407 (2012) (observing that there are reasons to believe that unilateral
exercises of extraterritorial authority may become more common); Shohit Chaudhry & Kartikey
Mahaj an, The Case for an Effective ExtraterritorialJurisdictionof Competition Commission of India in
Light of International Practices, 32 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 314, 314 (2011) (describing the role of
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Competition Commission of India and the need to enforce such
jurisdiction more effectively).
40. See KRISCH, supra note 35, at 4 (describing law and politics as having been "transformed").
See also David Kennedy, The InternationalStyle in PostwarLaw and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7, 10
(". . . interdependence is a fact, sovereignty a relic.").
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"municipal," but it is a real and largely uncoordinated development nonethelessone that is difficult to categorize and even harder to contain.
It is always dangerous to use a single event as a general indicator of future
happenings. However, as Commissioner Hedegaard's statement evidences, global
interdependencies and transnational problems are accelerating the need for
coordinated action at the very moment the international community's ability to
reach consensus-driven solutions in several critical areas languishes. 41 In response,
the EU has chosen to push the "international community," whoever that may be at
any one moment in time, into addressing problems such as climate change by
unilaterally imposing its ETS on much of the global aviation sector, with all
indications that it will not stop there.42 The mere act of landing or departing from
an aerodrome in a Member State now subjects a non-exempt aircraft and its owner
(and therefore tangentially its passengers and/or cargo recipients) to the "unlimited
jurisdiction" (i.e., global jurisdiction) of the EU for purposes of aviation emissions
from the beginning to the end of the flight regardless of origin, destination or
duration.43 A public international legal order that was, in theory, premised on

41. See, e.g., Carlyle A. Thayer, Standoffin the South China Sea, YALEGLOBAL (June 12, 2012),
available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edulcontent/standoff-south-china-sea (discussing China and the
Philippines both laying claim to the same islands); Dead Man Talking, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 28,
2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/18620814 (noting the challenges first world
countries are facing in negotiating with countries on the economic rise); Colum Lynch, Russia, China
Veto Syria Resolution at the United Nations, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russia-china-block-syria-resolution-atun/2011/10/04/gIQArCFBML story.html (describing Russia and China standing up to the U.S. with
regards to a Syrian resolution before the UN Security Council); Canada to Withdraw from Kyoto
Protocol, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada16151310 (describing Canada's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol); Noel Brinkerhoff, Why Does the
U.S. Refuse to Ratify the Hazardous Waste Treaty?, ALLGov (Aug. 28, 2011), availableat http://www.
allgov.com/USandtheWorld/ViewNews/Why Does the USRefuse to Ratify the Hazardous Wa
ste Treaty_110828 (pointing to the United States' lack of waste management and international
dumping).
42. See, e.g., Jeff Coelho, IMO to Discuss C02 Curbsfor Ships, Industry Frets, REUTERS (Feb.
22, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/us-carbon-shipping-idUSTRE81LIK
N20120222 (noting that the EU ran out of patience in the ICAO and imposed its own aviation emission
standards and that EU is ready to act if the IMO fails to deliver on maritime emissions). See also
JASPER FABER ET AL., TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN ACTION TO REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRANSPORT 1 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/cli
ma/policies/transport/shipping/docs/ghgships report en.pdf; SIMONE MANFREDI ET AL., PRODUCT
ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT (PEF) GUIDE 1 (July 17, 2012), availableat http://ec.europa.eu/environm
ent/eussd/pdf/footprint/PEF%20methodology%2Ofinal%20draft.pdf
43. See Air Transport Case, supra note 35,
125. But see Brief of the Federal Republic of
Germany as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
98 (2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 379578, at *3.4 (explaining that the U.S. assertion of universal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under the Alien Tort Statute should only be available if plaintiffs
show no legal remedy available in country of incorporation or center of management); Brief of the
Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Kingdom of the
Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S. Ct. 98 (2012), (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 405480, at *2 (explaining that there exists continued
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respect for the symmetric horizontal relationships of sovereign equals is being
displaced by complex, asymmetric relationships where influential states and
multiple actors use their regulatory powers to augment, provoke or even
As a
circumvent multilateral efforts aimed at shaping global behavior."
consequence, traditional conceptual curbs on a state's ability to overreach-for
example, freedom from external control, and even the very nature of state authority
or, exclusive sovereignty over a defined population within a given geographical
territory-are becoming both ambiguous and less effective.45 There has never
been any question concerning the authority of a state to regulate relationships and
behaviors within its borders regardless of an individual's citizenship, save that of
diplomats. But increasingly more influential states seek to regulate the behavior of
individuals with substantial connections to territory, economy or politics regardless
of their actual physical location on the planet. Globalization has effectively
created a virtual world for the political and regulatory powers of the most
influential states, encouraging them to see an ever broadening array of connections
between extraterritorial conduct and domestic interests that rationalize the greater
use of municipal law in response.46
recognition of the principle that broad assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction arising out of aliens'
claims against foreign defendants for alleged injuries in foreign jurisdictions should be avoided).
44. See, e.g., Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 129 ("Furthermore, the fact that ... certain
matters contributing to the pollution of the air, sea or land territory of the Member State originate in an
event which occurs partly outside that territory is not such as to call into question . . . the full
applicability of European Union law in that territory." (Citations Omitted)).
45. Traditionally, the four attributes of the state were (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined
territory, (3) a functioning government exercising authority over its population and territory, and (4)
independence. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-72 (7th ed. 2008).
46. Nicolas van de Walle notes that one potential consequence of globalization is the
"marketization" of public policy and public institutions through liberalization, privatization and
deregulation. Therefore, the globalization of the world's economy and the marketization of public
policy are distinctive but intertwined developments. See generally NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (1998), available at
http://www.iatp.org/files/economicglobalization andpolitical stability.pdf. See also Case C-89/85,
A. AhIstrom Osakeyhtio v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (1988) (endorsing the extraterritorial
application of EU competition law); Brendan Sweeney, Reflections on a Decade of InternationalLaw:
InternationalCompetition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress, 10 MELB. J. OF INT'L L. 58, 58 (2009)
(discussing both national and international developments in competition law); Bederman, supra note
38, at 27 ("For millennia, commerce has been the solvent of sovereignty. Throughout all epochs of
globalization ... international trade and all its attendant phenomena and consequences have been signal
contributors to the processes of political, social, and cultural change around the world. Indeed, we tend
to regard globalization as, first and foremost, a set of economic processes that bind international actors
(States, individuals, corporations, and other polities) together in a web of mutual interdependence ....
Commerce is subversive of established State and political order precisely because it allows for the free
communication and transport of people, goods, services, and information across recognized national
boundaries and cultural zones of influence. Throughout much of human history, the peoples of
radically different cultures, ethnicities, religious traditions, and imperial regimes have nonetheless
sought to trade with each other and to proposer from the consequent economic benefits that accrue from
such economic interaction."); Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International
Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 969, 969 (2006) (stating that trade is at the heart of many segments of
public international law).
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The Aviation Directive, therefore, is one of several illustrations of the impact
that globalization is having on the development of international law, modes of
international lawmaking, and the process by which the most influential states
identify and confront global issues, sometimes using their municipal law systems
as a principal response tool to perceived threats or transnational problems. With
the language of integration infused into virtually every discussion concerning the
globe's legal systems, the degree to which the most influential states use their
municipal authority to shape global behavior is an often overlooked but profoundly
important theme.47 It is an undertow sometimes working with and sometimes
against conventional structures of public international law and multilateralism.
With the emergence of the rule of law culture over the last sixty years,48 the
extraterritorial application of municipal law can become a surrogate means by
which the most influential states advance their many objectives. 49 Through law
these states are capable of projecting their values, policies and power globally
while protecting their domestic interests by wrapping them in a blanket of law that
can often go unchallenged5 0 because of the absence of super-national law
enforcement institutions capable of meaningfully containing state adventurism. 5 1
A. Environmentaland Economic Policy in the EU-Greeningthe Planet,
Green Protectionismor Both?
James Carville, the noted strategist for Bill Clinton's successful 1992
presidential campaign, famously coined the phrase, "It's the economy, stupid."
The linkage between a state's economy and its many other systems-including its

47. See, e.g., Commission Decision of 24 May 2004 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article
82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Microsoft Corporation, Case
COMP/C-3/37.792 - Microsoft, 2007 O.J. L32/23 (2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:032:0024:0024:EN:PDF (ordering Microsoft to disclose certain
software information to competitors).
48. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY I
(2004). See also Julio Faundez & Ronald Janse, Rule of Law Promotion and Security Sector Reform:
Partnersor Rivals?, 4 HAGUE J. RULE L. 1, 1-3 (2012), availableat http://joumals.cambridge.org/actio
n/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8519803; Otto Triffterer, Closing Remarks and a Vision:
InternationalCriminalJustice and the "Well-Being of the World," 22 CRIM. L.F. 531, 536-37 (2011).
49. Cf Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Using Trade Sanctions and Subsidies to Achieve Environmental
Objectives in the PacificRim, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 296, 297-98 (1993) (explaining that,
similarly, international law may be used as a means of advancing environmental objectives outside of a
state's borders).
50. Cf Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471-74 (2012) [hereinafter FACTA]
(requires foreign banks to locate American account holders and disclose their balances, receipts, and
withdrawals to the Internal Revenue Service or be subject to a thirty percent withholding tax on income
from U.S. financial assets held by the banks).
51. See e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Essay in Honor of W. Michael Reisman: Trade, Investment and
Dispute Settlement: The Enforcement of WTO Judgments, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 558, 562 (2009) ("[T]he
WTO dispute system has been effective because there is an expectation that decisions will ultimately be
complied with."). But see Born, supra note 16 (arguing that so-called second generation international
adjudicatory bodies have far more enforcement powers than first generation bodies, such as the
International Court of Justice).
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legal system-is inseparable. Anti-trust and competition law is premised on the
idea that the diffusion of commercial power is far better for a community than
monopolism. 52 Parochial trade laws of the 1920's and 1930's intended to insulate
national markets from global economic forces became accelerants to the Great
Depression producing massive social and political dislocation.5 3 More recently,
the widespread integration of the world's economies has spurred new regulatory
systems-both state and non-state driven-seeking to balance trade with other
considerations such as development, the environment, labor rights, and natural
resources exploitation.54 Economics is, in short, one of the foremost imperatives
behind a state's political, social, and legal order, as well as largely defining a
state's capacity to affect events across the planet. Accordingly, the architecture of
the global economy is not only undergirded by a complex system of international
and regional treaties, customary law, and emerging non-state regulation, it is also
influenced by municipal laws with significant extraterritorial reach.
The
globalization of a state's economy has, in some cases, encouraged and even
hastened the need to globalize a state's municipal law.
Over the last forty years, economics and the environment have become
intertwined as states and the international community recognize the impact human
activity has on transnational ecosystems and international relations. This impact is
not always empirically quantifiable leading at times to sharp disagreements over
just how much influence environmental considerations should have on economic
activity.5 5 The result is virtual combat in some states between environmental
considerations and economic development. 56 Such conflict is nothing new. But
52. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2012); Council Regulation (EC) No.
411/2004 of 26 February 2004 Repealing Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 and Amending Regulations
(EEC) No. 3976/87 and (EC) No. 1/2003, in Connection with Air Transport Between the Community
and Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 68) 1. See also David J. Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, The
"Modernization" of European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement:
Part 1, 27 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 10, 10-11 (2006); Heike Schweitzer, Competition Law and
Public Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship: The Example of Art. 81, 81 (Euro. Univ. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2007/30, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1092883.
53. Brendan Ruddy, The Critical Success of the WTO: Trade Policies of the Current Economic
Crisis, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 475, 475-77 (2010) (explaining that trade protectionism exacerbated the
Great Depression); Alan 0. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative
Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 473, 474 (2010) ("[T]he Great Depression taught the world that
protective policies can quickly and destructively spread from nation to nation.").
54. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17. See also Case C-337/09 P, Council v.
Zhejiang Xinan Chem. Indus. Grp. Co. Ltd., 2012 EUR-Lex (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://curia.eu
ropa.eu/juris/liste.jsflanguage=en&num=C-337/09%20P# (discussing what constitutes a state
controlled company from a non-market economy for purposes of applying anti-dumping rules).
55. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504, 511 (2007) (discussing issues surrounding
the power of the U.S. EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
56. See, e.g., Lucy Madison, House Republicans Reject Climate Change Science, CBSNEWS,
(Mar. 16, 2011, 2:38 PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20043909503544.html. See also Richard Balme, The Politics of EnvironmentalJustice in China 1 (Am. Political
Sci. Assoc. 2011 Annual Meeting, 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1901849. See, e.g., Alan
B. Sielen, Time for a Department of the Environment, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 435, 463 (2011)
(explaining that the failure of the U.S. to establish a cabinet level environment department contributes
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the emergence of truly global ecological problems,57 spurred in part by demands
for more robust worldwide economic growth, 58 is compelling some states to take a
more nuanced view of the competing interests, not simply to address transnational
problems but also to stimulate innovation and development at home. As Michael
E. Porter and Claas van der Linde have observed:
The relationship between environmental goals and industrial
competitiveness has normally been thought of as involving a tradeoff
between social benefits and private costs. The issue was how to balance
society's desire for environmental protection with the economic burden
on industry. Framed this way, environmental improvement becomes a
kind of arm-wrestling match. One side pushes for tougher standards; the
other side tries to beat the standards back.
Our central message is that the environment-competitiveness debate has
been framed incorrectly. The notion of an inevitable struggle between
ecology and the economy grows out of a static view of environmental
regulation, in which technology, products, processes and customer
needs are all fixed. In this static world, where firms have already made
their cost-minimizing choices, environmental regulation inevitably
raises costs and will tend to reduce the market share of domestic
companies on global markets.59
The application of the ETS to the global aviation sector may be seen as evidence of
the EU embracing the Porter/van der Linde proposition that the environment and
the economy are synergetic and therefore must be reciprocally regulated.60 From a

to a combative and not collaborative approach to finding solutions and allows industry to block
anything a particular industry does not find congenial to its interests).
57. See, e.g., Larry Cati Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure
Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations,39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 591, 592-93
(2008) (describing the role of multinational firms in creating a flexible new governance-style set of
substantive obligations tracking "public" goals, reinforced by a hard international law regime of
monitoring and disclosure).
58. See, e.g., The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Greenland, May 27-29, 2008, 48
I.L.M. 362, available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/IlulissatDeclaration.pdf. See, e.g.,
Tessa Mendez, Thin Ice, Shifting Geopolitics: The Legal Implications of Arctic Ice Melt, 38 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 527, 527-28 (2010) (geopolitics is tied to resource use and control; the Arctic as virgin
territory lacks geopolitical stability established in most other areas of the world). See also Cinnamon P.
Carlarne, Arctic Dreams and Geoengineering Wishes: The CollateralDamage of Climate Change, 49
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 602, 602-04 (2011).
59. Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the EnvironmentCompetitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1995). See also Geoffrey Heal, A Celebration
ofEnvironmental and Resource Economics, 1 ENVT'L ECON. & POL'Y 7, 7 (2007).
60. See Valeria Costantini & Massimiliano Mazzanti, On the Green and Innovative Side of Trade
Competitiveness? The Impact of EnvironmentalPolicies and Innovation on EU Exports, 41 RESEARCH
POL'Y 132, 132 (2012) (explaining that EU energy tax policies and innovation efforts positively
influence export flow dynamics, revealing a Porter-like mechanism). See also Hans Vedder, The Treaty
ofLisbon andEuropean EnvironmentalLaw and Policy, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 285, 286 (2010).
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purely regulatory perspective, 61 the U.S. has arguably reduced its international
environmental leadership footprint in response to domestic politics that often see
environmental and economic interests as opposing forces, 62 even placing itself at a
strategic disadvantage sometimes.
In contrast, the EU has used its vast
regulatory power over the Common Market to drive its economies to progressively
incorporate environmental concerns as root considerations in commercial
policies.64 Whether this largely top-down approach 6 5-as distinguished from a
market-based approach 66 -will prove effective in the long term as a means to
61. It is important to make a distinction between regulatory leadership and environmental impact.
As recent studies have shown, the shift of the U.S. to a greater use of natural gas has resulted in a
significant decline in GHG emissions as power companies switch from coal to generate electricity. This
is occurring even in the absence of regulatory-imposed emission reduction system. See Xi Lu, Jackson
Salovaara & Michael B. McElroy, Implications of the Recent Reductions in Natural Gas Prices for
Emissions of CO2from the US Power Sector, 46 ENvTL. Scl. TECH. 3014, 3014 (2012). In contrast, the
EU's ETS, which is meant to drive down GHG emissions through regulation, has had a smaller impact
for a variety of reasons. See also European Environment Agency, Why Did Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Increase in the EUin 2010? 3 (Technical Report No. 3/2012, 2012), available at http://www.eea.euro
pa.eu/publications/european-union-greenhouse-gas-inventory-2012/why-did-greenhouse-gas-emissions
.pdf/view.
62. See, e.g., David Burwell, Keystone XL Pipeline, A Poster Child for Political Posturing,
CNNOPINION (May 30, 2012, 3:13 PM), availableat http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/30/opinioniburwe
ll-keystone-pipeline/index.html?eref=rss_mostpopular. See also Jutta Brunn6e, The United States and
InternationalEnvironmental Law: Living with an Elephant, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 617, 618-19 (2004);
Miranda A. Schreurs, Henrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeveer, TransatlanticEnvironmental Relations:
Implications for the Global Community, in TRANSATLANTIC ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY POLITICS:
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 251, 254-55 (Miranda A. Schreurs, Henrik Selin &
Stacy D. VanDeveer, eds., 2009).
63. See, e.g., John A. C. Cartner & Edgar Gold, Commentary in Reply to "Is it Time for the United
States to Join the Law of the Sea Convention, "42 J. MAR. L. & COM. 49, 49-50 (2011) (arguing that the
failure to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention places the U.S. at a significant disadvantage). Cf Sharon
E. Foster, While America Slept: The Harmonization of Competition Laws Based Upon the European
Union Model, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 467, 467-68 (2001) (arguing that the EU has harmonized
competition laws and is influencing other states to adopt its model while the U.S. denies the feasibility
to do so, in turn enabling the EU to have greater influence in the development of global competition
law).
64. See Decision No. 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July
2002 Laying Down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, 2002 O.J. (L 242) 1. See
also Commission of the European Communities, Economic Growth and the Environment: Some
Implicationsfor Economic Policy, at 7, COM (1994) 465 final (Mar. 11, 1994); Communicationfrom
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Energy Roadmap 2050, at 1, COM (2011) 885/2 (Dec.
15, 2011); Naomi Salmon, What's Cooking? From GM Food to Nanofood: RegulatingRisk and Trade
in Europe, 11 ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 97 (2009).
65. But see Adam Weiss, Federalism and the Gay Family: Free Movement of Same-Sex Couples
in the United States and the European Union, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 81, 99 (2007) (arguing
that free movement of goods and peoples differ in the U.S. and EU with the former favoring a
centralized approach while the latter vacillates between centralization and competition).
66. Cf Gitanjali Deb, Atrazine: A Case Study in the Differences Between Regulations of
Endocrine DisruptingChemicals in the EU and the US, 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 173, 173,
186-87 (2006) (noting that while both the EU and U.S. have elements of precaution in their
environmental regulatory systems, the underlying drivers are very different).
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address ecological problems remains to be seen.67 Nevertheless, as Noah M. Sachs
notes, "[s]ince 2000, the EU has embarked on ambitious environmental lawmaking
in areas such as chemical regulation, energy efficiency, hazardous waste, and
climate change. Europe has in many cases supplanted the United States as the
leading originator and exporter of environmental law innovation." 68 The ETS is
evidence of the EU's effort to link environment well-being to the Common
Market's economic interests.69 As stated by the Ecologic Institute in the Sixth
Environmental Action Programme ("6EAP"):
In relation to international environmental governance, it should be noted
that the EU emerged as a global "green leader" in the second half of the
1980s. Observers have identified, among other factors, the withdrawal
of the U.S. as a leader in international environmental policy making, the
EU's (competitive) interest in promoting its own rather stringent

environmental standards at the international level, and the EU's desire
to shape its identity as a civilian world power as possible reasons for the
active role of the EU in international environmental policy making. 70
The result is the emergence of the EU as a leading environmental regulator with
reach well beyond the Common Market given the integrated nature of today's
economies and the size of its internal market.

67. Cf Issachar Rosen-Zvi, You Are Too Soft!: What Can CorporateSocial Responsibility Do for
Climate Change?, 12 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 527, 527-30 (2011) (arguing that the failure of the
Copenhagen Summit rested in part on the declining effectiveness of the regulatory state and the rise of

non-state governance actors).
68. Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical
Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1817, 1819-20 (2009) (noting that the EU's Registration, Evaluation, and
Authorization of Chemicals ("REACH") program is setting the defacto global standards in chemical
regulation).
69. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission - Developing an EU Civil Aviation Policy
Towards Brazil, at 1.1, COM (2010) 0210 final (May 5, 2010) ("[T]he European Commission has
proposed to launch targeted negotiations seeking to achieve comprehensive aviation agreements with
selected key partners in all regions of the world, with the aim of strengthening the prospectsfor
promoting European industry and ensuringfair competition, while at the same time seeking to reform
international civil aviation.") (emphasis added)); European Environment Agency, The European
Environment - State and Outlook 2010: Synthesis, at 9, State of the Environment report No. 1/2010
(Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/synthesis ("Continuing depletion of
Europe's stocks of natural capital and flows of ecosystem services will ultimately undermine Europe's
economy and erode social cohesion."). See also JAMES CONNELLY & GRAHAM SMITH, POLITICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 241 (Michael Waller & Stephen Young eds., 1999)

(describing EU environmental policy as dependent upon the "ecological modernisation" to minimize
conflict between environmental quality and economic growth by betting on technological advances).
70. Ecologic Institute, Berlin and Brussels, et. al., Final Rep.for the Assessment of the 6th Env't
Action Programme,at 119, DG ENV.1/SER/2009/0044 (Feb. 21, 2011) (emphasis added), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/pdf/Ecologic 6EAPReport.pdf.
71. See David A. Wirth, The EU's New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation 91 (Boston
Coll. Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 144, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1028733 (describing a new trend by which EU environmental policies are
having an impact on U.S. environmental policies). See also Miranda A. Schreurs, Henrik Selin & Stacy
D. VanDeveer, Expanding TransatlanticRelations: Implicationsfor Environment and Energy Politics,
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The EU's assumption of this role, however, cannot be seen solely as an
altruistic effort aimed at improving global living conditions writ large. As Michael
E. Porter further notes, "The performance of any company can be divided into two
parts: the first attributable to the average performance of all competitors in its
industry and the second to whether the company is an above- or below-average
performer in its industry." 72 Arguably, the same can be said of states. To the
extent that a state's internal market and regulatory systems can operate as an
"above-average performer" across a range of activities through innovation,
regulation, and process improvement, it holds a comparative and strategic
advantage over states that are simply average or below-average performers.
Singapore is arguably a case study in support of this principle.73 The reason for
this is simple: states with internal markets that perform above average and with
efficient regulatory systems not only possess significant economic clout, but they
position themselves to set favorable global standards-legal and otherwise. 74 As
all but the most sophisticated manufacturing and servicing activity is globalized
through integration and corporate restructuring,75 those states that control the
standards setting process, even informally,76 can position themselves to address
long-term environmental problems while promoting domestic innovation and
internal market development. Consequently, while there are philanthropic aspects
to the EU's global environmental efforts, it also reflects a keen desire to weave
sustainability, energy efficiency, health, and clean environment issues into its
practical economic objectives with the end result being an economy based on

in TRANSATLANTIC ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY POLITICS: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 1, 1-18 (Miranda A. Schreurs, Henrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeveer eds., 2009) (noting

the transatlantic cooperation and tension between the U.S. and the EU on matters regarding
environmental policy).
72. Michael E. Porter, Michael Porteron Competition, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 841, 844 (1999).
73. See generally GAVIN PEEBLES & PETER WILSON, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN
SINGAPORE: PAST AND FUTURE 1, 4-5 (2002) (discussing the current state and possible future of
Singapore's economy).
74. Cf Sachs, supranote 68, at 1819 (noting that the EU's REACH program is setting the defacto
global standards in chemical regulation). See also MANFREDI, supra note 42 (providing a guide to
measure the environmental impacts of a product during its life cycle).
75. See GILPIN, supra note 38, at 289.
76. See e.g., Communicationfrom the Commission to the EuropeanParliament,the Council, The
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Trade, Growth and
World Affairs Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU's 2020 Strategy, at 6-7, 11 COM (2010)
612 final (Sept. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Commission Communication: Trade] ("We [EU] will urge our
major trading partners to join and promote the use of existing sectoral regulatory convergence
initiatives such as the UN-Economic Commission for Europe ("ECE") regulations on automobiles, and
to participate actively in the development of international standards or common regulatory approaches
in a broad range of sectors. Indeed experience shows that it is much easier to tackle potential barriers
before regulatory practices become entrenched, both in well established EU industry sectors such as
automotives, machine tools and chemicals, but particularly in rapidly emerging sectors such as online
services or biotech."). The Commission also noted: "The biggest remaining obstacles lie in the
divergence of standards and regulations across the Atlantic, even though we [and the U.S.] have very
similar regulatory aims." Id. at 7.
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innovation and growth in emerging technologies." As the late U.S. House Speaker
Thomas "Tip" O'Neill so famously observed, "All politics is local." That includes
global politics and its interaction with parochial economic and environmental
interests.
Some fourteen principles now drive EU environmental and economic policy
including the polluter pays principle;78 a focus on sustainable development; 79 a
linking of environment, health, safety and consumer protection;80 a requirement
that environmental problems be rectified at the source;81 the integration of
environmental and health concerns into all aspect of EU policy-making; 82 and,
perhaps most influential, the notion of precaution to prevent problems and lower
risk.83 These principles impact a wide-range of industrial and economic interests
such as construction, 84 transportation, 85 and energy, 86 and drive the EU's policies
towards an interconnected environmental-economic regulation scheme within the
.

77. See, e.g., Council Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and
Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16 (noting the new
technologies in the renewable energy sector that will incentivize economic growth); Commission
Communication: Trade, supranote 76, at 5 ("Our economic future lies in keeping a competitive edge in
innovative, high-value products, generating long term and well paid jobs."). See also Emily Barrett
Lydgate, Biofuels, Sustainability, and Trade-Related Regulatory Chill, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 157, 158

(2012) (discussing the relationship between the World Trade Organization and national sustainable
development policies); Jan H. Jans & Hans H.B. Vedder, European Environmental Law, 35 EUR. L.
REv. 112, 113-14 (2010); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Real Partnership for Development?
Sustainable Development as Treaty Objective in European Economic Partnership Agreements and

Beyond, 13 J.INT'L ECON. L. 139, 139 (2010) (noting that a sustainable development treaty is one way
of achieving integration of societal, the environmental, and the economic interests); More Member
States Agree NSRF 2007-13 with Commission, 210 EU Focus 20, 20 (2007) (discussing various
National Strategic Reference Frameworks); Commission Outlines its Taxation Priorities,79 EU Focus
17, 17 (2001) ("[EU] tax policy must be fully consistent with other EU policies such as economic,
employment, health and consumer protection, innovation, environmental and energy policies.").
78. See Council Declaration, Programme of Action of the European Communities on the
Environment, 1973 O.J. (C 112) 16.
79. See Treaty on European Union, art. 130r(1), 1992 O.J. (C 191) 35, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/l 1992M/htm/1 1992M.html#0001000001.
80. See id. art. 129a(b).
81. Id. art. 130r(2).
82. See id. art. 130r(2) (noting what the European Community shall consider when preparing its
environmental policy).
83. Id. See also Council Directive 2011/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2011 on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic
Equipment, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 88 (noting the use of the precautionary principle in EU policy).
84. See European Parliament Resolution of 15 December 2010 on Revision of the Energy
Efficiency Action Plan (2010/2107(INI)), 2012 O.J. (C 169) 66, 68.
85. See id. at 75; European Parliament Resolution of 25 November 2010 on International Trade
Policy in the Context of Climate Change Imperatives (2010/2103(INI)), 2012 O.J. (C 99) 94, 99.
86. See, e.g., Directive 2005/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2005
Establishing a Framework for the Setting of Ecodesign Requirements for Energy-Using Products and

Amending Council Directive 92/42/EEC and Directives 96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2005 O.J. (L 191) 29.
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Common Market that is increasingly transposed across the globe. 87 Directives on
the use of renewable energies and bio-mass fuels 89 serve the dual propose of
promoting sustainability while propelling innovation and protecting established
and nascent European industries by imposing standards that others must adjust to
as a condition of market access.90 According to Tom Howes,
[T]he growth of renewable energy depends on new technologies and
processes, and ongoing efforts to improve the technology and bring
down costs. Consequently, there is a clear technology innovation drive
from the sector and a clear economic and employment benefit: the
sector employs over 1.4 million people . . .9

The EU's use of the "precautionary principle" does not simply express its clean
environment interests, it compels those in other states to alter their domestic
practices as a condition of gaining access to the Common Market, 92 while
promoting environmental innovation as a core economic driver at home. 93

87. See Brandon Mitchener, StandardBearers:Increasingly,Rules of Global Economy Are Set in
Brussels-to Farmers and Manufacturers, Satisfying EU Regulators Becomes a Crucial ConcernFrom Corn to SUV "Bull Bars, " WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2002, at Al.
88. See, e.g., Directive 2008/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
2008 Amending Directive 2005/32/EC Establishing a Framework for the Setting of Ecodesign
Requirements for Energy-Using Products, as well as Council Directive 92/42/EEC and Directives
96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC, as Regards the Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission, 2008

O.J. (L 81) 48.
89. See, e.g., Council Directive 2009/28/EC, supra note 77, art. 19.
90. See e.g., WILL STRAW, DAVID NASH & REUBEN BALFOUR, EUROPE'S NEXT ECONOMY: THE
BENEFITS OF AND BARRIERS TO THE Low-CARBON TRANSITION

12, 13 (2012), available at

http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2012/05/europesnexteconomy-lowcarbontransitionMay2012 9182.pdf (noting that energy intensive industries are at risk from competitive pressures
relating to the low-carbon transition and, "[t]herefore, the loss of these companies to jurisdictions
outside the EU would harm Europe's low-carbon transition and cost jobs and economic output. . . .
Given these complexities, compensating the energy-intensive sectors and using diplomatic channels to
ensure that other jurisdictions commit to binding emissions reduction targets is a better approach than
reducing the EU's own ambition, which could make a global agreement less likely and reduce current
incentives for technological innovation.").
91. Tom Howes, The EU's New Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC), in THE NEW
CLIMATE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 117, 117 (Sebastian Oberthtlr & Marc Pallemaerts eds.,

2010).
92. See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
December 2006 Concerning the Regulation, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals
(REACH), 2006 O.J. (L 136) 3, 16, 24, 40 [hereinafter REACH Regulation]. See also Yoshiko Naiki,
Assessing Policy Reach: Japan'sChemical Policy Reform in Response to the EU's REACH Regulation,
22 J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172 (2010); Doaa Abdel Motaal, Reaching REACH: The Challengefor Chemicals
Entering International Trade, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 643, 643-45 (2009); Bernard Hoekman & Joel
Trachtman, ContinuedSuspense: EC-Hormones and WTO Disciplineson Discriminationand Domestic
Regulation: Appellate Body Reports: Canada/UnitedStates-ContinuedSuspension of Obligations in
the EC - Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 Nov. 2008, 9 WORLD
TRADE REv. 151, 156 (2010).
93. Motaal, supra note 92, at 643; Porter & van der Linde, supra note 59, at 101 ("Innovation
offsets can be broadly divided into product offsets and process offsets. Product offsets occur when
environmental regulation produces not just less pollution, but also creates better-performing or higher-
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The willingness of the EU to go forward with the Aviation Directive in the
face of significant global opposition reflects (1) its unique character and market
size; (2) its linkage of economic security with the environment; (3) its desire to be
a global environmental regulator contributing to, if not outright commanding, the
standards setting process; and (4) its willingness to use its collective political and
economic clout to achieve the strategic policy objectives of the Member States and
the Brussels' bureaucracy through the use of law and regulation. 94 It also reflects
the keen economic interests of the EU, which originated as a trading bloc. 95 By
integrating and projecting its market and regulatory power, the EU can position
itself to set environmental standards across a wide-range of industries, services,
and technologies, which benefit its own economic interests. 96 Although David
Bederman notes that international organizations are essential in setting global
standards, in part, because "[n]o single nation, or even group of countries, can
unilaterally raise standards,"9 this is true only to an extent. Notwithstanding
growing economic integration and interdependency, the most influential states

quality products, safer products, lower product costs (perhaps from material substitution or less
packaging), products with higher resale or scrap value (because of ease in recycling or disassembly) or
lower costs of product disposal for users.").
94. Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the
Chemistry ofRegulatory Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897, 899, 939, 940-41 (2009).
95. See generally Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC); Commission of the
European Communities, Economic Growth and the Environment: Some Implicationsfor Economic
Policy, at 1, COM (1994) 465 final (Mar. 11, 1994); Commission of the European Communities,
Directionsfor the EU on EnvironmentalIndicators and Green NationalAccounting: The Integrationof
Environmental and Economic Information Systems, at 2, COM (1994) 670 final (Dec. 21, 1994). See
also Damian Chalmers, Inhabitants in the Field of European Community Environmental Law, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 39, 41 (1999) (discussing the "ecologization" of EU economics and the
"economization" of the EU ecology); A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins,Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 66,

66 (2007).
96. Lawrence A. Kogan, The Extra-WTO Precautionary Principle: One European "Fashion"
Export the United States Can Do Without, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 491, 491-92 (2008);
Constance E. Bagley, What's Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. Bus. L.J.
587, 587 (2010). See also STRAW et al., supra note 90, at 19-22 (making the following
recommendations with respect to the European economy and the ETS: "[1] Expand the EU ETS to
include imported energy-intensive goods. Serious consideration should be given to extending the ETS
into imported goods from energy intensive sectors if binding emissions commitments for 2020 are not
agreed by 2015. [2] Raise the carbon price. The EU should act to raise the price of carbon, which is
worryingly low. [3] Focus the EU's multiannual financial framework on innovation. In addition to the
demand-side measures described above, the EU should develop a set of supply-side policies. [4] Protect
ETS revenues for low-carbon projects. The ETS is partly undermined by concerns that it has become a
fiscal policy to raise revenue rather than a climate policy to reduce emissions. [5] Provide industry with
greater regulatory certainty. Industry participants from France, Germany and the UK called for more
stability in the EU's regulatory setting process. [6] Maximise the EU's role as a standard setter. Vehicle
emissions standards are a successful example of the EU generating a new market through standard
setting."). See also Two Ways to Make a Car, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21549950 (noting that currently Brazil builds automotive engines
exclusively to EU standards).
97. Bederman, supra note 38, at 57.
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9
continue to possess significant capacity to dominate global regulatory systems 8
often by conditioning access to vast internal markets on compliance with
domestically driven standards. 99 As G. John Ikenberry observed, "[a]ll states have
an interest in arriving at an agreement that coordinates policy-particular in areas
of business and trade regulation-but the leading state[s] can use its power
advantages to get other states to adopt its rules and regulations." 100 Even where
these attempts have been successfully resisted in venues such as the WTO, 10 i the
fact remains that with regularity environmental and economic interests converge
with the most influential states using their extensive lawmaking capacities to
achieve advantageous outcomes within that convergence.102 From the ETS to the
Aviation Directive to its emerging "environmental foot printing" efforts, the EU is
positioning itself to be a global innovator and regulator across a range of economic
activities by using its environmental regulatory systems.' 03 To the extent that the
EU is successful in projecting its environmental standards on the global plane it
forces the commercial bases, markets, and political establishments of other states,
particularly in the developing world, to either adjust to its vision of the

98. Cf Michael Byers, The Complexities of FoundationalChange, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2 (Michael Byers & George Nolte, eds. 2003).
99. See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 1235/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 334/ 25) 1 (EC); Marine
Mammals Protection Act of 1972, supra note 9. See also Willy, supra note 25 ("Europe has every right
to export this energy model to other developed countries, forcefully if necessary. It should stand up ...
[to] accurately price carbon in airlines as well as areas, such as oil taken from Canada's tar sands, even
if it means conflict with Ottawa. Europeans also, by their economic power, have the means to assert
themselves . . . . In addition, on the Western Eurasian landmass, which is to say in Europe's relations
with the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and Africa, the EU's trade position is so dominant that it
can effectively impose its preferences in that region.").
100. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF
THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER 113 (2011).

101. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil-MeasuresAffecting Imports of RetreadedTyres, 1 1,
WT/DS332/AB (Dec.3, 2007) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Tyres]; Appellate Body
Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 1 1, WT/DS2/AB/R
(Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline]; Appellate Body Report, Tuna1; Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the
Dolphin (2012), supra note 9,
ImportationofApples from New Zealand, 1, WT/DS367/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2010).
102. Pascal Liu, Alice Byers & Daniele Giovannucci, Value-Adding Standards in the North
American Food Market - Trade Opportunities in CertifiedProductsfor Developing Countries 1-2 (Mar.
18, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-ll07382; Michael W. Meredith, Malaysia's World
Trade Organization Challenge to the European Union's Renewable Energy Directive: An Economic
Analysis, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 399, 399, 404 (2012) (discussing how the EU's directive is seen by
some as green protectionism, the practice of adding non-environmental objectives that are
discriminatory, or overtly trade restrictive to environmental policy).
103. See generally FREDRIK ERIXON, GREEN PROTECTIONISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: How
EUROPE'S BIOFUELS POLICY AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE VIOLATE WTO
COMMITMENTS, ECIPE OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 1/2009 21 (Eur. Ctr. for Int'l Political Econ. ed.,

2009). Cf Julian L. Wong, Don't Miss the Forestfor the Trees, U.S. Investment in Clean Energy at
Home Is the Best Response to China 's Protectionism, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 23
2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2010/07/23/8128/dont-miss-the-forest-forthe-trees/ (noting that the U.S. risks falling behind China, the EU and others because it lacks a longterm coordinated vision on the development of renewable energy).
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environment-economics equation or find themselves outside a huge market.'0
This is arguably no different than the U.S. using its position as the world's leading
05
The fact that
financial system to achieve favorable domestic results in that field.
the Aviation Directive pulls a good part of a global sector into the EU's carbon
market illustrates the capabilities that the most influential states have in setting
global standards, creating and regulating markets, and shaping conduct well
beyond their borders by using their vast economic power.' 0 6 In the end, James
Carville is largely correct.
So why does this matter to public international law? For a long time the field
of public international law has been fixated on state-to-state relationships defined
by the symmetrical status of equal sovereigns. Yet one of the most powerful and
undervalued influences on the international legal order is the extent to which the
extraterritorial application of municipal law by powerful states shapes and alters
behavior patterns given global integration. As the Aviation Directive illustrates,
the most influential states have immense lawmaking and law-projecting
capabilities, often legitimatized by their perceived democratic nature and/or backed
by enormous economic strength as measured by the size of their internal markets
and their global trading profiles. These states also have a remarkable aptitude for
deploying their law projecting capabilities globally to achieve certain policy
objectives through the use of municipal regulatory systems. 0 7 When measured on

104. See European Union, CIA FACTBOOK (last updated Feb. 5, 2013), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (estimating EU GDP in 2012
at $15.7 trillion). See also Eric J. Boos, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Changing Nature of U.S.
and EU Development Policy and its Effects on the Least Developed Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa,
11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181, 181-83, 185 (2003) (noting that developing countries are concerned
that the U.S. and EU impose trade restrictions on labor and environmental grounds in order to satisfy
domestic interests); Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion PartII: Back to the Past or a
Small Step Forward?, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 189, 201 (2007) (discussing how the U.S. and EU
coerce developing countries by threatening to withdraw or halt foreign direct investment, close off
crucial markets, and impose retaliatory trade sanctions for failing to increase intellectual property
protection); Joanne Scott, The Multi-Level Governance of Climate Change, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L.
REv. 25, 28, 30 (2011) (noting that several EU leaders are proposing a carbon border tax on products
from states with less stringent emission standards).
105. See Michael Greenberger, The ExtraterritorialProvisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Protects
U.S. Taxpayersfrom Worldwide Bailouts, 80 U. MISSOURI-KANSAS L. REV. 965, 966 (2012).
106. Cf Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended ProducerResponsibility in the
European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 51, 62, 68 (2006) (noting the impact
California and the EU have on global standards setting).
107. See James L. Gunderson & Thomas W. Waelde, Legislative Reform in Transition Economies:
Western Transplants- A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy Status? 43 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 347, 347
(1994); Warren Pengilley, United States Trade and Antitrust Laws: A Study of International Legal
Imperialismfrom Sherman to Helms Burton, 1999 CCLJ LEXIS 1, 12, 16, 23 (1999); Austen Parrish,
The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1475-76 (2008); Peter K.
Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REv. 975, 977-78 (2011); Haider Ala
Hamoudi, The American Commercial Religion, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 107, 107-08 (2012). See
also JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN

AMERICA 280 (1980) (the law and development movement is "an energetic but flawed attempt to
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the global scale, regulations set by the most influential states matter well beyond
their borders; regulations set by small and developing states generally do not.
Consequently, this lawmaking and law-projecting capability enables some states to
dominate the global legal order-and therefore global behavior-even outside of
comprehensive multilateral frameworks or cooperation-based agreements.'o If the
EU can successfully use its municipal lawmaking capability to rework the
landscape of global environmental law in its economic favor,109 it expands its
global leadership, encourages the development of new industries and technologies
at home,1o forces other nations to adjust to its policy initiatives and standards, and
plays a more dominant role in shaping global markets and behavior by pushing its
standards ahead of others."' Basically, through the extraterritorial projection of its
environmentally-focused municipal law, the EU can become a powerful global
economic policy determiner.
The EU's assertiveness in global environmental regulation is not, therefore,
the product of happenstancell 2 or the pursuit of purely laudatory objectives. It also
reflects a keen and strategic effort to protect its long-range commercial interests as
transnational ecological problems become prime considerations in economic
development and economic innovation." 3 This is precisely why some perceive the
EU's ETS and other aggressive environmenial undertakings as trade protectionism
"green
wrapped in a flag of law-based environmentalism-so-called
protectionism."ll 4 History is replete with examples of influential states shaping
provide American legal assistance and to transfer American legal models, which were themselves
flawed.").
108. Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Women and InternationalHuman Rights Law: The Challengesof
Colonialism, CulturalSurvival, and Self-Determination, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 187, 189
(2010); Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 329, 340 (2004).
109. But see, MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 264 (noting that the EU often suffers from a
"capability-expectation gap" due to its structural inability to turn economic power into hard results).
110. Cf Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Innovating for
Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomyfor Europe, at 2, COM (2012) 60 final (Feb. 02, 2012).
111. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Preemptive Capacity Expansion, 16 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. 629, 631 (1986) (noting that one approach to economic dominance is preemptive capacity
expansion in which a competitor "locks-up" a major portion of the market thereby discouraging other
entrants).
112. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2493/2000, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 Nov. 2000 on Measures to Promote the Full Integration of the Environmental Dimension in the
Development Process of Developing Countries, 2000 O.J. (L 288) 43, 1-9.
113. Giorgio Maganza, The Treaty ofAmsterdam's Changes to the Common Foreign and Security
Policy Chapter and an Overview of the Opening Enlargement Process, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 174,
174 (1999).
114. See ERIXON, supra note 103; LAWRENCE A. KOGAN, 'ENLIGHTENED' ENVIRONMENTALISM OR
DISGUISED PROTECTIONISM? ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EU PRECAUTION-BASED STANDARDS ON
4
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo e/posp 7_nf
tcenlightened e.pdf. The EU is not alone in using its municipal regulatory power to shape global
environmental behavior. See also Marine Mammal Protection Act, supra note 9; Austen L. Parrish,
Trail Smelter Deja Vu: Extraterritoriality,International Environmental Law, and the Search for
Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 387-402
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global behavior. What is new is the extent to which the broadening use of
municipal law (in scope and subject) can be used to achieve global and domestic
policy objectives given the increasing integration of state economies, the
proliferation of transnational problems, and the substantial connectedness that now
exists between individual behavior abroad and domestic interests.
Whether the EU will be successful in increasing its influence over the global
environmental economic legal order remains an open question. The Aviation
Directive demonstrates an interesting paradox in the unilateral use of municipal
law to confront global problems. Global economic integration works in two
directions: the most influential states can dominate legal systems,' or they can be
forced by other influential states to accommodate alternatives standardsll 6 or run
the risk of disrupting vital trade and political interests.' '7 Thus, while the
combination of economic power, political acumen and provocative transnational
problems can incentivize a powerful state to aggressively extend its municipal law
transnationally, the success of that endeavor is hugely dependent upon other
similarly influential states yielding to the exercise. When they do not do this-as
may now be the case with the Aviation Directive-not only is a specific project
placed in jeopardy, but so too is the legitimacy of that state to act in a similar
manner as new problems arise. Stated differently, international relations is still a
game driven primarily by power politics and largely dominated by self-interest, no
matter how much we may try to convince ourselves that it has evolved to higher
standards of selflessness.

(2005) (describing the recent growth in the extraterritorial application of law in the environmental
context); Avoiding Green Protectionism- A New Programof World Growth, WORLD GROWTH (Dec. 6,
2010), http://worldgrowth.org/2010/12/avoiding-green-protectionism-a-new-program-of-world-growthdecember-2010/.
115. John C. Reitz, Export ofthe Rule ofLaw, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 429, 430-35
(2003).
116. Emily Barrett Lydgate, Biofuels, Sustainability, and Trade-Related Regulatory Chill, 15 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 157, 159-60 (2012) (discussing how EU biofuel regulations might violate WTO law).
See also America's Bounty: Gas Works, ECONOMIST (July 14,2012), availableat http://www.economi
st.com/node/21558459 (noting that the U.S. reduced GHG emissions by 450 million tons over five
years by increasing natural gas power generation while Europe's GHG emissions continue to rise given
its reliance on coal).
117. See, e.g., Fredrik Erixon, The Rising Trend of Green Protectionism: Biofuels and the
European Union 2 (ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 2/2012, 2012). See also Gareth Porter Pollution
Standards and Trade: The "EnvironmentalAssimilative Capacity" Argument, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV.
49, 49-51 (1998).
118. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the General System of
Preferences Case Who Decides the Conditionsfor Trade Preferences?Law and Politics of Rights, 39 J.
WORLD TRADE 977, 977 (2005); Daniel Abebe, Great Power Politics and the Structure of Foreign
Relations Law, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 125, 126-27 (2009). But see Nico Krisch, InternationalLaw in Times
of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the InternationalLegal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
369, 370-71 (2005).
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B. Relevant History of the ETS
A brief history of the EU's attempts to address climate change by regulating
carbon emissions under international environmental frameworks will provide
context for understanding the operation of the ETS today. The genesis of cap-andtrade systems predates the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change ("UNFCCC")ll 9 and the Kyoto Protocol.120
However, these two
agreements gave global legitimacy to carbon trading systems well beyond their
historic roots in the U.S.121 In addition to the EU's ETS, so-called "cap-and-trade"
systems now exist or are under consideration in Australia, China, Korea, and the
U.S.12 2 The UNFCCC recognizes the "common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities . . . to protect the climate system for the benefit of

The recognition of
present and future generations of humankind."l 23
"differentiated responsibilities" means in practice that developed countries (often
referred to as "Annex 1 countries") are to "take the lead in combating climate
change and the adverse effects thereof." 24 Accordingly, the Kyoto Protocol
required Annex 1 countries (including those of the EU) to reduce their greenhouse
gas ("GHG") emissions by 2012, while recognizing that it will take considerably
longer for developing countries to meet similar objectives.1 25 The 1997 Kyoto
Protocol highlighted three approaches to promoting GHG reductions: (1) joint
implementations;' 26 (2) clean development mechanisms ("CDMs"); 127 and (3)
emissions trading.128
Historically, the EU was predisposed to a carbon tax129 and resisted
implementing a cap-and-trade system.130 However, in June 1998 the then fifteen
119. See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 771 U.N.T.S.
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
120. See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
121. See PAUL A.U. ALI & KANAKO YANo, Eco-FINANCE: THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION
OF MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL

INSTRUMENTS

1-3

(2005)

(discussing how cap-and-trade

originated in the U.S. to combat acid rain). See also Richard Conniff, The PoliticalHistory of Cap and
Trade, SMITHSONIAN (August 2009), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/sciencenature/Presence-of-Mind-Blue-Sky-Thinking.html.
122. Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade - The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO, 15 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 111, 153 (2012).
123. UNFCCC, supranote 119, art. 3(1).
124. Id.
125. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 120, arts. 2.3, 3.14, 10, 11.
126. Id. art. 6.
127. Id. art. 12. For a general discussion on CDM, see Charlotte Streck & Jolene Lin, Making
Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performanceand the Need for Reform, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409, 410
(2008).
128. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 120, art. 17.
129. See Steven Nathaniel Zane, Leveling the Playing Field: The InternationalLegality of Carbon
Tariffs in the EU, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 199, 200-04 (2011).
130. Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices to Protectthe Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
515, 526-28 (2009) (noting that after a decade of pursuing a carbon tax unsuccessfully while
denouncing cap-and-trade, the EU changed its position between 1998-200 1).
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members of the Common Market adopted a GHG burden sharing agreement, in
effect an emissions allocation system, under which each state agreed to specific
emission reduction targets. The aggregate of these targets constituted part of the
EU's overall Kyoto Protocol contribution towards reducing GHG emissions.' 31 It
was followed in 2000 by the European Commission's ("Commission")1 32 Green
Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union that
concluded, in part, that
[t]he Commission believes that a coherent and coordinated framework
for implementing emissions trading covering all Member States would
provide the best guarantee for a smooth functioning internal emissions
market as compared to a set of uncoordinated national emissions trading
schemes. A Community emissions trading scheme would lead to one
single price for allowances traded by companies within the scheme,
while different unconnected national schemes would result in different
prices within each national scheme. The development of the internal
market has been one of the driving forces behind the EU's recent
development, and this should be taken into consideration when creating
new markets. Climate change is the clearest case of transboundary
effects requiring concerted action. Moreover, scale effects at the level of
the EU will allow for significant cost-savings, while similar regulatory
arrangements will allow [the EU] to keep administrative costs as low as
possible. 133
The EU's creation of an ETS was something of a watershed moment. It was a
policy shift away from an exclusive preference for carbon taxes as a mean to
reduce emissions to a market-based systeml 34-or a combination of the two' 3 5 that enabled the EU to employ its considerable market clout to implement a GHG
reduction agenda.

131. See FRANK CONVERY, DENNY ELLERMAN, & CHRISTIAN DE PERTHUIS, THE EUROPEAN
CARBON MARKET IN ACTION: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRADING PERIOD, INTERIM REPORT 7-8

(2008), available at http://www.chaireeconomieduclimat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/08-03European-carbon-market-in-action-EN.pdf.
132. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1(2)(b).
133. Commission Green Paperon Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union,
at 4, COM (2000) 87 final (Aug. 3, 2000), availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com
/2000/com2000_0087en01.pdf. See also Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament: Bringing Our Needs and Responsibilities Together-IntegratingEnvironmental
Issues with Economic Policy,at 1-3, COM (2000) 576 final (Sept. 20, 2000).
134. See Roberta Mann, How to Love the One You're with: Changing Tax Policy to Fit Cap-andTrade, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 145, 154-55 (2010) (discussing, in part, Europe's
increasing preference for environmental market-based measures in place of taxes). See also Wiener,
supranote 130, at 526-28.
135. ProposedDanish C02 Tax Reductions Conditionally Approved, EU Focus 2009, at 34-35.
See also David B. Hunter & Nuno Lacasta, Lessons Learnedfrom the European Union's Climate
Policy, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J. 575, 576-77 (2009).
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The EU established the current ETS in 2003 to promote "reductions in GHG
emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner."' 36 It was to be
implemented in three phases, with the final phase beginning January 1, 2013.137
The ETS is the first large-scale international carbon trading market of its kind,
covering approximately fifty percent of the EU's GHG emissions from listed
industries.138 It is built around a MBM framework centered on a "cap-and-trade
system" as distinguished from a "command and control system;" 13 that is,
emission limits were established and emitters are given relative flexibility in
meeting the limits through the buying, selling, and trading of European Union
emission allowances ("EUAs") as opposed to implementing specific mandated
emission control methodologies and technologies. 140 As originally constructed, the
ETS was a decentralized system with each Member State developing a National
Allocation Plan ("NAP")141 according to certain EU criteria.142 The NAPs
established "the total quantity of allowances that [a Member State] intends to
allocate for that period and how it proposed to allocate them."l 43 Key decisions
concerning the quantity and methodology of allocating EUAs were left to Member
States'" with the broad exception that (1) the NAP had to be based on objective
and transparent criteria,145 and (2) the amount of free EUAs would be reduced over
136. ETS Directive, supranote 1, art. 1.
137. The ETS was to be implemented in three phases: (1) January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007
was marked a pilot phase; (2) January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012 was the first commitment period
under which Member States were to meet their emission reduction obligations; and (3) January 1, 2013
to Dec. 31, 2020 is to provide a longer trading period to encourage long-term investment in emission
reduction.
138. Jon Birger Skjaerseth & Jorgen Wettestad, The EU Emission Trading System Revised
(Directive2009/29/EC), in THE NEW CLIMATE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 65, 65-66, 74-75
(Sebastian Oberthitr & Marc Pallemaerts eds. 2010); Eric R.W. Knight, The Economic Geography of
European Carbon Market Trading 7 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1302982.
139. For an explanation of "cap-and-trade" and "command and control," see generally Robert N.
Stavins, Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments 1-2, 20 (Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 52, 2002; Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Working Paper No. 00-004, 2004),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-199848.
140. See Skjaerseth & Wettestad, supra note 138, at 67 (noting that the EU was initially of the
market-based approach because of its flexibility, but that such mechanisms are now part of Kyoto
Protocol).
141. See ETS Directive, supra note 1, art. 9. But see, Directive 2009/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and
Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 140)
63 [hereinafter Directive 2009/29/EC] (establishing a central allocation scheme effective for 2013 and
beyond).
142. ETS Directive, supranote 1, art. 9(1).
143. Id.
144. See Case C-504/09 P, Comm'n v. Poland, 2012 E.C.R. 2 (Mar. 29, 2012), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/listejsf~language-en&num=C-504/09%20P; Case C-505/09 P, Comm'n v.
Estonia, 2012 E.C.R. 12 (Mar. 29, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsflanguage=en
&num=C-505/09%20P. For a general discussion of legal challenges under the Emission Trading
Directive, see Josephine van Zeben, Respective Powers of the European Member State and Commission
Regarding Emissions TradingandAllowance Allocation, 12 ENVTL. L. REv. 216, 216-17 (2010).
145. ETS Directive, supra note 1, art. 9.
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time. 14 In 2009, the EU centralized the authority for determining the quantity of
EUAs in the Commission beginning in 2013.147 This move was initiated to combat
the tendency of some states to liberally issue free EUAs, which had the effect of
depressing allowance values, producing windfall profits for some industries, and
doing little to actually reduce GHG emissions generated by the Community.148
Under Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States were required to ensure that as
of January 1, 2005, "no installation undertakes any activity listed in Annex I
resulting in emissions specified in relation to that activity unless its operator holds
a permit . . . ."149 Annex I activities include (1) energy; (2) production and
processing of ferrous metals; (3) the mineral industry, including the production of
cement, glass, and ceramic products; and (4) other activities including pulp and
paper product.1 50 Consequently, only certain GHG generating activities fell within
the ambit of the Directive and even then only activities within the EU qualified.''
Operators of these activities are required to obtain EUAs with each "unit"
representing the "right" to emit one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent during a
specified period.152 Article 6 of the Directive requires installation operators "to
surrender [EUAs] equal to the total emissions of the installation in each calendar
year." 53
Operators could acquire EUAs either directly from EU Member States or
from other persons holding EUAs.154 A key feature of the system was that EUAs
had to be transferable within the EU and with those in third countries where they
would be recognized.'5 ' Additionally, Article 2 of Directive 2004/101/EC
amended the ETS to enable operators to exchange "certified emissions reductions"
and "emissions reduction units" for EUAs up to a certain percentage of the allotted
allowances to that installation.' 5 6 These provisions then contributed to the market
mechanism by establishing channels that could eventually provide for global
carbon trading. ' By "capping" the total number of EUAs and establishing an

146. Id. art. 10, Annex H.
147. Directive 2009/29/EC, supra note 141, arts. 1(5), 1(11).
148. David Harrison Jr., Per Klevnas, Albert L. Nichols & Daniel Radov, Using Emissions Trading
to Combat Climate Change: Programsand Key Issues, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367, 10378 (2008).
149. ETS Directive, supranote 1, art. 4.
150. Id. Annex 1.
151. See id. art. 27, Annex 1(1) (the former providing temporary exemptions from the directive and
the latter exempting installations used for research, development and testing of new products and
processes).
152. Id. art. 3(a).
153. Id. art. 6(2)(e).
154. Id. art. 12.
155. Id. art. 12(1).
156. Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004
Amending Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance
Trading Within the Community, in Respect of the Kyoto Protocol's Project Mechanisms, 2004 O.J.
(L338) 18.
157. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN, THE EU EMissiON TRADING SCHEME: A PROTOTYPE GLOBAL
SYSTEM? 23 (2008), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Ellermanl1.pdf
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exchange mechanism for trading, the ETS seeks to reward low emitters by
allowing them to sell surplus EUAs while penalizing excessive emitters by
requiring them to purchase additional EUAs.' 5 8 The fact that so many EUAs are
issued free along with "grandfathering" has led some to question the efficacy of
this approach since even typically large emitters can nevertheless reap windfall
profits by selling surplus EUAs.159 But, at least in theory, the ETS incentivizes
industries and operators to lower their emissions within the Common Market (and
now globally) by using market forces rather than explicit reduction directives.
It is important to note that the ETS as developed and implemented by the EU
is not mandated by the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. 6 0 The Kyoto Protocol
only obligates a party to "[i]mplement and/or further elaborate policies and
measures in accordance with its nationalcircumstances"to achieve "its quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments . . . ."16 It is also important to
note that while the Kyoto Protocol called for reductions in emissions from aviation
and marine bunker fuels, this was to be done "working through the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization,
respectively."l 62 Thus, the ETS is a unilateral response to climate change; it is not
a legal mandate of the Kyoto Protocol nor has either the International Civil
Aviation Organization ("ICAO") or the International Maritime Organization
("IMO") endorsed it. In point of fact, the ICAO has objected to the extension of
the ETS to the global aviation sector and has called upon the EU to reverse its
unilateral action.1 63 Consequently, the extension of the ETS to much of the global
aviation sector was an act unsupported by the consent of states outside the EU.
C. The ETS and the Aviation Sector
The Aviation Directive pulls a significant portion of the global aviation sector
into the ETS by giving the system broad extraterritorial effect. As previously
158. See Danielle Goodwin, Aviation, Climate Change and the European Union's Emissions
TradingScheme, 6 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 742, 743 (2008).
159. Kathryn M. Merritt-Thrasher, Tracing the Steps of Norway's Carbon Footprint: Lessons
Learned From Norway and the European Union Concerning the Regulation of Carbon Emissions, 21
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 338-40 (2011); E. Woerdman, 0. Couwenberg & A. Nentjes, Energy
Prices and Emissions Trading: Windfall Profitsfrom Grandfathering?,28 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 185, 18586 (2009); Henry Van Geen, Emission Allowance Trading in the European Union, 11 INT'L ENERGY L.
& TAXATION REV. 299, 303-05 (2003).
160. ETS Directive, supra note 1, pmbl.
5. See also Final Report of the European Climate
ChangeProgramme II Aviation Working Group, Annex I at 5 (April 2006), available at http://ec.europa
.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/docs/finalreport en.pdf (outlining options for extending the ETS
to aviation intra-EU only; all flights departing from the EU; all flights arriving or departing from the
EU). Other options discussed, but rejected, included intra-EU plus fifty percent of routes to and from
the EU; emissions in EU airspace; all flights departing from the EU and EU airspace; and intra-EU and
routes to and from countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
161. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 120, arts. 2.1, 2.1(a) (emphasis added).
162. Id. art. 2.2.
163. See International Civil Aviation Organization, Council - 194th Session Summary Minutes of
the Second Meeting on 2 Nov. 2011, $ 107, C-MIN 194/2 (Nov. 18, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/docs/minutes-icao en.pdf.
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noted, effective January 1, 2012 operators of non-exempt aircraft arriving at or
departing from the EU must hold or acquire a sufficient number of EUAs or
interchangeable credits to cover their carbon emissions.'" Additionally, aircraft
operators must "prepare a monitoring plan and monitor and report emissions in
accordance with that plan."' 65 The Commission has assigned various air carriers
(both EU and non-EU carriers) to "administrating Member States" to oversee
compliance with the Aviation Directive.'66 For example, Aeroflot is assigned to
Germany while Qatar Airways is assigned to the United Kingdom ("UK").'16 This
means, in practice, that Member States with vast international and regional air
transport hubs will receive a bulk of the income generated by auctioning of the
allowances, an issue that could become a point of some controversy as Member
States face significant budget challenges.
Like much of the EU's environmental policy, the ETS reflects both a strong
ecological rationale-such as combating climate change-and a strong economic
rationale-such as reducing energy consumption, incentivizing innovation,
establishing global standards, promoting favorable market mechanisms, and
protecting local industries. The Aviation Direction is no different in having a dual

purpose. The ecological rationale is rather obvious: the EU has "made a firm
independent commitment . .. to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to at least 20
[percent] below 1990 levels by 2020." 16' Thus, "[i]f the climate change impact of
the aviation sector continues to grow at the current rate, it would significantly
undermine reductions made by other sectors to combat climate change." 70 But the
economic rationale, while more subtle, is equally important. If the Aviation

164. Aviation Directive, supranote 2, pmbl. T 16.
165. Id. T 15.
166. Commission Regulation (EU) No 100/2012 of 3 February 2012 Amending Regulation (EC)
No 748/2009 on the List of Aircraft Operators that Performed an Aviation Activity Listed in Annex I to
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on or after 1 January 2006
Specifying the Administering Member State for Each Aircraft Operator Also Taking into Consideration
the Expansion of the Union Emission Trading Scheme to EEA-EFTA Countries Text with EEA
Relevance, 2012 O.J (L39) 1.
167. Id. Annex IT 8, 124. For a complete list of airline assignments to administrating Member
States, see TT 3-132.
168. Council Directive 2008/101, 2008 O.J. (L 8) 3 (foreseeing that in 2012, eight-five percent of
the allowances will be given for free to aircraft operators and fifteen percent of the allowances will be
allocated by auctioning. In the trading period 2013-2020, eighty-two percent of the allowances will be
granted for free, fifteen percent of the allowances will be auctioned, and the remaining three percent
will remain in reserve for later distribution to fast growing airlines and new entrants into the market.)
For a full discussion on how EU-wide aviation allowances are to be calculated and allocated, see
Climate Action, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/climalpolicies/transport/aviation/allowanc
es/indexen.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2011).
169. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, pmbl. 4.
170. Id. I 11. But see Tate L. Hemingson, Comment, Why Airlines Should Be Afraid: The Potential
Impact of Cap and Trade and Other Carbon Emissions Reduction Proposalson the Airline Industry, 75
J. AIR L. & CoM. 741, 742 (2010) (noting that the aviation sector accounts for only two percent of GHG
emissions but is lumped in with the overall transportation sector, which accounts for one-third of
emissions).

2013

THE EU's ETS AND GLOBAL AVIATION

447

Directive applied only to the EU aviation sector it would have a market-distorting
effect by placing European airlines at a competitive disadvantage to their
international counterparts.171
European airlines would likely incur higher
operating costs as a function of complying with the ETS, costs that would include
those associated with administrative compliance, such as measuring and reporting
on emissions, and the costs of emission compliance, such as buying EUAs. There
are wildly varying estimates on the costs of compliance. 172 But this is clearly not a
cost-free exercise. The EU aviation sector would presumably pass these costs on
to customers through higher fees who might then decide to fly non-EU long-haul
carriers not subject to the ETS.17 3 Likewise, investors in the EU's aviation sector
might see lower returns given the costs of the programs. Consequently, absent
broad application the EU aviation sector would suffer a "carbon leakage"
problem' 74 as the cost from pricing carbon leads businesses and consumers to
relocate to, or obtain services from, countries with a lower carbon price.' 75 The
result would be no net reduction in carbon emissions and yet higher costs to
European consumers.' 76 The universal application of the Aviation Directive to the
global aviation sector, in theory, addresses the economic challenges created by the
ETS by leveling the field between EU and non-EU carriers. It also promotes EU
environmental and economic standards given the increasing ties between the two
systems, the size of the Community's internal market, and the breath of the EU's
carbon trading market.
There are several features of Directive 2008/101/EC that are significant.
First, perhaps the most important feature of the directive and the feature that has
generated the greatest objection is the extent of its application. Under the 1944
Convention on International Civil Aviation ("Chicago Convention"), "[a]ircraft
have the nationality of the State in which they are registered."' 77 However, the
Chicago Convention also recognizes that,
the laws and regulations of a contracting state relating to the admission
to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air
navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while

171. See Aviation Directive, supra note 2, pmbl. 16.
172. See, e.g., Madhu Unnikrishnan, European Union, ATA Offer Wildly Difering Views on ETS
Costs, AvIATION DAILY, Oct. 31, 2011, at 3.
173. Meltzer, supra note 122, at 118-19.
174. Id. at 112-13.
175. For a fuller discussion of carbon leakage-competitive concern on other European industries,
see PEDRO LINARES & ALBERTO SANTAMARIA, THE EFFECTS OF CARBON PRICES AND ANTI-LEAKAGE
POLICIES ON SELECTED INDUSTRIAL SECTORS 3 (2012), available at http://www.climatestrategies.org/
research/our-reports/category/61/363.html.
176. See JULIA REINAUD, CLIMATE POLICY AND CARBON LEAKAGE: IMPACTS OF THE EUROPEAN
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME ON ALUMINUM 2 (2008), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/fr
eepublications/publication/AluminiumEUETS-1.pdf. See also Steve Chamovitz, Trade and Climate
Change: Reviewing Carbon Charges and Free Allowances Under EnvironmentalLaw and Principles,
16 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395, 398-99 (2010).
177. Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 17.
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within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting
States without distinction as to nationality . .1
Therefore, no clear rules exist
that the law of that state applies on board the aircraft in the same way as
the law of the flag state applies aboard ships, and the extent to which a
state's laws apply to events occurring on board an aircraft registered in

its territory has been largely left to states to determine for themselves.' 79
As a result, the Aviation Directive does not limit itself to the EU aviation
sector or intra-EU air travel, both of which are clearly under the EU's jurisdiction.
Rather, the Aviation Directive extends the ETS to all segments of all flights of
non-exempt operators without regards to the principles of nationality or
territoriality, in effect forcing a significant part of the global aviation sector into
the EU's carbon trading market. With few exceptions, all flights to or from the EU
must account for their carbon emissions and surrender a sufficient number of
EUAs regardless of nationality of the air carrier or territorial location of the
emission generating activity. Therefore, emissions from EU- bound or departing
aircraft include generating activity (1) over EU's territory; (2) over the territory of
non-EU states; (3) in international airspace; and (4) while on the ground in a third
country.' 80
This broad application results from the Aviation Directive's fuel consumption
formula, which is based on the "[a]mount of the fuel contained in aircraft tanks
once fuel uplift for the flight is complete [minus] amount of fuel contained in
aircraft tanks once fuel uplift for subsequent flight is complete [plus] fuel uplift for
that subsequent flight."' 8 ' Thus, a flight from Hong Kong to Frankfurt must hold
EUAs for its total fuel consumption (and therefore total carbon emissions) from
point of departure to the point of landing, including the running of an auxiliary
power unit while parked at the gate.182 A non-exempt aircraft operator that has
exhausted its free EUAs must then purchase additional EUAs from other holders.
As free EUAs are reduced over time,'8 the global aviation sector will be forced to
purchase additional EUAs in the carbon market where hopefully a raise in carbon
prices will spur behavioral changes and innovation.
Second, under the Aviation Directive the Commission may exclude from the
ETS airlines from a third country if it has adopted "measures for reducing the
climate change impact of flights departing from that country which land in the
Community .... " 8 4 This vaguely worded provision, when read in conjunction

178. Id. art. 11.
179. Eileen Denza, InternationalAviation and the EU Carbon Trading Scheme: Comment on the
Air Transport Association of America Case, 37 EUR. L. REv. 314, 325 (2012) (citation omitted). See
also Chicago Convention, supra note 17, arts. 17-21.
180. See Aviation Directive, supranote 2, Annex 2(b). See also Meltzer, supranote 122, at 114.
181. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, Annex 2(b).
182. Cf id. (describing calculation for fuel consumption).
183. Id. art. 3(c).
184. Id. $18.
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with the Directive's Preamble language of "equivalent measures,"' 8 5 appears to
give the Commission significant authority to assess the sufficiency of a third
country's carbon reduction programs. Although the EU has stated that it intends to
seek "optimal interaction" between trading systems to avoid double regulation, the
fact remains that third country measures must in the view of the Commission
"have an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of this Directive" 1 6 before
an exemption is granted. This provision encourages two unstated objectives: (1)
promoting the EU's emission trading system as the globe's aspirational standard;
and (2) promoting the tie between environmental regulations and economic activity
with the EU as a precursor to further technological and industrial innovation.
Whether provisions within the Directive authorizing recognition of third party
measures will incentivize the development of a global ETS system that aligns with
the EU's ETS remains an open question.'8 7 However, absent objective standards
for assessing whether third country's measures have an "environmental effect at
least equivalent to [that of the ETS]," it is difficult to see how the question of
equivalency can be assessed in a transparent, objective and apolitical manner given
the interdependencies of the global economy.' 8 8 The lack of objective standards
may, in practice, lead to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Aviation Directive
by granting accommodations to third countries that amounts to a race to the
bottom. Or, it may do so by creating complete paralysis in efforts to obtain a
global GHG emissions reduction agreement given vast difference over what
constitutes "equivalent" measures now that the EU's ETS is in place and
operational.
Finally, funds derived from the ETS are intended to "tackle climate change in
the EU and third countries."'18 However, the Aviation Directive also states that,
"[i]t shall be for Member States to determine the use to be made of revenues
generated from the auctioning of allowances."190 This language raises two
important issues. First, although there is a political agreement that a significant
portion of the revenues generated by the auctioning EUAs will be dedicated to
reducing GHG emissions, to fund research and development, and to cover the costs
of administering the ETS,1'9 the revenues are paid directly to Member States and
therefore can be diverted to other purposes.1 92 While the Aviation Directive
185. Id. pmbl. 17.
186. Id.
187. See Hua Lan, Comments on EU Aviation ETS Directive and EU - China Aviation Emission
Dispute, 45 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 589, 600-01 (2011).
188. Cf Airbus Supports China's Opposition to EU Emissions Tax, CHINA DAILY (June 13, 2012,
9:21 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-06/13/content 15497338.htm (describing
negative reactions by entities from European, Chinese, and U.S. aviation industries to EU taxing
international airlines under ETS).
189. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 14.
190. Id.
191. Id. 22; Council Conclusions on Climate Finance - Fast Start Finance, at % 5-7 (May 15,
2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/130262
.pdf
A
192. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 22.
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strongly suggests that the revenue should be dedicated to addressing climate
change, nothing prevents a Member State from using the revenues to cover, for
example, the costs of state pensions.' 93 Second, because the global aviation sector
must acquire EUAs issued by Member States even for emissions that occur outside
the EU, the ETS's revenue generating provisions effectively forces the global
aviation industry into the EU's carbon market by attaching to economic activity
occurring outside the territory of the EU. Whether this constitutes an
extraterritorial tax is debatable.194 What is less debatable is that the Aviation
Directive establishes an extraterritorial revenue generating mechanism that, for the
most part, ignores issues of nationality and territoriality with respect to global
aviation economic activity.
D. Legal Validity of the ETS-the ECJ's Opinion

In addition to the diplomatic row caused by the EU's unilateral extension of
the ETS to third country airlines-such as threats to remove landing rights for
European airlines,' 95 introduction of legislation prohibiting airlines from
complying,' 96 and formal objections' 97-the Aviation Directive was almost
immediately challenged in the courts. The Air Transport Association of America
("ATA"), along with a number of U.S. and Canadian airlines, initiated suit in the
High Court of England and Wales ("Queens Bench") seeking a preliminary ruling
on the validity of the UK's regulations implementing the Aviation Directive.1 98
Because the case implicated the validity of EU legislation and was thus beyond the
competence of a national court,199 the case was referred to the ECJ under Article
267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). 20 0
On December 21 2011, the ECJ issued its ruling rejecting the ATA's
challenge holding generally that neither customary international law nor existing
treaties barred the EU from applying its directive to third country aircraft operators

193. Cf Minister Says Suspend EU ETSfor Two Years, GLOBAL TRAVEL INDUSTRY NEWS (Mar.

21, 2012, 10:55 AM), http://www.eturbonews.com/28426/minister-says-suspend-eu-ets-two-years
(noting that UK's Air Passenger Duty ("APD") started off as a "green tax" but is now a pure revenueraising mechanism).
194. See Meltzer, supra note 122, at 127.
195. See, e.g., James Fontanella-Khan, et al., India Warns EU on Airline Carbon Tax, FINANCIAL
TIMES, May 25, 2012, at 1 (noting that India has threatened to bar European airlines from its airspace
should sanctions be imposed against its airlines for non-compliance).
196. See, e.g., European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 2594,
112th Cong. §§ 2-4 (2011).
197. See, e.g., Chinese Airlines Oppose ETS, SHANGHAI DAILY, Mar. 22, 2011,
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2011-03/22/content 22195295.htm (describing statement the China
Air Transport Association ("CATA") sent to the EU about ETS on 10 March 2011).
1-2, 45.
198. See Air Transport Case, supranote 35,
199. Id.T 47.
200. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, Mar.
30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 164 [hereinafter TFEU] (national court may apply to the ECJ for preliminary
ruling on the interpretation of the treaties or the validity or interpretation of acts of the EU).
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or to those operating outside of its territory.201 It is not necessary to conduct an
extensive review of the ECJ ruling with respect to the technical validity of the
ETS. However, three particular issues are noteworthy: the status of the EU as a
supranational lawmaking entity with separate legal personality; the conditions
under which international law forms a benchmark against which EU law is
measured; and the ETS's extraterritorial revenue generating mechanism.
First, as an entity with legal personality, the EU is unique.202 One observer
has noted:
The misunderstandings [of the power of the European Union] have
multiple sources, not least of which has been the failure of political
scientists to reach an agreement on the character of the EU. It is more
than a conventional international organization, but it is less than a state.
Establishing its character has been made more difficult by the rearguard
actions fought by European governments in the name of national
sovereignty, which have combined with the pioneering nature of the EU
experiment to produce a system of policy-making that is segmented,
complex, often unpredictable and constantly changing. Unlike the
founders of the United States or the French Fifth Republic, the founders

of the European Union did not draw up a constitution to serve as a
blueprint for a new system of government, but instead reached some
general agreements about some policy goals, and have spent the last
[fifty] years editing those agreements in order to redefine the nature of
integration. 203
The status and authority of the EU as a regulator is a point of contention across the
globe and within the EU itself. Unlike a federated union with a clear hierarchy of
authority, the EU is something of a limited confederation in which its principal
actors-the Member States-have ceded some authority to a supranational body
but have not ceded their status as sovereign states. In reverse, the EU has assumed
powers as a supranational governing institution that, in theory, sits separate and
apart from its Member States-at once bound to and liberated from its creator.
As a supranational body with independent legal personality, the EU has
declared that it is not bound by international agreements unless it has agreed to be
so, unless it has assumed from the Member States authority over a particular
matter, or unless another body has exclusive jurisdiction over a subject the EU
would otherwise seek to regulate. 204 As the ECJ pointed out with regards to the
Chicago Convention, the EU is not a signatory to the Convention 205 and the ICAO
has not assumed exclusive authority over aviation.206 While all Member States are

201. See Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 129.
202. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 47, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 41

[hereinafter TEU].
203. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 69.

204. Air Transport Case, supra note 35,
205. Id. 60.
206. Id. 69.

1M
61-

63.
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bound by the Chicago Convention, the EU itself is not. 207 Consequently, the ECJ
declared that the EU can neither be bound by the Convention nor can the
Convention be relied upon to defeat an act of an EU institution. 208 The ECJ's
opinion essentially recognizes the institution of the EU as possessing the qualities
of a quasi-state for certain purposes, leading to the larger unresolved question of
what now constitutes a "state" for purposes of international law.
Second, the ECJ has often acknowledged that EU institutions are bound by
international law, including customary international law. 209 However, being bound
by international law and subjecting acts of EU institutions to scrutiny under
international law are two different considerations. According to the ECJ, for an
international agreement to limit EU authority, two conditions beyond membership
must be met: (1) the "nature and the broad logic of [the agreement concerned] do
not preclude [such a review of validity]"; 21 0 and (2) the agreement must be
unconditional and sufficiently precise as to confer some right upon the
individual. 211 For example, in contrast to its conclusions relative to the
applicability of Chicago Convention, the ECJ found with regard to the Kyoto
Protocol that notwithstanding the EU's membership that it conferred no rights
upon individuals 212 and, in any event, it was not sufficiently precise as to grant
exclusive authority over aviation to another institution preempting EU authority.213
Stated differently, the Kyoto Protocol may have imposed binding obligations on
EU institutions leading to the promulgation of binding regulations to effectuate its
purposes, but it could not be read as conferring any individual standing to
challenge regulations promulgated in pursuit thereof Moreover, with regard to the
Open Skies Agreement,2 14 the ECJ found that it could be read to confirm rights
upon individuals, 215 and was sufficiently precise, 216 but nevertheless the ETS was
completely compatible with the agreement.217 Consequently, according to the ECJ,
none of the cited agreements could defeat the broad regulatory application of the
Aviation Directive.
The ECJ also held that the same interpretative principles generally applied
within the context of customary international law: (1) the principles are capable of
calling into question the subject-matter competence of the EU; and (2) the custom
affects "rights which the individual derives from European Union law or to create

207. Id. 71.
208. Id. 72.
209. Id. f 49, 102.
210. Id. 53.
211. Id. 54.
212. Id. 77.
213. Id.
214. See generally United States European Union Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-E.U., Apr. 27 &
30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470 [hereinafter Open Skies Agreement].
215. Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 84.
216. Id.
217. Id. % 131-157.
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obligations under European Union law in [the individual's] regard." 218 Applying
this analysis, the ECJ rejected challenges to the Aviation Directive under the
customary international law principles of sovereignty of airspace, freedom of
international airspace, and jurisdiction of aircraft in international airspace. 219 The
ECJ concluded that in as much as flights subject to the Aviation Directive
performed some activities within an EU Member State, they were subject to "the
unlimited jurisdiction of the European Union."220 It stated that since the Aviation
Directive was intended to provide a high level of environmental protection, the EU
may permit commercial activity within its territory "on condition that operators
comply with the criteria that have been established by the European Union and are
designed to fulfill the environmental protection objectives." 221 It also explained
that using activities that take place outside EU airspace for purposes of applying
the Aviation Directive does not impinge upon the sovereignty of non-EU states.222
Finally, the ECJ rejected the claimants' contention that the Aviation Directive
amounted to an unlawful tax in violation of the Open Skies Agreement. In
rejecting this attack, the ECJ distinguished the allowance system from a tax, duty,
or fee on fuel stating, in part, that "it is not intended to generate revenue for public
The ECJ concluded that the Aviation Directive does not
authorities . . . .223
breach Open Skies Agreement provisions that exempt fuel from taxes and other
fees as it found no direct or inseverable link exists between the cost of the Aviation
Directive and fuel used.224 This conclusion is highly suspect, given that Member
States are free to use revenue generated by the sale of EUAs for other purposes
notwithstanding political commitments to support climate change programs.225
The ECJ appears to have ignored the fact that the directive clearly states that
income generated by the sale of EUAs were under the discretion and control of
Member States.226
218. Id. 107.
219. Id. TT 124-130.
220. Id. 125.
221. Id.1 128.
222. Id.1 125-130.
223. Id. 143. The ECJ also held that the Aviation Directive did constitute a tax because it was not
a rate-based system but rather the costs of compliance depended as much on market conditions as upon
action of state authorities. See id. 1145-147.
224. Id. 142, 143.
225. At least one Member State, the UK, refuses to "ring-fence" revenue generated by the sale of
carbon credits for climate change projects. Report Criticises the UK Over Its Refusal to Earmark EU
ETS Carbon Revenues for Financing Green Projects, GREENAIR ONLINE.COM (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.greenaironline.com/news.php?viewStory-1077.
226. The issue of how ETS revenues generated by aircraft operations are to be used presents the EU
with two rather thorny problems. First, as originally presented, the revenue generated by aircraft
operations was to be used principally for climate change programs. See Aviation Directive, supra note
2, 22 (revenues generated from auctioning allowances should be used to reduce GHG emissions, adapt
to climate change, fund research and development, cover the cost of administration, fund contributions
to the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, and undertake measures to avoid
deforestation and facilitate adaptation in developing countries). If dedicated to these purposes, the
revenues arguably would not amount to a general tax per se, but rather a fee dedicated to a specific
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What is perhaps most fascinating in the ECJ's decision is the degree to which
the ECJ sustained the EU's climate change efforts by promoting the concept of
"unlimited jurisdiction" 227 and the degree to which the Court relied on EU treaties
alone to justify extending the EU's authority beyond its borders to encompass
aviation activities occurring in third states. An aircraft operator is now subject to
very specific EU jurisdiction-the Aviation Directive-no matter where on the
planet it is headquartered so long as its aircraft arrive at or depart from an
aerodrome in an EU Member State. The Aviation Directive does not simply
require an aircraft operator in a third country to hold sufficient EUAs for a
particular flight. It requires that operator to develop and maintain sophisticated
emission calculation and reporting systems even if only a relatively small
percentage of its flights are connected to Europe and even if only a small
percentage of its emissions actually occur over EU airspace. Moreover, in its final
discussion on the applicability of customary international law, the ECJ noted that,
"European Union policy on the environment seeks to ensure a high level of
protection in accordance with art. 191(2) TFEU ....
The EU, therefore, claims
broad authority to regulate transnational economic activity based not only on its
international obligations (which cannot be challenged), but also on the
transnational extension of the aspirational guarantees contained in the TFEU.229
Stated differently, because the TFEU seeks a high level of environmental
protection within the EU, institutions of the EU by extension must have broad
authority to regulate activity occurring outside the EU that jeopardize the
guaranteed protection. This is not only an extraordinary example of the assertion
of municipal jurisdiction beyond the physical boundaries of a state; it is an
example of the capacity of influential states to use the notion of substantial
connections to capture the virtual space between what is domestic and what is
international for regulatory purposes.
cause not unlike security fees imposed on air transport passengers. However, the lack of any authority
within the EU to demand that Member States dedicate revenue to this purpose leaves states with
discretion to use the funds as they see fit. See, e.g., id. ("Decisions on national public expenditure are a
matter for Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity."). Arguably, this seriously
jeopardizes the legitimacy of both the EU's and the ECJ's position with regards to whether the ETS is a
tax under Open Skies. See, e.g., Open Skies Agreement, supranote 214, art. 1. Given the current fiscal
crisis now gripping states such as Greece, Italy and Spain, policymakers will be hard pressed not to
divert Aviation Directive revenues to general government purposes, e.g., funding schools, pensions,
defense, healthcare. The current practice of Member States, except Germany, is to plough revenues
raised from carbon permit auctions into general expenditures. This calls into question the entire
integrity of the ETS as a climate change initiative, leading to the possible conclusion that the Aviation
Directive is nothing more than a revenue generating exercise in practice if not in theory. Second, and
possibly more divisive within the EU, is that Member States to whom a large number of airlines have
been assigned will potentially reap windfall revenues over time that, as noted, could be applied to
general government operations. States with smaller assignments will receive far less revenue for either
climate change initiatives or general government operations.
227. Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 1 124. It should be noted that in the French version of the
decision the term "unlimited jurisdiction" is expressed as the "pleine jurisdiction."
228. Id. 128.
229. Id.

2013

THE EU's ETS AND GLOBAL AVIATION

455

III. THE AVIATION DIRECTIVE AS INDICATOR

This article began with the assertion that the Aviation Directive provides a
platform upon which to see an emerging trend in international law: the use of
municipal law to regulate global relationships and behaviors. Alone, the Aviation
Directive does not represent a momentous shift in "international" lawmaking so
much as it serves as an indicator of the how the most influential states can assert
and protect their self-interests in a global arena. Other states have acted likewise
to project their political values, economic interests, and legal norms unilaterally
using municipal law. 230 But the Aviation Directive is an important example of
how states and institutions such as the EU use a combination of economic power,
political power, and municipal lawmaking to protect their interests.23'
As transnational problems explode and the world becomes more integrated in
terms of economics, energy, culture, 232 security, and the environment, the actions
of one state can clearly have parochial and global consequences for others.233 The
embedded liberalism pushed by Western states and so embraced by the world 234
may in the end have encouraged so much integration, in both the economic and
non-economic spheres, that distinctions between the limits of state legal authority
and the limits of international legal authority blur incentivizing the greater
extraterritorial application of municipal law as a tantalizing alternative to
multilateralism. The importance of the Aviation Directive lies in what it says
about changing attitudes concerning the nature of the "state" and the agility of the
most influential states to alter global behavior through their municipal lawmaking
and regulatory apparatuses.

230. See generally Smitherman, supra note 9, at 771-72.
231. See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, Knowledge, Responsibility, Engagement: The
EU Outlines its Policy for the Arctic (July 3, 2012), availableat http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP12-739_en.htm?locale=en; Press Release, European Commission, Strengthening Europe's Place in the
World: An External Budget for 2014-2020 to Respect EU Commitments and Promote Shared Values
(Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1510;
OrganizationEnvironmentalFootprint(OEF), availableat http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/corp
orate footprint.htm; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PRODUCT ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT (PEF), available

at http://ec.europa.eu/environmentleussd/product footprint.htm; THE EU ARCTIC FOOTPRINT AND
POLICY ASSESSMENT PROJECT, THE EU ARCTIC FOOTPRINT, available at http://arctic-footprint.eu/.

232. See, e.g., Brand of Dreams: America is Wooing Foreign Tourists for the First Time,
ECoNOMIST, June 30, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21557782 (noting that one Brazilian's
explanation for not visiting the U.S. is "[t]he United States did such a good job of tuming Brazilians
into Americans it's not all that different.").
233. See, e.g., Steven Wheatley, A DemocraticRule offlnternationalLaw, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 525,
528-29 (2011) ("The consequences of industrialization, globalization, and modernization have resulted
in policy issues that states acting alone cannot regulate effectively (global warming, the international
financial markets, and international terrorism, etc.), and states accept the need for highly focused
cooperation and coordination efforts in the various sectors of global society (trade, environment, human
rights, etc.).").
234. See JONATHAN GRAUBART, LEGALIZING TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: THE STRUGGLE TO
GAIN SOCIAL CHANGE FROM NAFTA's CITIZEN PETITIONS 9 (2008).
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A. ManagingInterstate Relations
For some 300 years the theoretical legal management of the international
relations system was premised on the notion of sovereign equality and noninterference in the affairs of other states. These were not merely geographicallybased concepts. Rather, their importance rested in the assumed quality of the
nation-state as an autonomous, self-regulating, and sovereign political constituent
equal to all other like constituents. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted more than
100 years ago, "[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory."235
Sovereignty did not merely mean physical control of geographical territory; it
meant the exclusive control of all of the means available to a state to regulate
relationships and behavior within its territory.236 Whether this assumed quality of
the nature of the state reflected the actual equality of the state are two separate
considerations. While states may enjoy legal equality in theory under international
law, it is self-evident that not all states enjoy equivalent influence and, therefore,
are not created equal when measured on the broader plains of economic, political,
legal and cultural power. The world of statehood is a place of evolving and
relative equities and parities, not static and absolute equalities. The globalization
of economic activity and its attendant impacts on states means that developments
in one part of the world can rapidly have dire consequences in another part of the
world demanding domestic regulation of extraterritorial activities as a means of
self-preservation. The relative parity of states is the very reason that some are far
more capable of defining global rules and global behavior than are others.
The Aviation Directive demonstrates that globalization combined with the
openness and plasticity of the international law system 237 leaves ample space for
the most powerful states to influence the internal legal regimes of other states, or to
influence how individuals behave in other parts of the world. Global phenomena
such as climate change, economic integration, resource management, and
transnational security concerns now serve to entice states to act extraterritorially in
an effort to favorably shape their global interdependencies, 238 protect local

235. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
236. Cf KRASNER, supra note 11, at 227; MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW,
POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 93, 124 (1995).

237. For example, a state may sign a treaty but then make numerous reservations to critical
provisions effectively rendering its obligations a nullity. See Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J.
INT'L L. 307, 307-08 (2006); Catherine Logan Piper, Note, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: The
Goal of Universality, 71 IOWA L. REV. 295, 308 (1985); Andrds E. Montalvo, Reservations to the
American Convention on Human Rights: A New Approach, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 269, 274-76
(2001).
238. Cf Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritorialityof American
Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 208 (1996) ("Extraterritoriality results in frequent
conflicts between the United States and other nations."); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg,
Draft Convention on Jurisdictionand Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77
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markets, 239 promote specific behaviors, 240 and address problems whose origins
may rest elsewhere but nevertheless have a clear domestic impact. 241 The world is
not a collection of legally isolated states. It is a world of asymmetrical paradoxes
marked by a greater need for multilateralism offset by tempting opportunities for
state unilateralism. 242
The Aviation Directive evidences this paradox in three ways. First, at a
policy level, the Aviation Directive demonstrates that the most influential states
retain significant influence over the international legal order even as their formal
authority has been constrained by the diffusion of global political power.24 3 States,
such as the U.S., the EU, and now China, exercise this influence by combining
their distinctive lawmaking capabilities with their economic strengths leveraging
both to achieve particular objectives. 244 As EU Climate Commissioner Hedegaard
stated, "[t]his is very much proof that we in the Commission do not think we
should sit idly waiting for the big international agreement." 245 Moving forward in
Europe means unilaterally globalizing Europe's climate change framework using
its considerable collective regulatory and economic power, 246 an approach used by
the other most influential states as well.24 7 The EU is clearly prepared to play to its
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1065, 1117 (2002) ("Extraterritorial application of law has become worrisome to

many observers because it interferes with sovereign authority by limiting the extent to which a State can
control the local conditions . . . .").
239. Cf Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-BorderSearches,
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 103 (2001); Ariel Ezrachi, Globalization of Merger Control: A Look at
BilateralCooperation through the GE/Honeywell Case, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 397,400 (2002).
240. Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. 109-293, 120 Stat. 1344, §§ 301-02 (2006); Stop Online
Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112 b Cong. § 102 (2011). See also REACH Regulation, supra note 92.
241. See Parrish,supra note 114, at 387-88; Colleen Graffy, Water, Water, Everywhere, nor any
Drop to Drink: The Urgency of TransnationalSolutions to InternationalRiparian Disputes, 10 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 399, 424 (1998).
242. See e.g., Hedegaard,supra note 10.
243. Cf Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
54, 72 (1997) (noting that U.S. law is applied transnationally creating entities able to operate across
borders).
244. Cf Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in
Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 239 (2004) ("The inherent
discriminatory nature of bilateralism/regionalism is often blended with an internal power disparity and
ultimately begets unilateralism. Unilateralism, which is often clad with extraterritoriality, tends to
eclipse international trade law, thereby placing the global trading system at the mercy of bare politics by
a handful of powerful states.").
245. Hedegaard, supra note 10.
246. Aaron R. Harmon, The Ethics of Legal ProcessOutsourcing -Is the Practiceof Law a "Noble
Profession," or is it Just Another Business?, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 41, 44 (2008) (noting that "[t]he
European Union has largely consolidated its economies, raising its collective resources and influence.").
247. See Richard Frimpong Oppong, The African Union, the African Economic Community and
Africa's Regional Economic Communities: Untangling a Complex Web, 18 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
92, 93 (2010); Jason Pierce, A South American Energy Treaty: How the Region Might Attract Foreign
Investment in a Wake of Resource Nationalism, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 417, 437 (2011); Rafael LealArcas, Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?,
11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 597, 620-21 (2011). See also Smitherman, supra note 9, at 783 (noting that other
supranational bodies are seeking to broaden their global influence as well).
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strengths and push its climate change agenda even in the absence of a multilateral
consensus on the specific approaches to be used to address atmospheric carbon
levels.248 The combination of power, impatience, and transnational problems
provide fertile ground for aggressive unilateralism on the part of some contrary to
the so-called embedded liberal framework that was supposed to promote greater
integration while containing national adventurism. 249
Second, in the absence of a binding multilateral framework, the
implementation of the Aviation Directive indicates that the EU is positioning itself
to create and regulate carbon markets by defining and setting the standards of
equivalency. 25 As noted earlier, while all states have an incentive to seek
common policy on transnational issues, the state that leads the effort can often
force other states to adapt to its standards. Within the context of the ETS and the
Aviation Directive, the EU can achieve its objectives in three ways: (1) by tightly
regulating its carbon market, which is the largest in the world; 251 (2) by defining
what constitutes equivalency between its carbon markets and emerging thirdcountry carbon reduction policies thereby driving the latter to largely comport with
the former; 252 and (3) by broadening the definition of what constitutes economic
activity within the Common Market thus expanding its transnational regulatory
reach into activities that occur in third states. The Aviation Directive, to the extent
it is successfully implemented,253 drives a significant segment of a global industry
into a regional carbon trading system and extends the EU's regulatory powers into
spaces previously assumed to be reserved to other states.254 The mere act of
landing at, or departing from, an aerodrome in the EU effectively constitutes

248. See, e.g., Council Directive 2009/30, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 88 (EC). See also Michael Taylor &
Sabrina Davis, Oil Sands and European Union Fuel Quality Directive (FQD): an Update,
LEXOLOGY.COM (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-cc8066c
7-4eb8-4318-b89d-570aa518bbad.
249. Cf Jeffrey A. Hart & Aseem Prakash, Globalisation and Regionalisation:Conceptual Issues
and Reflections, 2 INT'L TRADE L. & REGULATION 205, 205 (1996).
250. Similarly, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§
401, 768 (2009) sought to include imports in the U.S. cap-and-trade system starting from 2020 through
"intemational reserve allowances" to offset lower energy and carbon costs of manufacturing covered
goods. This would not have applied to countries with acceptable carbon reduction regimes in place.
251. Cf Council Directive 2009/29, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 63 (EC).
252. Cf IKENBERRY, supra note 100, at 113. See also Scott & Rajamani, supra note 6, at 483
(discussing that "equivalent" may have multiple meanings, but that "third country measures are
required to achieve an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of the directive" and that "the
emphasis upon equivalence would seem to suggest that equal treatment, not differentiation, will be the
guiding principle in this respect.").
253. See Julia Pyper, U.S. Lawmakers, State Dept. to Escalate Opposition to E.U. Emissions
Scheme, CLIMATEWIRE, July 31, 2012, at 3.
254. With odd sort of reasoning, Advocate General Kokott opined that the Aviation Directive did
not pose a threat to the sovereignty of non-EU member states by regulating aviation emissions over
their territories because it did not preclude third countries from bringing into effect or applying their
own emissions trading schemes for aviation activities. See Air Transport Case, supranote 35, 156.
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economic activity within the Common Market, notwithstanding the fact that a bulk
of that economic activity may occur outside the EU.255
Finally, as noted, under the Aviation Directive the EU retains authority to
pass on the efficacy of aviation-based climate change policies initiated in third
states. The Aviation Directive accomplishes this by empowering the Commission
to grant waivers to third-country air carriers based upon the quality of a country's
aviation carbon reduction efforts. It also deploys certain economic tools to support
the waiver system-such as granting or withdrawing landing rights. This waiver
system is, in effect, an approval system. That is, the granting of a waiver is the
equivalent of the EU placing its imprimatur on a third country's aviation emission
reduction efforts. Conversely, the Commission's refusal to grant a waiver is a de
facto judgment that a third country's aviation carbon reduction efforts do not pass
EU muster. Not only does the Aviation Directive project a regulatory system onto
third parties, but it pulls into the Brussels' bureaucracy the assessment of thirdcountry efforts in this area. Whether the Commission ultimately uses this power is
an open question. The fact that the EU uses its own treaties and regulations to
confer upon itself certain comprehensive powers provides important insight into
256
here with regard to
states' responses to the impact of transnational problems,
effectively globalizing one aspect of the EU's environmental regulatory authority.
B. Managing State and Global Conduct by ReshapingIndividual Behavior
Traditionally the authority of a state to regulate the behaviors of persons
(legal and natural) within its borders free from outside interference has been

255. Some might argue that the EU's aviation direction is no different from other aviation
regulatory schemes imposed by other states such as, for example, the U.S. requirement of 100 percent
cargo screening for inbound flights regardless of origin. The Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-53, § 1602, 121 Stat. 380, 478 [hereinafter The
Implementing Recommendations]. Does that requirement not constitute extraterritorial regulation of
economic activity that occurs elsewhere? To some extent the answer is "yes." However, the Aviation
Directive is distinguishable in one important sense. The formula that was developed to calculate the
amount of fees to be paid through the purchase of carbon credits clearly enables both generators and
non-EU states to distinguish between locations of economic activity, such as in a non-EU state and over
international airspace. Thus, unlike the 100 percent cargo screening requirement or many airport
landing fees, the Aviation Directive imposes a financial charge on carbon generating economic activity
attributable to a particular flight even when much of that economic activity occurs outside the EU. As
discussed, the reason for this approach was to (1) mitigate a potential carbon leakage problem, and (2)
protect EU-based airlines from economic distortions associated with compliance. This does not alter the
fact, however, that a non-EU registered airline landing or departing from a Member State is subject to
the regulatory effects of the ETS and must ostensibly pay a fee based upon the length of flight (that is,
total fuel consumed) to the assigned Member State for its total carbon generating economic activity
regardless of where it physically occurs.
256. See, e.g., TFEU, supra note 200, arts. 3, 191, 192. Cf Commission Proposalfor a Directive of
the European Parliamentand of the Council Amending Directive 1999/32/EC as Regards the Sulphur
Content of Marine Fuels, at 4, COM (2011) 439 final (July 15, 2011) (explaining that EU authority to
regulate sulphur content of marine bunker fuels stems from IMO regulations and authority granted to it
by the TFEU).
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considered sacrosanct in international relations. 257 Although the so-called
"American Doctrine" 258 has at times recognized extraterritorial application of
municipal laws, most states have resisted its broad adoption in the absence of
treaty or customary obligations. 259 Even U.S. courts have been hesitant to grant
wide transnational application to domestic laws and regulations. 260 The extent to
which one state may extend its domestic authority into the affairs of another state
is, however, a question with liquid results. Ian Brownlie notes that, "[t]he present
position is probably this: a state has enforcement jurisdiction abroad only to the
extent necessary to enforce its legislative jurisdiction" based primarily on the
principle of "substantial connection." 261 Under assumed principles of public
international law, an extraterritorial act can only be legal if: (1) there is a
substantial and bona fide connection between the regulated act, the subject matter,
and the jurisdiction; (2) the principle of non-intervention is observed; and (3)
accommodation, mutuality and proportionality are followed.262
But this is only "probably" the law and as Halpin and Roeben note,
globalization gives broad artistic legal license to states and lawmakers.
Limitations on the extraterritorial extension of municipal law are fluid because
international law is a creation of actors (state and now non-state) imbued with wide
discretion 263 juxtaposed by narrow accountability for their actual regulatory
choices. 26 By defining the notion of "substantial and bona fide connection"
narrowly or broadly, the most influential states can restrict or expand the
application of their municipal law to individuals and activities in other states. The

257. But see Jaye Ellis, Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public InternationalLaw, 25
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 313, 324 n. 74 (2012) ("[lIt once appeared self-evident that state sovereignty implied

a right of the sovereign to define and pursue domestic policy goals without interference from other
states. This interpretation of sovereignty remains highly persuasive and pervasive, but has lost its selfevidence.").
258. Brownlie, supra note 45, at 309.
259. P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality:Correcting the "Balance of Interests," 41 INT'L
COMP. L. Q. 245, 251 (1992).
260. See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123 (1825) (the courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991) (rejecting the EEOC's
position that Title VII applies extraterritorially to regulate employment practices of U.S. employers
employing American citizens abroad); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878, 2881
(2010) (rejecting the "conduct and effects" tests relying upon the default presumption against
extraterritorial application of American laws abroad, absent express statutory designation).
261. Brownlie, supra note 45, at 311 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 311-12.
263. See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) [hereinafter Genocide Advisory Opinion] ("It
is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent, and that
consequently no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto.").
264. See, e.g., Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Rights Body Condemns Syria Over Violations, REUTERS,
Mar. 1, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/uk-syria-rights-idUKTRE82001220120301. See
also Cedric Ryngaert, The European Court of Human Rights' Approach to the Responsibility of
Member States in Connection with Acts of InternationalOrganizations,60 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 997, 997
(2011) (discussing the lack of member state responsibility for actions of international organizations).
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expanding list of transnational problems in such areas as climate change, 265
security,266 and finance 267 actually serve to incentivize states to see substantial
connections where none existed before,268 or even undertake the unilateral
enforcement of the "collective will," whatever that may mean. 269 In short, for
regulatory purposes it is increasingly difficult to tease apart purely domestic
behavior from the purely transnational behavior, given their interconnectedness.270
But the Aviation Directive illustrates more than the expanding notion of
substantial connection between external behavior and domestic state interests. It
also illustrates the emerging tendency of the most influential states to achieve
certain policy objectives by circumventing frozen multilateral apparatuses and
going directly after the extraterritorial conduct of individuals. Globalization has
arguably created the "virtual citizen" living in multiple legal spheres and subject
directly and indirectly to a virtual system of legal regimes, some of which operate
completely beyond the borders of a particular state. Such regimes seek to alter
global behavior by attaching directly to individual conduct regardless of where it

265. See, e.g., Air Transport Case, supranote 35,1124-29, 33.
266. See Christopher C. Joyner, CounteringNuclear Terrorism:A ConventionalResponse, 18 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 225, 225-26 (2007) (discussing the threat of nuclear terrorism to international security).
267. In addition to issues concerning the environment and climate change, the 2008 financial crisis
encouraged further extraterritorial regulation of the global financial industry given the transnational
effects of that crisis. For example, the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CTFC") has
proposed that as part of its implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act's swap rules the term "U.S. person"
be interpreted "by reference to the extent to which swap activities or transactions involving one or more
such person has relevant effect on U.S. commerce." Press Release, CFTC Approves Proposed
Interpretive Guidance on Cross-Border Application of the Swaps Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
(June 29, 2012) (emphasis added), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6293-12. This
results from provisions within the Dodd-Frank Act that apply to activities that "have a direct and
significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States . . . ."
Commodities Exchange Act, § (i)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2, amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203 §722(d)(i)(1)
(2010). Although the CTFC does not require foreign governments, central banks or international
financial institutions to register, it is clear that Dodd-Frank and the CTFC's interpretation of its powers
are meant to cast a wider transnational net over certain financial transactions that have effects on the
U.S. economy. For further definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap
Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract Participant," see 77 Fed.
Reg. 30596, 30693 (May 23, 2012).
268. See also Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting
that CERCLA expresses clear intent by Congress to remedy domestic conditions within U.S. even from
extraterritorial sources thus justifying the extraterritorial application of CERCLA in some cases). See,
e.g., Larry Kramer, ExtraterritorialApplication ofAmerican Law After the InsuranceAntitrust Case: A
Reply to ProfessorsLowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 755-56 (1995).
269. See Nico Krisch, UnilateralEnforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq and the Security
Council, 3 MAX PLUNK Y.B. U.N.L. 59, 60 (1999) (discussing the evolution of a new right of states to
take unilateral action to enforce the perceived collective will when multilateral enforcement efforts
fail).
270. See e.g., Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Reducing the Climate
Change Impact of Aviation, at 4, COM (2005) 459 final (Sept. 27, 2005) (stating that "international
aviation should be included in any post-2012 climate change regime to give States stronger incentives
to take action.").
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occurs on the planet and with decreasing respect for the notion of total state
sovereignty. The extraterritorial application of municipal law becomes a
convenient and largely unchecked method for shaping global behaviors ranging
everywhere from how tuna are caught on the high seas,27' to how the internet is
used,272 to how the world is reducing its carbon footprint,273 to overseeing
corporate activity,274 to provincial concerns over national security.275
The Aviation Directive is not simply an attempt to highlight a growing global
problem or regulate a specific market activity. It is rather an attempt at behavior
modification par excellence; 276 a behavior modification exercise in which the EU
extends its municipal authority beyond the notion of the state to a virtual world of
substantially connected behavior in an attempt to alter global conduct by
individuals and companies,277 while protecting its domestic interests from the
adverse consequences of its own policy choices. Transnational certification
regimes can serve a similar purpose.278 The Aviation Directive seeks to achieve
the dual goals of attacking climate change and protecting domestic economic
interests by incentivizing alternative behavior making existing behavior more
expensive to continue while capitalizing on the effort. 279 If airlines must buy
carbon credits and the cost of carbon increases, passengers are more likely to
demand greater efficiency and innovation in the delivery of aviation services if for
no other reason than to reduce associated expenses. And, if the EU is ahead of the
271. See, e.g., Marine Mammals Protection Act, supra note 9, § 111(c).
272. See e.g., R v. Re the MARITIM Trade Mark, [2003] I.L. Pr. 17, 297 (Hamburg Dist. Ct.)
(Ger.) (holding that under German law, a tort occurs any place where the internet domain can be called
up regardless of the physical location of the domain).
273. See e.g., Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 16.
274. See, e.g., Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/PO20071012533593
599575.pdf (declaring law shall apply extraterritorially based on effects); The U.K. Bribery Act 2010,
2010 c. 23 (2010) (extending UK bribery law to third counties).
275. See e.g., The Implementing Recommendations, supra note 255 (requiring 100 percent cargo
scanning in foreign ports). One additional area of emerging concern regards income taxation. With the
globalization of capital, investments and profits, the sources of income for taxation purposes diversify.
See Nolan Cormac Sharkey, International Tax as International Law and the Impact of China, 3 BRIT.

TAX REV. 269, 270 (2012).
276. According to the ICAO, "[t]he airlines of ... 191 Member States carried approximately 2.7
billion passengers in 2011, showing an increase of about 5.6 per cent over 2010. The number of
departures on scheduled services reached 30.1 million globally in 2011 compared to 29 million in
2010." Int'l Civil Aviation

Org., Annual Report of the Council

1 (2011), available at

http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9975_en.pdf. See also Aviation Directive, supra note 2,
15 ("Aircraft operators have the most direct control over the type of aircraft in operation and the way in
which they are flown.. . .").
277. Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 1 147.
278. Cf Kristin L. Stewart, Dolphin-Safe Tuna: The Tide is Changing, 4 ANIMAL L. 111, 118

(1998) (discussing the "Dolphin-Safe Tuna" certification).
279. See, e.g., Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 140 ("In particular, by allowing the allowances
... to be sold, the scheme is intended to encourage every participant in the scheme to emit quantities of
greenhouse gases that are less than the allowances originally allocated to him.").
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pack in altering its behavior and transforming its economy, better for its citizens
and its future economic prospects.
The unilateral application of the Aviation Directive, therefore, targets a broad
swath of persons by penalizing existing behavior and incentivizing alternative
behavior. By extending the ETS to global aviation, the EU effectively seeks to
drive-up the financial costs of current global carbon generating behavior (not by
aircraft but by people); encourage other states to take climate change more
seriously; establish its carbon trading market as a central tool in global emissions
reduction efforts; meet its international climate change obligations by globalizing
those obligations; and protect its own internal markets from the potentially
distorting effects of its climate change policies while simultaneously encouraging
innovation. Aircraft are not merely static objects of metal, plastic and rubber.
They exist for a functional purpose and that is to transport people and goods.
The Aviation Directive's individual behavior-focused approach to addressing
global climate change, as distinguished from a formal state-to-state focused
approach typically associated with multilateralism, has two advantages: (1) it
bypasses external political barriers, such as the inconvenience of multilateral
agreements or intransigence of other states; and (2) it enables the EU to protect its
own domestic policies and objectives. 280 It also has the potential of sparking a
significant trade war in response to a perception of EU overreach, thus
encouraging other states to take equally broad unilateral actions in other areas of
transnational concern.
IV. CONCLUSION

Throughout history influential states have sought to shape global relations and
global behavior beyond their immediate borders often through conquest and
colonization. In more recent years, law has become an important tool in achieving
political and economic objectives, and protecting domestic interests from global
forces. The Aviation Directive evidences that while many global problems need
multilateral solutions, those same problems can incentivize states to act unilaterally
by extending their municipal laws into the virtual spaces of transnational conduct
created by globalization. 281 Yet the EU's unilateral efforts at addressing climate
change and other environment concerns do more than demonstrate developments
and paradoxes within the field of international law. It demonstrates three
important points about the globe's legal order. First, the extension of the ETS to
global aviation demonstrates that notwithstanding efforts by Western states over
280. Danielle Goodwin, Aviation, Climate Change and the European Union's Emissions Trading
Scheme, 6 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 742, 744, 748 (2008); Mark Stallworthy, New Forms of Carbon
Accounting: The Significance of a Climate Change Act for Economic Activity in the United Kingdom,
18 INT'L CO. & COMM. L. REV. 331, 331 (2007). See also Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 15 (noting
air carriers "have the most direct control over the type of aircraft in operation and the way in which they

are flown.").
281. See, e.g., Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 16 ("In order to avoid distortions of competition
and improve environmental effectiveness, emissions from all flights arriving at and departing from
Community aerodromes should be included from 2012."). See also sources cited, supranote 9.
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the last sixty years to promote multilateralism as the favored tool for solving global
problems, these same states can still be driven by domestic concerns to act
unilaterally when it suits them, given their vast reserves of political, economic and
cultural power. As non-economic matters such as climate change, national
security, and transnational crime emerge on the same plane as economics they
become powerful incentives for unilateralism and extraterritoriality. In short,
when multilateralism fails, the world's most powerful states are not rendered
powerless in shaping global behavior.
Second, the Aviation Directive demonstrates that in a world defined by
substantial connectedness, influential states have the power to shape global
behavior by regulating individual conduct regardless of where a person or entity
may be physically located on the planet. The Aviation Directive is not simply
about regulating economic activity. It is fundamentally about reshaping global
behavior by using municipal laws to incentivize behavior change across the world.
Aircraft operators have the most direct control over the type of aircraft
in operation and the way in which they are flown and should therefore
be responsible for complying with the obligations imposed by this
Directive, including the obligation to prepare a monitoring plan and ...
to report emissions in accordance with that plan. 282
Global interdependencies will demand greater multilateral cooperation and yet
encourage states to use extraterritorial legal powers to regulate individual behavior
elsewhere regardless of the limitations imposed by conventional notions of the
state.283 The idea of the "virtual individual" subject to the virtual regulatory power
of states is replacing the idea that an individual is tied to a time and place in order
to define the limit of state authority. 284
Finally, the Aviation Directive points to the fact that notwithstanding a desire
to define the normative parameters of public international law-always a
questionably successful exercise-globalization is not only contributing to subject
matter fragmentation, but more importantly, source fragmentation.285 What is to
be made of the Aviation Directive, the Dodd-Frank Act, or India's amended
Competition Law on the spectrum of law? Are they examples of purely municipal
law? Are they examples of a new form of international law? Are they hybrids of

282. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 15.
283. But see Wheatley, supranote 233.
284. Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International
Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT'L ECON L. 1037, 1038 (2010).
285. See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez & Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-And Back Again:
The Fate of the Multilateral TradingRegime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 102 (2002). See Michael S. Barr &
Geoffrey Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 17 (2006)
(critiquing lawmaking by networks of bank regulators and international bureaucrats in the Basel Accord
as lacking accountability and legitimacy, but arguing that Basel II is subject to a subtle structure of
international administrative law). See also Meredith Crowley & Robert Howse, US-Stainless Steel
(Mexico), 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 117, 148 (2010); Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many Use: Standards and
Global Regulation, 18 GOVERNANCE 611, 612 (2005); Andrea Hamann & H616ne Ruiz Fabri,
TransnationalNetworks and Constitutionalism,6 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 481, 48 1-82 (2008).
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both? While these examples are arguably not "international law" in the strictest,
most conventional sense of that term, each is nevertheless designed to shape
international behavior, to redefine the relationship of the individual to the state,
and to project a municipal regulatory system across the globe. Thus, in spite of
efforts over the last sixty years to transform international law from a coordinating
exercise into a cooperation exercise, it is still the product of a segmented society.
It is defined by the will of each segment to cooperate and capability of its more
influential segments to "go it alone" when cooperation fails. To ignore this fact is
to ignore one of the most important and understudied developments in
international law: the power of some states to rebuff multilateralism when
unilateralism provides a more effective and expedient approach to transnational
problem-solving. As transnational problems grow in breadth, number, and speed
of effect, the incentive for some states to shape global behavior-and therefore
international law through the unilateral use of municipal law-will be an attractive
alternative to multilateralism, claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

